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I, Daniel J. English, Clerk of District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, in and for the County of Kootenai, do hereby certify that I have personally served or 
mailed, by United State mail, one copy of the Clerk's Record and the Reporters Transcript to each 
of the Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows: 
John F. Magnuson 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 2350 
1250 Northwood Center Court Suite A 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
Patrick M. Braden, Deputy Attorney 
Kootenai County Legal Services 
P.O. Box 9000 
451 Government Way 
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cia' District Court - Kootenai 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2009-0002S16 Current Judge: John T. Mitchell 
Douglas Stafford, eta/. vs. Kootenai County, eta/. 
User: HARWOOD 
Douglas Stafford, Michelle Stafford vs. Kootenai County, Kootenai County Board of Commissioners, Elmer R (Rick) 
Currie, Rich Piazza, Todd Tondee 
Date Code User Judge 
3/27/2009 NCOC VICTORIN New Case Filed - Other Claims John T. Mitchell 
VICTORIN Filing: R2 Appeal or petiton for judical review, or John T. Mitchell 
cross-appeal or cross-petition, from Commission 
Boardl or body to the District Court Paid by: 
John Magnuson Receipt number: 0841126 
Dated: 3/27/2009 Amount: $88.00 (Check) For: 
3/31/2009 SUMI MCCORD NO Summons Issued John T. Mitchell 
4/27/2009 PETN LEU First Amended Petition For Judicial Review John T. Mitchell 
5/22/2009 NOTC CRUMPACKER Notice of Estimate of Cost for Preparation of John T. Mitchell 
Transcript & Agency Record 
5/26/2009 NOTC HUFFMAN Notice of Estimate of Cost for Preparation of John T. Mitchell 
Transcript & Agency Record 
6/16/2009 AFFD HUFFMAN Affidavit of Sandi Gilbertson in Support of Motion John T. Mitchell 
for Conditional Order of Dismissal 
MOTN HUFFMAN Motion for Conditional Order of Dismissal John T. Mitchell 
6/18/2009 NOTC HUFFMAN Notice of Withdrawal of Motion for Conditional John T. Mitchell 
Order of Dismissal 
7/212009 NOTC CRUMPACKER Notice of Lodging of Transcript & Agency Record John T. Mitchell 
7/17/2009 NOTC BAXLEY Notice Of Settlement And Filing Of Transcript John T. Mitchell 
And Agency Record 
8/3/2009 HRSC CLAUSEN Hearing Scheduled (Oral Argument on Appeal John T. Mitchell 
11/24/200904:00 PM) 
ORDR CLAUSEN Order for Hearing and Setting of Briefing John T. Mitchell 
Schedule on Administrative Appeal 
9/1712009 BRIE BAXLEY Plaintiffs' 1 Petitioners' Opening Brief On Appeal John T. Mitchell 
9/21/2009 FILE HARPER *************File No.2 Created - Expando******** John T. Mitchell 
FILE HARPER *************File NO.3 Created - Expando******* John T. Mitchell 
FILE HARPER ***********File No.4 Created - Expando******* John T. Mitchell 
10/9/2009 BRFR BAXLEY Brief Of Respondent John T. Mitchell 
11/19/2009 BRIE VICTORIN Plaintiffs'IPetitioners' Reply Brief on Appeal John T. Mitchell 
11/24/2009 DCHH CLAUSEN Hearing result for Oral Argument on Appeal held John T. Mitchell 
on 11/24/2009 04:00 PM: District Court Hearing 
Held 
Court Reporter: Carrie Veare 
12/212009 ORDR CLAUSEN Memorandum Decision and Order on Appeal - John T. Mitchell 
Affirming Decisions 
12/3/2009 STAT CLAUSEN Case status changed: closed John T. Mitchell 
1113/2010 SHEDLOCK Filing: L4 - Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal John T. Mitchell 
to Supreme Court Paid by: Magnuson, John F. 
(attorney for Stafford, Douglas) Receipt number: 
0001602 Dated: 1/13/2010 Amount: $101.00 
(Check) For: Stafford, Douglas (plaintiff) and 
Stafford, Michelle (plaintiff) 
004 
Date: 2/9/2010 
Time: 03:36 PM 
Page 2 of2 
F District Court - Kootenai User: HARWOOD 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2009-0002516 Current Judge: John T. Mitchell 
Douglas Stafford, etal. vs. Kootenai County, etal. 
Douglas Stafford, Michelle Stafford vs. Kootenai County, Kootenai County Board of Commissioners, Elmer R (Rick) 
Currie. Rich Piazza, Todd Tondee 
Date Code User Judge 
1/13/2010 BNDC SHEDLOCK Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 1603 Dated John T. Mitchell 
1/13/2010 for 100.00) 
STAT SHEDLOCK Case status changed: Closed pending clerk John T. Mitchell 
action 
FILE SHEDLOCK New File Created *****File #5***** John T. Mitchell 
NOTC SHEDLOCK Notice Of Appeal John T. Mitchell 
1/14/2010 CERT SHEDLOCK Clerk's Certificate Of Appeal John T. Mitchell 
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JOf-IN F. MAGNUSON 
Attotneyat Law 
P.O. B(JX 2350 
J 250 Northwood Center Court, Suite A 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
Phone: (208) 667-0100 
Fax: (208) 667-0500 
ISB #4270 
)\)0 
SUMMONS ISSUED 
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Petitioners MAR g 7 2UUB 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
DOUGLAS AND MICHELLE 
STAFFORD, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs/Petitioners, 
vs. 
KOOTENAI COUNTY, a Political 
Subdivision of the State of Idaho, acting 
through the KOOTENAI BOARD OF 
COMMISSIONERS; and ELMER R. 
"RICK" CURRIE, RICH PIAZZA, and 
TODD TONDEE, COMMISSIONERS, in 
their official capacities, 
Defendants/Respondents. 
CASE NO.: \N a~- :251 \a 
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW 
FEE CATEGORY: R.2 
FEE: $88.00 
COME NO W the Plaintiffs/Petitioners named above, Douglas and Michelle Stafford, by and 
through their attorney of record, Jolm F. Magnuson, by way of this "Petition for Judicial Review" 
against the Defendants/Respondents named above, and aver and allege as set forth herein. 
Petitioners appeal pursuant to the Local Land Use Plalming Act, I.e. §67-6501, et. seq., including 
but not limited to I. C. §67-6521. Petitioners further appeal pursuant to the Idaho Administrative 
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW - PAGE I 
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. ASSIGNED f0. 
JUDGE f\t1JTCl-IELL 
Procedure Act, I.C. §67-520 1, et. seq., including but not limited to I.c. §67-S270. This appeal is also 
made pursuant to I.R.C.P. 84. 
I. PARTIES. 
1. Plaintiffs/Petitioners Douglas and Michelle Stafford are the owners of certain real 
property located in unincorporated Kootenai County. Said property is identified as Kootenai County 
Parcel No. 0-14S0-001-01S-A, Lots IS and 16, Block 1, Coeur d'Alene Lake Estates (amended). 
Said property consists of littoral property on Lake Coeur d'Alene. Plaintiffs/Petitioners are 
collectively referred to herein as "Stafford." 
2. Defendant/Respondent Kootenai County is a political subdivision of the State of 
Idaho acting by and through Defendants/Respondents CUlTie, Piazza, and Tondee (all members of 
the Kootenai County Board of Commissioners). Defendant/Respondent is referred to herein as 
"Kootenai County." 
II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE. 
3. This Petition for review is filed pursuant to the Local Land Use Planning Act, I.e. 
§67-6501, et. seq., including but not limited to I.C. §67-6521, as well as the Idaho Administrative 
Procedure Act, I.c. §67-520 1, including but not limited to I.C. §67-S270. Jurisdiction and venue 
are proper pursuant to Idaho Law, including the foregoing authorities as well as I.R.c.P. 84. 
III. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 
4. In July of 1999, Stafford submitted a site plan in conjunction with site improvements 
and the construction of a home on the Stafford property. The property had previously been disturbed 
through third-patiy logging operations and development, including activities within twenty-five (2S) 
feet of the ordinary high watermark (OHWM) of Lake Coeur d' Alene (elevation 2128 (WWP 
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW - PAGE 2 
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datum)). 
5. The site disturbance permit was issued in conjunction with the site plan submitted 
in July of 1999. Construction thereafter progressed. In March 2000, a Certificate of Occupancy was 
issued to Stafford. 
6. At the time Stafford submitted the July 1999 site plan, and the County thereafter 
issued the requisite site disturbance permit, the County's Site Disturbance Ordinance was 
denominated Ordinance 251. 
7. In the spring of 2001, Stafford personally made inquiry of the Kootenai County 
Planning Department regarding his ability to vegetate within the twenty-five (25) foot setback zone 
from the OHWM. He was advised that "re-greening" was not a problem. He was fmiher advised 
that "re-:greening" would not require any permit or approval from Kootenai County. 
9. At the time Stafford purchased the property, the twenty-five (25) foot setback zone 
from the OHWM, as described above, included native sands and basalt rock. The same is true both 
then and today with respect to adjacent property located below the OHWM of2128. 
10. Following Stafford's contact with the Kootenai County Planning Department, in 
2001, Stafford placed natural basalt rocks near the shore as a natural bulkhead. The rocks are 
indigenous to the area. 
II. At the same time, Stafford also replaced some naturally occurring sand that had been 
dissipated by boat wakes and prior 100 year flooding incidents in 1996 and 1997. 
12. At about the same time, Stafford also placed some grass outside and inside the 
twenty-five (25) foot setback zone, and area that had previously been occupied by both native grasses 
and noxious weeds. 
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW - PAGE 3 
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13. Stafford made no effort to hide any of these "improvements," the same being 
implicitly if not explicitly condoned or approved by Kootenai County. 
14. During the intervening five (5) years following installation of the improvements, 
Kootenai County took numerous pictures of the Stafford property, pictures that it retained in its 
actual possession. Kootenai County took no enforcement action of any kind or nature during this 
five-year period. 
15. In 2005, the Staffords submitted a second site plan. At that time, Stafford intended 
to construct an addition to the home first constructed under the July 1999 permit. 
16. The site plan depicted a barbecue pit, showing the same to traverse the actual twenty-
five (25) foot setback line. Kootenai County reviewed the plan, signed off on the plan, and approved 
the same. 
17. In conjunction with the site improvements sought in 2005, Kootenai County 
inspected the Stafford property. No objections were raised by Kootenai County as to any conditions 
extant on the Stafford property. 
18. The Staffords undertook construction as authorized by the 2005 permit so as to add 
an addition to their home. Throughout the construction process, numerous inspections were 
undertaken by various agents of Kootenai County. Those agents either viewed, or had the 
opportunity to view, any improvements previously made by the Staffords within said twenty-five 
(25) foot setback zone. No objections were raised. 
19. In August of 2007, the Staffords called for a final inspection in order to obtain their 
Certificate of Occupancy. The framing inspector advised them that they would not obtain a 
Certificate of Occupancy due to alleged site disturbance violations. 
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW - PAGE 4 
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20. The Staffords immediately initiated contact with Kootenai County. The Staffords 
suggested that the parties resolve the issue before the impending holiday season of 2007. They 
received no response from Kootenai County. 
21. The Staffords renewed their suggestion that the parties attempt to resolve the issue 
prior to the holiday season of2007 so that they could get a Certificate of Occupancy. They received 
no response from Kootenai County. 
22. In January of 2008, Kootenai County made contact with the Staffords, having 
previously ignored their amicable efforts to meet and resolve the issue, and advised them that 
Kootenai County would refuse to issue the Staffords a Certificate of Occupancy for their addition 
based upon alleged violations (under the Site Disturbance Ordinance) that had absolutely nothing 
to do with the addition to the home. 
23. In order to placate Kootenai County, the Staffords submitted a proposed site 
remediation plan. The site remediation plan recommended leaving the basalt boulders and sand in 
place as the removal of the same would cause a larger disturbance than simply leaving them as is. 
Kootenai County refused to accept the site remediation plan. 
24. Kootenai County cited the Staffords with a violation of Kootenai County Ordinance 
No. 374. The Staffords timely appealed the same to Kootenai County. 
25. The Staffords' appealed the referenced "Notice of Violation," dated August 29, 2007 
and issued specifically under and limited by Ordinance No. 374 (was rejected) by the Kootenai 
County Planning Depal1ment. 
26. The subsequent appeal was had from the Planning DepaI1ment' s decision to a Hearing 
Officer appointed by Kootenai County (Lisa Keys). Following the hearing, Hearing Examiner Keys 
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW -PAGE 5 
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denied the appeal. 
27. A final appeal was made to the Kootenai County Board of Commissioners. The 
Commissioners issued a final written decision, on March 19,2009, in the form attached hereto as 
Exhibit A. The Staffords now appeal from the decision of Kootenai County (Exhibit A) denying 
their appeal from an alleged violation of Ordinance No. 374. 
IV. LEGAL BASES FOR APPEAL. 
28. Ordinance No. 374 was adopted effective December 12,2005. Ordinance No. 374 
"superceded" the County's prior Site Disturbance Ordinance (Ordinance No. 283). The Kootenai 
County Site Disturbance Ordinance before Ordinance No. 283 was Ordinance was No. 251. As of 
December 12,2005, all prior Site Disturbance Ordinances had been specifically "superceded" by 
Ordinance No. 374. 
29. The use of the word "supercede" is distinct from the use of the word "amend." 
"Supercede" means that the prior Site Disturbance Ordinances that pre-date Ordinance No. 374 no 
longer existed as of December 12,2005. Had the word "amend" been used, those Ordinances would 
have remained in effect save and except for the specific modifications accomplished by Ordinance 
No. 374. 
30. Without conceding the same, if there was a violation of Ordinance No. 251 or 283, 
as occasioned by the Staffords prior to December 12,2005, then those violations would have been 
conclusively "grandfathered" through the adoption of Ordinance No. 374. That is the legal effect 
of the use of the use "supercede." 
31. Kootenai County, through the decision attached hereto and the matters set forth on 
the record, held that the Staffords' argument regarding the specific use of the word "supercede" did 
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110t matter in that the conduct claim to be violative of Kootenai County's Site Disturbance Ordinance 
would have been actionable under Ordinance Nos. 251 or 283. Not only were these Ordinances not 
in effect at the time the Staffords were cited, the Staffords were not charged, and have not been 
charged, with violations of the same. The only alleged violation at issue in the proceedings below, 
and on appeal, is under Ordinance No. 374. 
32. By deciding as it did, Kootenai County has violated the substantive and procedural 
rights of due process of Stafford, as secured by the U.S. and Idaho Constitutions. In essence, 
Kootenai County has held Stafford in violation of an Ordinance under which Stafford was never 
charged and which is no longer in effect. 
33. Additionally, the violations noticed by Kootenai County do not constitute "significant 
adverse effects" encompassed by Ordinance No. 374 even ifthe same is retroactively applicable to 
the conditions under consideration. 
34. Additionally, the "natural vegetation buffer" of the Stafford property was disturbed 
prior to adoption of the Site Disturbance Ordinance (Ordinance No. 374) and prior to the Staffords' 
actions that form the basis for the alleged violation. 
35. Additionally, Ordinance No. 374 does not apply to the subject facts based upon the 
clear language set forth in Sections 15 and 16 thereof. 
36. Additionally, the County has waived any right to claim a violation of Ordinance No. 
374 based upon its explicit approvals of actions undertaken by and at the County's direction and with 
the County's approval. 
37. Additionally, the County is estopped to claim any violation of Ordinance No. 374 
based upon the facts of this case. 
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38. The charged violations asserted by Kootenai County are barred by all Statutes of 
Limitation that apply to Kootenai County Ordinance No. 374, as well as its predecessor Ordinances 
(Nos. 251 and 283). 
V. PETITION FOR REVIEW 
39. Stafford incorporates herein as though set forth in full all allegations contained in 
Paragraphs 1 through 38 above. 
40. Under the cited provisions of the Local Land Use Planning Act, I.e. §67-6501, et. 
seq., and the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act, I.e. §67-5201, et. seq. The Staffords have the 
right to seek judicial review. 
41. The County's "Order of Decision" (Exhibit A hereto), finding Stafford in violation 
of Kootenai Ordinance No.3 74, is contrary to law for each of the following non-exhaustive reasons: 
(1) The Board's decision was not supported by substantial evidence on 
the record as a whole; 
(2) The Board's decision was arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of 
discretion; 
(3) The Board's decision was contrary to law; and 
(4) The Board's decision violated the due process protections afforded 
Stafford under the due process clauses of the U.S. and Idaho 
Constitutions. Additionally, the Board's decision violates the Equal 
Protection Clause in that Ordinance No. 374 has been disparately and 
unequally enforced against the Staffords as contrasted with other 
littoral property owners 011 Lake Coeur d' Alene. 
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42. The Board's Order of Decision must be set aside and remanded with instructions to 
dismiss the cited "Notice of Violation" for the reasons set forth herein. 
43. The Board's Order of Decision must be set aside and remanded with instructions to 
dismiss the same, or for other consistent proceedings, given the facts alleged herein. 
44. Kootenai County has acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law, sUbjecting itself 
to an award ofthe Staffords' reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred under the authority of I.C. 
§§12-117 and 12-121. 
VI. PRAYER FOR RELIEF. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs/Petitioners Stafford pray for relief as follows: 
(l) For entry of relief vacating Kootenai County's Order of Decision (Exhibit A), and 
remanding this matter with instructions to dismiss the charged "Notice of Violation"; 
(2) For an award of reasonable attorney fees and costs as incUlTed herein and as provided 
by Idaho Law, including but not limited to I.e. §§12-117 and 12-121; and 
(3) For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and equitable. 
DATED this Zf:; of March, 2009. 
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Petitione s Staffordd 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that a true and correct copy of the fOret~ document was served upon the 
following by regular U.S. mail addressed as follows, this ay of March, 2009: 
John A. Cafferty, Deputy Attorney 
Kootenai County Dept. of Legal Services 
451 Government Way 
P.O. Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-9000 
Patrick M. Braden, Deputy Attorney 
Kootenai County Dept. of Legal Services 
45 I Government Way 
P.O. Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-9000 
STAFFORD PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW.wpd 
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BEFORE THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF KOOTENAI COUNTY, IDAHO 
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPEAL 
OF DOUGLAS STAFFORD, 
REGARDING AN ADMINISTRATIVE 
DECISION OF KOOTENAI COUNTY 
SITE DISTURBANCE ORDINANCE 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
CASE NO. APP08-0002 
(Pertaining to Case No. CV07-0092) 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
ORDER OF DECISION 
J BA CKGROUND AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
1.0 I The site which is the subject of this appeal and of the underlying code violation proceedings, Case 
No. CV07-0092 ("the subject property") is owned by Dr. and Mrs. Douglas Stafford ("Appellants") 
and is located at 2707 E. Mockingbird Loop, Harrison, Idaho 83833, Parcel Number 0-1450-001-
o IS-A, Lots 15 and 16 Block t, Cd' A Lake Estates (Amended). 
1.02 On August 29, 2007, the Kootenai County Building and Planning Department issued a Notice of 
Violation of Site Disturbance Ordinance #374 for a disturbance in the twenty-five foot (25 ') 
undisturbed natural vegetation buffer (hereinafter referred to as "the no-disturbance zone"). (Exhibit 
S-1, Notice) 
1.03 On September 6, 2007, an inspection was performed and attended by then-County employees 
Stephanie Blalack and Sandy Young, landowner Michelle Stafford and representatives from Aspen 
Homes, Steve Swaim and Joe Coulter. At that time Ms. Blalack and Ms. Young were informed by 
Mrs. Stafford that the boulders, sand and lawn had recently been placed within the no-disturbance 
zone, which immediately prompted discussions regarding the necessary actions for remediation and 
compliance. As a result, verbal agreement was reached that a remediation plan would be 
forthcoming for this site. 
1.04 On November 9, 2007, the County received a letter from the Stafford's remediation design 
professional, Todd Walker of CDF Landscape, in reference to his site visit on September 20, 2007, 
which clarified the need of the remediation to comply with the Site Disturbance Ordinance. (Exhibit 
A-12, Letter) 
1.05 On November 21,2007, the Director received a letter from the Staffords' attorney, John Magnuson, 
suggesting the violation is unmerited and unnecessary. (Exhibit A-13a, Letter) 
1.06 On January 15, 2008, the Director provided a responsive letter outlining the historical details of the 
various permits, which did not include materials substantiating any allowance or approval for 
disturbance within the no-disturbance zone. Moreover, an offer was extended to the Staffords to 
provide any additional materials they felt would assist in our review of the Code Violation. No 
substantive materials were provided. (Exhibit S-16, Letter) 
1.07 On January 23, 2008, the Director received a letter from Mr. Magnuson advising that the remediation 
plan would be submitted that day. (Exhibit A-18, Letter) 
J .08 On January 23, 2008, the remediation plan was submitted. However, upon review the submission 
was found to be incomplete. As such, Stephanie Blalack returned an e-mail on January 23 rd with a 
list of clarifications and additional information needed for the remediation plan to proceed. As of the 
date of this report, the remediation plan is yet incomplete. (Exhibit S-19, Email) 
0'16 
EXHIBIT A 
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1.09 On March 3, 2008, the Director received a letter from Mr. Magnuson responding to the January IS, 
2008 letter from the Director disputing the need for a site disturbance remediation plan. No 
substantive materials were provided. (Exhibit A-23, Letter) 
I. lOOn March 19, 2008, a Notice of Site Disturbance Ordinance Violation letter was mailed, which 
provided 30 days to appeal and 45 days to resolve the violation. (Exhibit 8-27, Notice) 
I. I I On March 21, 2008, Mr.Magnuson submitted a letter as a Notice to Appeal on behalf of Dr. and 
Mrs. Douglas Stafford with respect to the referenced Notice of Violation. (Exhibit A-2B, Letter) 
1.12 Pursuant to the Department's offer to meet and resolve the issue prior to conducting the appeal, a 
meeting was held on April 9,2008 with Mrs. Stafford, Mr. Magnuson, Director Scott Clark and Staff 
to discuss the code violation. Based on staff's understanding that the Staffords had agreed to work 
with their landscape architect to bring the site into compliance, it is unclear why the appeal process 
has continued. 
1.13 In a letter dated May 9,2008, Mr. Magnuson requested that the County proceed with the appeal. 
J • 14 Staff received a telephone call and a letter from Mr. Magnuson during the afternoon of August 18, 
2008. Mr. Magnuson stated there was no possibility he would be able to attend the hearing 
scheduled for August 2 I, 2008 as he would be in Boise and could not get back in time for the 6:00 
p.m. hearing. Mr. Magnuson later rescinded his request for rescheduling when he was informed of 
the necessary rescheduling fee. Nevertheless, County staff pulled the Hearing Examiner packet was 
pulled from the August 18th afternoon mail and rescheduled the hearing. (Exhibits A-43 and S-52, 
Letters) 
1.15 A letter dated August 27, 2008, to Mr. Magnuson clarified the basis for canceling the hearing, 
proceeding with rescheduling and charging the appropriate fees. (Exhibit 8-49, Letter) 
1.16 Notice of the hearing on appeal was published in the Coeur d'Alene Press on September 3,2008. 
I. I 7 On October 2, 2008, a hearing was held before the Kootenai County Hearing Examiner. Roxy Webb 
presented the County's position. She testified that the Appellants were cited for site disturbance 
ordinance violations in August, 2007, based upon installation of a lawn, landscaping, a water feature, 
sand and boulders in the 25 foot no disturbance zone. Based upon dated assessors photos, she stated 
that staff had determined that the improvements had been installed after the 2000 permit. She 
showed assessors photos dated July, 200 1, showing work be done in the 25 foot no disturbance zone, 
in violation of the conditions of the 2000 building permit (which she stated were based upon 
Ordinance 25 I). She testified that since the beginning of development of this project, the site 
disturbance zone ordinance has not changed, and that waterfront properties are required to maintain a 
no disturbance zone 25 feet from the ordinary high water mark, which is at an elevation of 2125.0 
feet above sea level for Lake Coeur d' Alene. She noted that those areas must be maintained in a 
natural vegetative state, with no logging, construction, utility trenches, roads, structures, or surface or 
storm water facilities, excepting one stairway, walkway or tram of a specified width. She testified 
that according to staff notes in the Departmental records; Ms. Stafford had indicated to both Ms. 
Blalack and Ms. Young that grass, sand and boulders had recently been placed on the site when the 
two staff members were conducting a site visit. She submitted into the record a Section R I 05.4 of 
the International Residential Building Code, which states "The issuance or granting of a permit shall 
not be construed to be a permit for, or an approval of any violation of any provisions of this code or 
any other ordinance of the jurisdiction." It also states "The building official is also authorized to 
prevent occupancy or use of a structure where in violation of this code or of any other ordinances of 
this jurisdiction. .. (Exhibit HE-lOOO, International Residential Building Code) 
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Mr. Magnuson, Appellants' representative, testified that natural rocks and sand placed to supplement 
that which already existed on site would have no adverse impact to the natural environment. He 
noted that the County base site plan map shows the 25' no disturbance line running right through the 
existing BBQ pit, which was approved in 2005. He also noted that the silt fence shown in photo 6, 
dated August 28, 2008, was installed and inspected prior to work commencing on the addition. He 
testified- that the Stafford's had submitted a remediation plan (Exhibit A-12) on January 23, 2008, 
after not hearing from the County "for months." 
When questioned about the meeting in April of 2008, Mr. Magnuson stated that considerable 
information had been discussed regarding additional remediation, beyond what had been proposed in 
their plan. 
Mr. Magnuson argued that Section 15 of Ordinance 374 states that the subject ordinance 
"supercedes" all prior ordinances, stating that Webster's dictionary defines the term as "causing to be 
set aside and rendered useless, void." Section 16 of Ordinance 374, established the effective date as 
December 12,2008. On this basis, he argued that if the prior ordinance was rendered null and void, 
and the new ordinance did not take effect until a date certain, all violations prior to the effective date 
of the new ordinance were essentially "grandfathered." 
He also argued that sand and basalt boulders were not explicitly prohibited by the ordinance, and that 
the general purpose of the ordinance was specifically to protect against adverse effects. He noted 
that the definition implied that man-made activities/materials were prohibited. He argued that rocks 
and sand are natural materials that are appropriate. 
He also argued that a $240 "rescheduling fee" was improperly charged by the Building and Planning 
Department. He testified that the hearing was originally scheduled for late August, and that he 
contacted the Building and Planning Department on the Monday before the hearing, notifYing them 
of his inability to attend the hearing, and requesting that it be rescheduled. On Tuesday, he was 
faxed a letter from Building and Planning, stating the hearing would be rescheduled ifhe provided a 
check in the amount of $420 by 4 pm that same day (August 19th). He understood this to mean that 
the hearing would not be rescheduled if he was unwilling or unable to pay the fee by 4 pm that day. 
He testified that he e-mailed and faxed a letter to the Building and Planning Department on that same 
day (August 191h) refusing to pay the fee and rescinding the request to reschedule. He was told that 
the hearing had already been pulled from the agenda, and that a retraction could not be granted due 
to the newspaper deadline for public notice cancellation. 
Appellant Dr. Doug Stafford also testified. He stated that he and his wife had built the home, and 
had lived there since 2000. He noted that the waterfront area on this property was a "mess," that 
property had been logged and subdivided, and when they purchased the property, the waterfront was 
trash strewn and sported a 6' high slash pile; vegetation was sparse, and mostly consisted of noxious 
weeds - knapweed and thistle. He stated that in 200], he interviewed professional landscapers and 
discussed their plans; when he asked if the planned lawn and landscaping was allowed, the 
landscaper said he did this type of work all the time. He testified that he asked at the front desk of 
Building and Planning, and was told that grass and trees, and that it was never an issue to "re-green" 
a site. He also stated that the second photo, dated July 200, was labeled wrong, because the 
landscaping depicted in that picture was not completed until October of 2001. He also testified that 
the natural vegetation seen in the picture taken from shore in July, 2000 was still in place. He stated 
that they had not done any work since October of2001, and that while they have received a permit 
for an addition in 2007, and that did not address erosion control. He said that the statement that 
rocks and sand had recently been placed was simply not true, they had been installed in 200 I, though 
the grassy swale was installed as part of the 2007 improvements. He also stated that a good portion 
of the shoreline is still in a natural vegetative state. 
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In rebuttal, Roxy Webb simply referenced the Assessor's photos, which came from the assessors 
records, and that the dates were clearly identified in the e-mail included in the Hearing Examiner's 
packet. She also submitted into the record a letter dated September 27, 2008 providing an "event 
timeline" for the fee issue (Exhibit HE-t002). She also introduced into the record an area map, 
giving an overview of the area (Exhibit HE-t003). 
Scott Clark also provided rebuttal testimony. He stated that the definition of "Undisturbed Natural 
Vegetation Buffer" in both Ordinance 251 and 374 reads "An area where no development activity 
has occurred or will occur, including but not limited to , logging, construction oj utility trenches, 
roads. structures, or surface and stormwater facilities. Buffer areas shall be left in their natural 
state . .. 
He noted that in Exhibit C-2, the Appellants' depiction of the "no disturbance line" was actually the 
lake line, not the high water mark. He questioned the validity of Mr. Magnuson's definition of 
supercede, and also questioned how that would affect conditions of pre-existing permits. No other 
testimony was heard and the hearing was closed. -
1.18 An appeal hearing was held before the Kootenai County Board of Commissioners on February 12 
2009, at 10:00 a.m. Douglas and Michelle Stafford and their representative John Magnuson were 
present and testified. Their testimony at the hearing before the Board was consistent with their 
testimony before the Hearing Examiner, as summarized above. Bret Bowers and Greg Delevan also 
requested to testiry as individuals and as representatives of the Coeur d'Alene Lakeshore Owners 
Association. Although the Board provided each of them with the opportunity to demonstrate how 
they were affected by the issues raised in this appeal, the Board found that they did not meet the 
definition of "affected person" under Idaho Code § 67-6521 or of "affected party" under Section 9-
22-8 of the Zoning Ordinance, and they were therefore not allowed to testiry to the merits of the 
appeal. 
II FINDINGS OF FACT 
2.01 The original Building Permit, #30796, was issued on July 27,1999 on a 0.750 acre parcel. There 
was a financial guarantee for site disturbance activity in the amount of $2,700.00. The site plan 
submitted with the Application for permit #30796 shows 50' from the deck on the house to ordinary 
high water mark. Placement of the Grassy Infiltration Area (GIA) is specifically addressed as 
condition of that permit, which states: "Lake City Engineering need to move GIA out of 25 foot 
buffer zone." The single family residence for Building Permit #30796 was issued a Certificate of 
Occupancy on March 23, 2000 and the $2,700.00 financial guarantee was refunded on June 7,2000. 
(Exhibit 5-5, Permit) 
2.02 Site Disturbance Ordinance No. 251, Section 8(B) was in effect at the time the original single family 
residence building permit (#30796) was submitted and approved. Ordinance #251 required a 25' no 
disturbance buffer from the ordinary high water mark. (Exhibit 5-6, Ordinance 251) 
2.03 Permit #40613, which was for an addition/alteration to the previously approved single family 
residence, was issued July 25, 2006. The site plan submitted with the application and the engineered 
Site Disturbance Plan both show 50' setback from ordinary high water mark (OHWM) with no plans 
shown for any development or activity within the no-disturbance zone. (Exhibit 5-7, Permit) 
2.04 Site Disturbance Ordinance No. 374, Section 8(B) was in effect at the time the second building 
permit, #40613 was issued. Ordinance No. 374 still required a 25' no disturbance buffer from the 
ordinary high water mark. (Exhibit 8-8, Ordinance 374) 
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Ord.ei of Decision Appeal - Case No. APP08-0002 Page 5 of9 
2.05 During the recent investigation of Code Violation CV07-0092, it has been discovered through review 
of Assessor photography that four months after the certificate of occupancy (CO) and the release of 
the site disturbance bond on permit #30796, the site clearly reveals natural vegetation still existing 
within the no-disturbance zone, which appears consistent with County approvals and the application 
materials provided by the applicant to that date. (Exhibit 8-3a, Photograph) 
2.06 Site inspection photographs dated August 28, 2007 and August 29, 2007 show un-permitted 
waterfall, manicured lavin, bulkhead, swales and sand within the no-disturbance zone. (Exhibit 8-4, 
Photographs) 
2.07 The July 11, 2001 Assessor photographs reveals site disturbance work within the no-disturbance 
zone without the benefit of submission of new application materials. (Exhibit S-3b, Photograph) 
2.08 Assessor pictures dated July 17, 2002 show both manicured lawn and the installation of a rock 
bulkhead within the no-disturbance zone, which is inconsistent with both of the applicable County 
Site Disturbance Ordinances, as well as the site plans submitted and approved for permits #30796 
and #40613. (Exhibits 8-3c, d, e, f, Photographs) 
2.09 The photographic evidence provided during the course of this violation along with testimony and 
research by staff, clearly show that there is a violation of the site disturbance ordinance. 
III APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS 
3.01 Kootenai County Site Disturbance Ordinance No. 374, adopted December 12,2005, codified at Title 
11, Chapter 2, Kootenai County Code 
Site Disturbance Ordinance No. 251, adopted January I, 1997 
Site Disturbance Ordinance No. 283, adopted July 26, 1999. 
The following language pertaining to this violation is contained in the current Site Disturbance 
Ordinance, Ordinance No. 374, and is unchanged from that contained in the previous Site 
Disturbance Ordinances, Ordinance No. 251 and Ordinance No. 283: 
Section 4: 
Undisturbed Natural Vegetation Buffer - An area where no development activity has occurred or 
will occur, including, but not limited to, logging, construction of utility trenches, roads, structures, 
or surface and stormwater facilities. Buffer areas shall be left in their natural state. 
Section 8(B): 
Waterfront Lots:For lots with frontage on a recognized lake or the Coeur d'Alene or Spokane Rivers, 
an undisturbed natural vegetation buffer shall be retained at the waterfront. A stairway or walkway 
(which does not exceed 4 feet in width), stairway landings (which do not exceed 6 feet in width or 
length). or a tram shall be allowed io encroach within the buffer. The buffer shall be a minimum of 
25 feet in slope distance from the high water mark of the water body. For purposes of this 
Ordinance. high water marks shall be considered to be the follOWing elevations: 
Coeur d'Alene Lake 2125.0 (N.G. V.D. 1929 datum) 
020 
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3.02 Building and Planning Department Fee Schedule per Resolution No. 2006-111; Appeal of 
Administrative Detennination, Rescheduling Hearing 
Reschedule Hearing 
Public Notice 
$200.00 
$ 40.00 
IV HEARING EXAMINER ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS (from Hearing Examiner report) 
In the matter of the appeal of Douglas Stafford, regarding the issuance of code violation CV07-0092, a site 
disturbance code violation, Mr. Magnuson requests the estoppel of the notice of violation, as based upon the 
following: 
4.0 I Mr. Magnuson claims that the County has waived its right to claim a violation based upon their de 
facto prior approval of development in the no disturbance buffer. The evidence presented by 
theBuilding & Planning Department supports a finding that the vast majority of the violations 
occurred after the issuance of their 2000 building permit, and the release of the site disturbance 
surety in association with that permit. Granting of the 2007 building permit for the addition was 
irrelevant with respect to pre-existing violations, particularly in light of Section RI05.4 of the 
International Residential Building Code, which clearly states "The issuance or granting of a permit 
shall not be construed to be a permit for, or an approval of, any violation of any provisions of this 
code or any other ordinance of the jurisdiction. " 
4.02 Mr. Magnuson claims that Ordinance 374 does not apply to alleged violations under consideration, 
which occurred prior to the effective date of the ordinance of December 8, 2005, as based upon 
Section 15 of that ordinance, which states that the provisions of Ordinance 374 "shall supersede" the 
requirements of the prior Site Disturbance Ordinance No. 283. He argued that Webster's dictionary 
defines the "supersede" as "causing to be set aside and rendered useless, void." Section 16 of 
Ordinance 374, established the effective date as December 12, 2005. On this basis, he argued that if 
the prior ordinance was rendered null and void, and the new ordinance did not take effect until a date 
certain, all violations prior to the effective date of the new ordinance were essentially 
"grandfathered. " 
While Mr. Magnuson's definition of "supersede" is, in fact, one of the definitions listed in Webster's 
Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of the English Language, Portland House, New York, 1989, it 
also lists the definition as "to replace in power, authority, effectiveness, acceptance, use, etc., as by 
another person or thing." In the case of Ordinance 374 "superseding" prior Site Disturbance 
Ordinances that would generally and reasonably be interpreted to mean that Ordinance 374 
"replaced" prior Site Disturbance Ordinances in use after its effective date. Therefore, Mr. 
Magnuson's argument that Ordinance 374 rendered Ordinance 25 J null and void, thus 
grandfathering any pre-existing violations, appears to be without merit. 
4.03 Mr. Magnuson claims that the- alleged violations are otherwise unsupported in fact andlor in law. 
The argument that sand, basalt boulders, lawn and other "re-greening" were natural and allowed 
under the ordinance appears to have no merit, as the intent of "Undisturbed Natural Vegetation 
Buffer" in both Ordinance 251 and 374 is quite explicit in the definition, which appears in both 
ordinances: "An area where no development activity has occurred or will occur, including but not 
limited to, logging, construction of utility trenches, roads, structures, or surface and storm water 
facilities. Buffer areas shall be left in their natural state." Section 8 of both those ordinances, 
which addresses Disturbance Restrictions, is also quite explicit as to the location of the undisturbed 
natural vegetation buffer for waterfront properties, actually citing the high water mark from which 
this buffer distance shall be measured specifically for Lake Coeur d'Alene. Photos taken by the 
Assessor, as well as the Hearing Examiner's site visit, confirm that activities, landscaping, and 
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development not in conformance with the Site Disturbance Ordinance have, in fact, occurred within 
the required 25' Undisturbed Natural Vegetation Buffer. 
As a separate issue brought forward at the hearing, Mr. Magnuson sought a refund of a $240 rescheduling 
fee. 
4.04 Mr. Magnuson claims that the hearing originally scheduled for August 21, 2008 was effectively 
rescheduled by County staff, after he refused to pay the fee that was required by a date specific as a 
condition of his rescheduling. On this basis, he argues that the County lacked the authority to 
impose the $240 re-scheduling fee. The County clearly has the authority to charge a rescheduling 
fee for applicant-initiated re-scheduled hearings, as based on Resolution No. 2006-111. Based upon 
the record established by Mr. Magnuson through correspondence with Roxanne Webb, he contacted 
the Building & Planning Department on August 18,2008, prior to the scheduled hearing, requesting 
that the hearing be rescheduled. On August 19, 2008, he was faxed a letter from Building and 
Planning, stating the hearing would be rescheduled if he provided a check in the amount of $420 by 
4 pm that same day (August 19). He provided evidence that he in fact e-mailed and faxed a letter to 
the Building & Planning Department on August 19 refusing to pay the fee and rescinding the request 
to reschedule. He was then told that the hearing had already been pulled from the agenda, and that a 
retraction could not be granted due to the newspaper deadline for public notice cancellation. These 
facts were corroborated by Roxanne Webb's timeline (Exhibit HE-t002). As based upon the letter 
from Ms. Webb, faxed to Mr. Magnuson on August 19, Mr. Magnuson testified that he understood 
this to mean that the hearing would not be rescheduled if he was unwilling or unable to pay the fee 
by 4 pm that day. His response on August 19 clearly stated that he was "rescinding his request" to 
have the hearing rescheduled and that he was unwilling to pay the fee. The fact is that he responded 
within the deadline established by Ms. Webb and withdrew that request for re-scheduling. It appears 
that the County chose to go ahead with the rescheduling (regardless of the reason), and therefore, it 
appears unwarranted to charge the appelJant[s] the cost associated with the rescheduled hearing. 
V HEARING EXAMINER RECOMMENDATION (from Hearing Examiner report) 
5.01 In the case of APP08-002, an appeal by Douglas Stafford regarding the issuance of code violation 
CV07-0092, as based upon the Analysis and Findings set forth in this document, and the 
Appellant[s]' failure to present facts or evidence to support overturning the Director's notice of 
violation, the Appellant[ s'J request to estop the notice of violation CV07 -0092, and any enforcement 
actions undertaken pursuant thereto, is hereby DENIED. 
5.02 In regard to the imposition of the $240 re-scheduling, as based upon the findings and analysis 
contained herein, the Hearing Examiner hereby finds that $240 fee for re-scheduling was improperly 
levied against the AppelJant[s], and hereby recommends to the Kootenai County Board of 
Commissioners that the $240 fee be refunded. 
VI BOARD ANALYSIS 
6.01 At the appeal hearing, the Board received testimony and evidence from Mr. Magnuson, Dr. Stafford, 
Mrs. Stafford and Building and Planning Department Staff. They also reviewed the letter in 
reference to the appeal submitted by Mr. Magnuson, and reviewed the Staff Report, Hearing 
Examiner Report and the documentary and photographic evidence admitted into the record at the 
appeal hearing before the Hearing Examiner. 
6.02 The testimony and evidence admitted at the appeal hearing clearly shows that there is site 
disturbance in the 25 foot no-disturbance zone. This disturbance is not in compliance with Site 
Disturbance Ordinance No. 374. Appellants failed to prove by a preponderance of evidence that any 
0f112 L. " 
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of these disturbances predated the enactment of Site Disturbance Ordinance No. 251, when this no-
disturbance zone was first established. 
6.03 In regards to the definition of "supersede," the Board concurs with the Hearing Examiner's analysis 
of this issue, as set forth in section 4.02 above. 
6.04 The code violation which is the subject of this appeal may be remedied through the approval and 
completion of a remediation site disturbance plan. 
6.05 Since the BBQ fire pit shown in the site disturbance plan, permit #40613 was approved and issued 
on July 25, 2006, it will therefore, be allowed to stay as shown on the plan. 
6.06 After receiving testimony and evidence admitted at the appeal hearings before the Hearing Examiner 
and the Board in regards to the $240.00 rescheduling fee, the Board concurs with the Hearing 
Examiner's analysis and recommendation on. this issue. The letter to the appellant is clear that 
County staffwotild reschedule the hearing if the County received the appropriate rescheduling fee. 
Because the applicant did not pay the required fee and staff nevertheless cancelled the hearing, it is 
appropriate for the County to bear this cost. 
Vll CONCLUSIONS OF LA W 
7.01 The applicable ordinance under consideration in this appeal is Site Disturbance Ordinance No. 374, 
codified at Title 11, Chapter 2, Kootenai County Code. 
7.02 The A ppellant received sufficient notice of the nature of the violation and of necessary measures to 
bring the property into compliance with the applicable requirements of the Site Disturbance 
Ordinance. 
7.03 The Department properly determined that the development on site is not in conformance with the 
applicable requirements of the Site Disturbance Ordinance. Specifically, the un-permitted 
development of, including but not limited to, a waterfall, lawn, bulkhead, swales and sand within the 
25 foot no disturbance zone. 
7.04 The code violation which is the subject of this appeal may be remedied through the approval and 
completion of a remediation site disturbance plan. 
7.05 Rescheduling fees were inappropriately charged under the Building and Planning Department Fee 
Schedule. The Appellant responded within the deadline established and withdrew that request for re-
schedul ing. 
VIII ORDER OF DECISION 
Based upon the Findings of Fact, Board Analysis, and Conclusion of Law set forth in this document, and on 
the record of proceedings in this appeal, the Kootenai County Board of Commissioners hereby ORDERS 
thaI the issuance of the Notice of Violation in Case No. CV07-0092 be, and hereby is, AFFIRMED. 
The Board further ORDERS as follows: 
8.0 I The Appellants, Dr. and Mrs. Douglas Stafford, shall submit and receive approval for a Site 
Disturbance remediation plan and pay all associated fees. 
8.02 The Board of County Commissioners hereby sets a compliance timeline of sixty (60) days from the 
date of signing to bring the site into compliance with Kootenai County Ordinances. 
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8.03 The rescheduling fee of $240.00 shall be refunded to the Appellants. 
IX NOTICE OF RIGHTS 
You have the right to request a regulatory takings analysis pursuant to Idaho Code § 67-8003. Any such 
request must be submitted to the Kootenai County Building and Planning Department within twenty-eight 
(28) days from the date of mailing this decision. 
You also have twenty-eight (28) days from the date of mailing to appeal this decision to the District Court. 
Any such appeal must be taken in accordance with Title 67, Chapter 52, Idaho Code and Rule 84 of the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Dated this J 9th day of March 2009 
BY ORDER OFTHE KOOTENAI COUNTY 
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS 
Yea Nay 
r&I 0 
Elmer R. Currie, ~rman 
o 
C: Prosecuting Attorney (Civil Division) 
John F. Magnuson, Attorney at Law 
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JOHN F. MAGNUSON 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 2350 
1250 Northwood Center Court, Suite A 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
Phone: (208)667-0100 
Fax: (208) 667-0500 
IS13 #4270 
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Petitioners 
STA;E Oi-- ICi\fJO ~,,~ 
COllNiY OF rIOOr::NAIJ .JJ 
FILED: 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
DOUGLAS AND MICHELLE 
STAFFORD, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs/Petitioners, 
vs. 
KOOTENAI COUNTY, a Political 
Subdivision of the State ofIdaho, acting 
through the KOOTENAI BOARD OF 
COMMISSIONERS; and ELMER R. 
"RICK" CURRIE, RICH PIAZZA, and 
TODD TONDEE, COMMISSIONERS, in 
their official capacities, 
Defendants/Respondents. 
CASE NO.: 09-2516 
FIRST AMENDED PETITION FOR 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 
COME NOW the Plaintiffs/Petitioners named above, Douglas and Michelle Stafford, by and 
through their attorney of record, John F. Magnuson, by way of this "First Amended Petition for 
Judicial Review" against the Defendants/Respondents named above, and aver and allege as set forth 
herein. Petitioners appeal pursuant to the Local Land Use Planning Act, I.e. §67-6501, et. seq., 
including but not limited to 1. C. §67-6521. Petitioners further appeal pursuant to the Idaho 
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Administrative Procedure Act, I.e. §67-5201, et. seq., including but not limited to I.C. §67-5270. 
This appeal is also made pursuant to LR.C.P. 84. 
I. PARTIES. 
1. PlaintifTs/Petitioners Douglas and Michelle Stafford are the owners of certain real 
property located in unincorporated Kootenai County. Said property is identified as Kootenai County 
Parcel No. 0-1450-001-015-A, Lots 15 and 16, Block 1, Coeur d'Alene Lake Estates (amended). 
Said property consists of littoral property on Lake Coeur d'Alene. Plaintiffs/Petitioners are 
collectively referred to herein as "Stafford." 
2. Defendant/Respondent Kootenai County is a political subdivision of the State of 
Idaho acting by and through Defendants/Respondents Currie, Piazza, and Tondee (all members of 
the Kootenai County Board of Commissioners). Defendant/Respondent is referred to herein as 
"Kootenai County." 
II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE. 
3. This First Amended Petition for review is filed pursuant to the Local Land Use 
Planning Act, I.C. §67 -6501, et. seq., including but not limited to I.C. §67-6521, as well as the Idaho 
Administrative Procedure Act, I.C. §67-5201, including but not limited to I.C. §67-5270. 
Jurisdiction and venue are proper pursuant to Idaho Law, including the foregoing authorities as well 
as l.R.c.P. 84. 
III. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 
4. In July of 1999, Stafford submitted a site plan in conjunction with site improvements 
and the construction of a home on the Stafford property. The property had previously been disturbed 
through third-party logging operations and development, including activities within twenty-five (25) 
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feet of the ordinary high watermark (OHWM) of Lake Coeur d' Alene (elevation 2128 (WWP 
datum)). 
5. The site disturbance permit was issued in conjunction with the site plan submitted 
in July of 1999. Construction thereafter progressed. In March 2000, a Certificate of Occupancy was 
issued to Stafford. 
6. At the time Stafford submitted the July 1999 site plan, and the County thereafter 
issued the requisite site disturbance permit, the County's Site Disturbance Ordinance was 
denominated Ordinance 251. 
7. In the spring of 2001, Stafford personally made inquiry of the Kootenai County 
Planning Department regarding his ability to vegetate within the twenty-five (25) foot setback zone 
from the OHWM. He was advised that "re-greening" was not a problem. He was further advised 
that "re-greening" would not require any permit or approval from Kootenai County. 
8. At the time Stafford purchased the property, the twenty-five (25) foot setback zone 
from the OHWM, as described above, included native sands and basalt rock. The same is true both 
then and today with respect to adjacent property located below the OHWM of 2128. 
9. Following Stafford's contact with the Kootenai County Planning Department, in 
2001, Stafford placed natural basalt rocks near the shore as a natural bulkhead. The rocks are 
indigenous to the area. 
10. At the same time, Stafford also replaced some naturally occurring sand that had been 
dissipated by boat wakes and prior 100 year flooding incidents in 1996 and 1997. 
11. At about the same time, Stafford also placed some grass outside and inside the 
twenty-five (25) foot setback zone, and area that had previously been occupied by both native grasses 
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and noxious weeds. 
12. Stafford made no effort to hide any of these "improvements," the same being 
implicitly if not explicitly condoned or approved by Kootenai County. 
13. During the intervening five (5) years following installation of the improvements, 
Kootenai County took numerous pictures of the Stafford property, pictures that it retained in its 
actual possession. Kootenai County took no enforcement action of any kind or nature during this 
five-year period. 
14. In 2005, the Staffords submitted a second site plan. At that time, Stafford intended 
to construct an addition to the home first constructed under the July 1999 permit. 
15. The site plan depicted a barbecue pit, showing the same to traverse the actual twenty-
five (25) foot setback line. Kootenai County reviewed the plan, signed off on the plan, and approved 
the same. 
16. In conjunction with the site improvements sought in 2005, Kootenai County 
inspected the Stafford property. No objections were raised by Kootenai County as to any conditions 
extant on the Stafford property. 
17. The Staffords undertook construction as authorized by the 2005 permit so as to add 
an addition to their home. Throughout the construction process, numerous inspections were 
undertaken by various agents of Kootenai County. Those agents either viewed, or had the 
opportunity to view, any improvements previously made by the Staffords within said twenty-five 
(25) foot setback zone. No objections were raised. 
18. In August of 2007, the Staffords called for a final inspection in order to obtain their 
Certificate of Occupancy. The framing inspector advised them that they would not obtain a 
FInST AMENDED PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW -I'AGE4 
028 
Certificate of Occupancy due to alleged site disturbance violations. 
19. The Staffords immediately initiated contact with Kootenai County. The Staffords 
suggested that the parties resolve the issue before the impending holiday season of 2007. They 
received no response from Kootenai County. 
20. The Staffords renewed their suggestion that the parties attempt to resolve the issue 
prior to the holiday season of2007 so that they could get a Certificate of Occupancy. They received 
no response from Kootenai County. 
21. In January of 2008, Kootenai County made contact with the Staffords, having 
previously ignored their amicable efforts to meet and resolve the issue, and advised them that 
Kootenai County would refuse to issue the Staffords a Certificate of Occupancy for their addition 
based upon alleged violations (under the Site Disturbance Ordinance) that had absolutely nothing 
to do with the addition to the home. 
22. In order to placate Kootenai County, the Staffords submitted a proposed site 
remediation plan. The site remediation plan recommended leaving the basalt boulders and sand in 
place as the removal of the same would cause a larger disturbance than simply leaving them as is. 
Kootenai County refused to accept the site remediation plan. 
23. Kootenai County cited the Staffords with a violation of Kootenai County Ordinance 
No. 374. The Staffords timely appealed the same to Kootenai Connty. 
24. The Staffords' appealed the referenced "Notice of Violation," dated August 29, 2007 
and issued specifically under and limited by Ordinance No. 374 (was rejected) by the Kootenai 
County Planning Department. 
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25. The subsequent appeal was had from the Planning Department's Decision to a 
Hearing Officer appointed by Kootenai County (Lisa Keys). Following the hearing, Hearing 
Examiner Keys denied the appeal. 
26. A final appeal was made to the Kootenai County Board of Commissioners. The 
Commissioners issued a final written Decision, on March 19,2009, in the form attached hereto as 
Exhibit A. The Board's Decision of March 19,2009 was amended by an "Amended" Decision of 
April 16,2009. A true and correct copy of the Amended Decision is attached hereto as Exhibit B. 
The Staffords now appeal fi'om the Decisions of Kootenai County (Exhibits A and B) denying their 
appeal fi'om an alleged violation of Ordinance No.3 74. 
IV. LEGAL BASES FOR APPEAL. 
27. Ordinance No. 374 was adopted effective December 12,2005. Ordinance No. 374 
"superceded" the County's prior Site Disturbance Ordinance (Ordinance No. 283). The Kootenai 
County Site Disturbance Ordinance before Ordinance No. 283 was Ordinance was No. 251. As of 
December 12,2005, all prior Site Disturbance Ordinances had been specifically "superceded" by 
Ordinance No. 374. 
28. The lise of the word "supercede" is distinct from the use of the word "amend." 
"Supercede" means that the prior Site Disturbance Ordinances that pre-date Ordinance No. 374 no 
longer existed as of December 12,2005. Had the word "amend" been used, those Ordinances would 
have remained in effect save and except for the specific modifications accomplished by Ordinance 
No. 374. 
29. Without conceding the same, if there was a violation of Ordinance No. 251 or 283, 
as occasioned by the Staffords prior to December 12,2005, then those violations would have been 
FIRST AMENDED PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW - l)AGE 6 
030 
conclusively "grand fathered" through the adoption of Ordinance No.3 74. That is the legal effect 
of the use of the use "supercede." 
30. Kootenai County, through the Decision attached hereto and the matters set forth on 
the record, held that the Staffords' argument regarding the specific use ofthe word "supercede" did 
not matter in that the conduct claim to be violative of Kootenai County's Site Disturbance Ordinance 
would have been actionable under Ordinance Nos. 251 or 283. Not only were these Ordinances not 
in effect at the time the Staffords were cited, the Staffords were not charged, and have not been 
charged, with violations of the same. The only alleged violation at issue in the proceedings below, 
and on appeal, is under Ordinance No. 374. 
31. By deciding as it did, Kootenai County has violated the substantive and procedural 
rights of due process of Stafford, as secured by the U.S. and Idaho Constitutions. In essence, 
Kootenai County has held Stafford in violation of an Ordinance under which Stafford was never 
charged and which is no longer in effect. 
32. Additionally, the violations noticed by Kootenai County do not constitute "significant 
adverse effects" encompassed by Ordinance No. 374 even ifthe same is retroactively applicable to 
the conditions under consideration. 
33. Additionally, the "natural vegetation buffer" of the Stafford property was disturbed 
prior to adoption of the Site Disturbance Ordinance (Ordinance No. 374) and prior to the Staffords' 
actions that form the basis for the alleged violation. 
34. Additionally, Ordinance No. 374 does not apply to the subject facts based upon the 
clear language set forth in Sections 15 and 16 thereof. 
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35. Additionally, the County has waived any right to claim a violation of Ordinance No. 
374 based upon its explicit approvals of actions undeliaken by and at the County's direction and with 
the County's approval. 
36. Additionally, the County is estopped to claim any violation of Ordinance No. 374 
based upon the facts of this case. 
37. The charged violations asserted by Kootenai County are barred by all Statutes of 
Limitation that apply to Kootenai County Ordinance No. 374, as well as its predecessor Ordinances 
(Nos. 251 and 283). 
V. PETITION FOR REVIEW 
38. Stafford incorporates herein as though set forth in full all allegations contained in 
Paragraphs j through 37 above. 
39. Under the cited provisions of the Local Land Use Planning Act, I.e. §67-6501, et. 
seq., and the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act, I.e. §67-520 1, et. seq. The Staffords have the 
right to seek judicial review. 
40. The County's "Order of Decision" (Exhibit A hereto), finding Stafford in violation 
of Kootenai Ordinance No. 374, is contrary to law for each ofthe following non-exhaustive reasons: 
(l) The Board's Decision was not supported by substantial evidence on 
the record as a whole; 
(2) The Board's Decision was arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of 
discretion; 
(3) The Board's Decision was contrary to law; and 
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(4) The Board's Decision violated the due process protections afforded 
Stafford under the due process clauses of the U.S. and Idaho 
Constitutions. Additionally, the Board's Decision violates the Equal 
Protection Clause in that Ordinance No. 374 has been disparately and 
unequally enforced against the Staffords as contrasted with other 
littoral property owners on Lake Coeur d' Alene. 
41. The Board's Order of Decision must be set aside and remanded with instructions to 
dismiss the cited "Notice of Violation" for the reasons set forth herein. 
42. The Board's Order of Decision must be set aside and remanded with instructions to 
dismiss the same, or for other consistent proceedings, given the facts alleged herein. 
43. Kootenai County has acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law, subjecting itself 
to an award of the Staffords' reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred under the authority of I.C. 
§§/2-117 and 12-121. 
VI. PRAYER FOR RELIEF. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs/Petitioners Stafford pray for relief as follows: 
(1) For entry of relief vacating Kootenai County's Orders of Decision (Exhibits A and 
B), ancl remanding this matter with instructions to dismiss the charged "Notice of Violation;" 
(2) For an award of reasonable attorney fees and costs as incurred herein and as provided 
by Idaho Law, including but not limited to I.C. §§12-117 and 12-121; ancl 
(3) For such other and further relief as the Court deems just ancl equitable. 
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DA TED this.?-__ 1 day of April, 2009. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was served upon the 
following by regular u.s. mail addressed as follows, this £day of April, 2009: 
John A. Cafferty, Deputy Attorney 
Kootenai County Dept. of Legal Services 
451 Government Way 
P.O. Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-9000 
Patrick M. Braden, Deputy Attorney 
Kootenai County Dept. of Legal Services 
451 Government Way 
P.O. Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-9000 
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BEFORE THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF KOOTENAI COUNTY, IDAHO 
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPEAL 
OF DOUGLAS STAFFORD, 
REGARDING AN ADMINISTRATIVE 
DECISION OF KOOTENAI COUNTY 
SITE DISTURBANCE ORDINANCE 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
CASE NO. APP08-0002 
(Pertaining to Case No. CV07-0092) 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
ORDER OF DECISION 
I BACKGROUND AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
1.01 The site which is the subject of this appeal and of the underlying code violation proceedings, Case 
No. CV07-0092 ("the subject property") is owned by Dr. and Mrs. Douglas Stafford ("Appel/ants") 
and is located at 2707 E. Mockingbird Loop, Harrison, Idaho 83833, Parcel Number 0-1450-001-
015-A, Lots 15 and 16 Block I., Cd' A Lake Estates (Amended). 
1.02 On August 29, 2007, the Kootenai County Building and Planning Department issued a Notice of 
Violation of Site Disturbance Ordinance #374 for a disturbance in the twenty-five foot (25') 
undisturbed natural vegetation buffer (hereinafter referred to as "the no-disturbance zone"). (Exhibit 
S-I, Notice) 
1.03 On September 6, 2007, an inspection was performed and attended by then-County employees 
Stephanie Blalack and Sandy Young, landowner Michelle Stafford and representatives from Aspen 
Homes, Steve Swaim and Joe Coulter. At that time Ms. Blalack and Ms. Young were informed by 
Mrs. Stafford that the boulders, sand and lawn had recently been placed within the no-disturbance 
zone, which immediately prompted discussions regarding the necessary actions for remediation and 
compliance. As a result, verbal agreement was reached that a remediation plan would be 
forthcoming for this site. 
1.04 On November 9, 2007, the County received a letter from the Stafford's remediation design 
professional, Todd Walker of CDF Landscape, in reference to his site visit on September 20, 2007, 
which clarified the need of the remediation to comply with the Site Disturbance Ordinance. (Exhibit 
A-l2, Letter) 
1.05 On November 21, 2007, the Director received a letter from the Staffords' attorney, John Magnuson, 
suggesting the violation is unmerited and unnecessary. (Exhibit A-13a, Letter) 
1.06 On January 15, 2008, the Director provided a responsive letter outlining the historical details of the 
various permits, which did not include materials substantiating any allowance or approval for 
disturbance within the no-disturbance zone. Moreover, an offer was extended to the Staffords to 
provide any additional materials they felt would assist in our review of the Code Violation. No 
substantive materials were provided. (Exhibit S-16, Letter) 
1.07 On January 23, 2008, the Director received a letter from Mr. Magnuson advising that the remediation 
plan would be submitted that day. (Exhibit A-IS, Letter) 
1.08 On January 23, 2008, the remediation plan was submitted. However, upon review the submission 
was found to be incomplete. As such, Stephanie Blalack returned an e-mail on January 23 rd with a 
list of clarifications and additional information needed for the remediation plan to proceed. As of the 
date of this report, the remediation plan is yet incomplete. (Exhibit S-19, Email) 
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1.09 On March 3, 2008, the Director received a letter from Mr. Magnuson responding to the January 15, 
2008 letter from the Director disputing the need for a site disturbance remediation plan. No 
substantive materials were provided. (Exhibit A-23, Letter) 
1.10 On March 19, 2008, a Notice of Site Disturbance Ordinance Violation letter was mailed, which 
provided 30 days to appeal and 45 days to resolve the violation. (Exhibit S-27, Notice) 
I. I I On March 21, 2008, Mr. Magnuson submitted a letter as a Notice to Appeal on behalf of Dr. and 
Mrs. Douglas Stafford with respect to the referenced Notice of Violation. (Exhibit A-28, Letter) 
I.J 2 Pursuant to the Department's offer to meet and resolve the issue prior to conducting the appeal, a 
meeting was held on April 9, 2008 with Mrs. Stafford, Mr. Magnuson, Director Scott Clark and Staff 
to discuss the code violation. Based on staff's understanding that the Staffords had agreed to work 
with their landscape architect to bring the site into compliance, it is unclear why the appeal process 
has continued. 
I. 13 In a letter dated May 9,2008, Mr. Magnuson requested that the County proceed with the appeal. 
I. 14 Staff received a telephone call and a letter from Mr. Magnuson during the afternoon of August 18, 
2008. Mr. Magnuson stated there was no possibility he would be able to attend the hearing 
scheduled for August 21, 2008 as he would be in Boise and could not get back in time for the 6:00 
p.m. hearing. Mr. Magnuson later rescinded his request for rescheduling when he was informed of 
the necessary rescheduling fee. Nevertheless, County staff pulled the Hearing Examiner packet was 
pulled from the August lSIh afternoon mail and rescheduled the hearing. (Exhibits A-43 and S-52, 
Letters) 
I. I 5 A letter dated August 27, 2008, to Mr. Magnuson clarified the basis for canceling the hearing, 
proceeding with reschedul ing and charging the appropriate fees. (Exhibit S-49, Letter) 
1. I 6 Notice of the hearing on appeal was published in the Coeur d'Alene Press on September 3, 2008. 
J .17 On October 2, 2008, a hearing was held before the Kootenai County Hearing Exam iner. Roxy Webb 
presented the County's position. She testified that the Appellants were cited for site disturbance 
ordinance violations in August, 2007, based upon installation of a lawn, landscaping, a water feature, 
sand and boulders in the 25 foot no disturbance zone. Based upon dated assessors photos, she stated 
that staff had determined that the improvements had been installed after the 2000 permit. She 
showed assessors photos dated July, 2001, showing work be done in the 25 foot no disturbance zone, 
in violation of the conditions of the 2000 building permit (which she stated were based upon 
Ordinance 251). She testified that since the beginning of development of this project, the site 
disturbance zone ordinance has not changed, and that waterfront properties are required to maintain a 
no disturbance zone 25 feet from the ordinary high water mark, which is at an elevation of2125.0 
feet above sea level for Lake Coeur d'Alene. She noted that those areas must be maintained in a 
natural vegetative state, with no logging, construction, util ity trenches, roads, structures, or surface or 
storm water facilities, excepting one stairway, walkway or tram of a specified width. She testified 
that according to staff notes in the Departmental records; Ms. Stafford had indicated to both Ms. 
Blalack and Ms. Young that grass, sand and boulders had recently been placed on the site when the 
two staff members were conducting a site visit. She submitted into the record a Section R 105.4 of 
the International Residential Building Code, which states "The issuance or granting of a permit shall 
not be construed to be a permit for, or an approval of, any violation of any provisions of this code or 
any other ordinance of the jurisdiction." It also states "The building official is also authorized to 
prevent occupancy or use of a structure where in violation of this code or of any other ordinances of 
thisjurisdiction. .. (Exhibit HE-IOOO, International Residential Building Code) 
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Mr. Magnuson, Appellants' representative, testified that natural rocks and sand placed to supplement 
that which already existed on site would have no adverse impact to the natural environment. He 
noted that the County base site plan map shows the 25' no disturbance line running right rhrough the 
existing BBQ pit, which was approved in 2005. He also noted that the silt fence shown in photo 6, 
dated August 28, 2008, was installed and inspected prior to work commencing on the addition. He 
testified. that the Stafford's had submitted a remediation plan (Exhibit A-12) on January 23, 2008, 
after not hearing from the County "for months," 
When questioned about the meeting in April of 2008, Mr. Magnuson stated that considerable 
information had been discussed regarding additional remediation, beyond what had been proposed in 
their plan. 
Mr. Magnuson argued that Section 15 of Ordinance 374 states that the subject ordinance 
"supercedes" all prior ordinances, stating that Webster's dictionary defines the term as "causing to be 
set aside and rendered useless, void." Section 16 of Ordinance 374, establis~ed the effective date as 
December 12,2008. On this basis, he argued that if the prior ordinance was rendered null and void, 
and the new ordinance did not take effect until a date certain, all violations prior to the effective date 
of the new ordinance were essentially "gran dfathered. " 
He also argued that sand and basalt boulders were not explicitly prohibited by the ordinance, and that 
the general purpose of the ordinance was specifically to protect against adverse effects. He noted 
that the definition implied that man-made activities/materials were prohibited. He argued that rocks 
and sand are natural materials that are appropriate. 
He also argued that a $240 "rescheduling fee" was improperly charged by the Building and Planning 
Department. He testified that the hearing was originally scheduled for late August, and that he 
contacted the Building and Planning Department on the Monday before the hearing, notitying them 
of his inability to attend the hearing, and requesting that it be rescheduled. On Tuesday, he was 
faxed a letter from Building and Planning, stating the hearing would be rescheduled if he provided a 
check in the amount of $420 by 4 pm that same day (August 19th). He understood this to mean that 
the hearing would not be rescheduled if he was unwilling or unable to pay the fee by 4 pm that day. 
He testified that he e-mailed and faxed a letter to the Building and Planning Department on that same 
day (August 19th) refusing to pay the fee and rescinding the request to reschedule. He was told that 
the hearing had already been pulled from the agenda, and that a retraction could not be granted due 
to the newspaper deadline for public notice cancellation. 
Appellant Dr. Doug Stafford also testified. He stated that he and his wife had built the home, and 
had lived there since 2000. He noted that the waterfront area on this property was a "mess," that 
property had been logged and subdivided, and when they purchased the property, the waterfront was 
trash strewn and sported a 6' high slash pile; vegetation was sparse, and mostly consisted of noxious 
weeds - knapweed and thistle. He stated that in 2001, he interviewed professional landscapers and 
discussed their plans; when he asked if the planned lawn and landscaping was allowed, the 
landscaper said he did this type of work all the time. He testified that he asked at the front desk of 
Building and Planning, and was told that grass and trees, and that it was never an issue to "re-green" 
a site. He also stated that the second photo, dated July 200, was labeled wrong, because the 
landscaping depicted in that picture was not completed until October of 200 f. He also testified that 
the natural vegetation seen in the picture taken from shore in July, 2000 was still in place. He stated 
that they had not done any work since October of 2001, and that while they have received a permit 
for an addition in 2007, and that did not address erosion control. He said that the statement that 
rocks and sand had recently been placed was simply not true, they had been installed in 200 I, though 
the grassy swale was installed as part of the 2007 improvements. He also stated that a good portion 
of the shoreline is still in a natural vegetative state. 
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In rebuttal, Roxy Webb simply referenced the Assessor's photos, which came from the assessors 
records, and that the dates were clearly identified in the e-mail included in the Hearing Examiner's 
packet. She also submitted into the record a letter dated September 27, 2008 providing an "event 
timeline" for the fee issue (Exhibit HE-I 002). She also introduced into the record an area map, 
giving an overview ofthe area (Exhibit HE-I 003). 
Scott Clark also provided rebuttal testimony. He stated that the definition of "Undisturbed Natural 
Vegetation Buffer" in both Ordinance 251 and 374 reads "An area where no development activity 
has occurred or will occur, including but not limited to , logging, construction of utility trenches, 
roads, structures, or surface and stormwater facilities. Buffer areas shall be left in their natural 
state . .. 
He noted that in Exhibit C-2, the Appellants' depiction of the "no disturbance line" was actually the 
lake line, not the high water mark. He questioned the validity of Mr. Magnuson's definition of 
supercede, and also questioned how that would affect conditions of pre-existing permits. No other 
testimony was heard and the hearing was closed. -
1.18 An appeal hearing was held before the Kootenai County Board of Commissioners on February 12 
2009, at 10:00 a.m. Douglas and Michelle Stafford and their representative John Magnuson were 
present and testified. Their testimony at the hearing before the Board was consistent with their 
testimony before the Hearing Examiner, as summarized above. Bret Bowers and Greg Delevan also 
requested to testify as individuals and as representatives of the Coeur d'Alene Lakeshore Owners 
Association. Although the Board provided each of them with the opportunity to demonstrate how 
they were affected by the issues raised in this appeal, the Board found that they did not meet the 
definition of "affected person" under Idaho Code § 67-652] or of "affected party" under Section 9-
22-8 of the Zoning Ordinance, and they were therefore not allowed to testi:f)rto the merits of the 
appeal. 
II FINDINGS OF FA CT 
2.01 The original Building Permit, #30796, was issued on July 27, 1999 on a 0.750 acre parcel. There 
was a financial guarantee for site disturbance activity in the amount of $2,700.00. The site plan 
submitted with the Application for permit #30796 shows 50' from the deck on the house to ordinary 
high water mark. Placement of the Grassy Infiltration Area (GIA) is specifically addressed as 
condition of that permit, which states: "Lake City Engineering need to move GlA out of 25 foot 
buffer zone." The single family residence for Building Permit #30796 was issued a Certificate of 
Occupancy on March 23, 2000 and the $2,700.00 financial guarantee was refunded on June 7,2000. 
(Exhibit 5-5, Permit) 
2.02 Site Disturbance Ordinance No. 251, Section 8(B) was in effect at the time the original single family 
residence building permit (#30796) was submitted and approved. Ordinance #251 required a 25' no 
disturbance buffer from the ordinary high water mark. (Exbibit 5-6, Ordinance 251) 
2.03 Permit #40613, which was for an addition/alteration to the previously approved single family 
residence, was issued July 25, 2006. The site plan submitted with the application and the engineered 
Site Disturbance Plan both show 50' setback from ordinary high water mark (OHWM) with no plans 
shown for any development or activity within the no-disturbance zone. (Exhibit 5-7, Permit) 
2.04 Site Disturbance Ordinance No.3 74, Section 8(B) was in effect at the time the second bu ilding 
permit, #40613 was issued. Ordinance No. 374 still required a 25' no disturbance buffer from the 
ordinary high water mark. (Exhibit S-8, Ordinance 374) 
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2.05 During the recent investigation of Code Violation CV07-0092, it has been discovered through review 
of Assessor photography that four months after the certificate of occupancy (CO) and the release of 
the site disturbance bond on permit #30796, the site clearly reveals natural vegetation stil I existing 
within the no-disturbance zone, which appears consistent with County approvals and the application 
materials provided by the applicant to that date. (Exhibit S-3a, Photograph) 
2.06 Site inspection photographs dated August 28, 2007 and August 29, 2007 show un-permitted 
waterfall, manicured la',.'1n, bulkhead, swales and sand within the no-disturbance zone. (Exhibit S-4, 
Photographs) 
2.07 The July I J, 2001 Assessor photographs reveals site disturbance work within the no-disturbance 
zone without the benefit of submission of new application materials. (Exhibit S-3b, Photograph) 
2.08 Assessor pictures dated July 17, 2002 show both manicured lawn and the installation of a rock 
bulkhead within the no-disturbance zone, which is inconsistent with both of the applicable County 
Site Disturbance Ordinances, as well as the site plans submitted and approved for permits #30796 
and #40613. (Exhibits S-3c, d, e, f, Photographs) 
2.09 The photographic evidence provided during the course of this violation along with testimony and 
research by staff, clearly show that there is a violation of the site disturbance ordinance. 
III APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS 
3.01 Kootenai County Site Disturbance Ordinance No. 374, adopted December 12,2005, codified at Title 
II, Chapter 2, Kootenai County Code 
Site Disturbance Ordinance No. 251, adopted January 1, 1997 
Site Disturbance Ordinance No. 283, adopted July 26, 1999. 
The following language pertaining to this violation is contained in the current Site Disturbance 
Ordinance, Ordinance No. 374, and is unchanged from that contained in the previous Site 
Disturbance Ordinances, Ordinance No. 251 and Ordinance No. 283: 
Section 4: 
Undisturbed Natural Vegetation Bu(fer - An area where no development activity has occurred or 
will occur, including, but not limited to, logging, construction of utility trenches, roads, structures, 
or surface and stormwater facilities. Buffer areas shall be left in their natural state. 
Section 8(B): 
Waterfront Lots:For lots withfrontage on a recognized lake or the Coeur d'Alene or Spokane Rivers, 
an undisturbed natural vegetation buffer shall be retained al the waterfront. A stairway or walkway 
(which does not exceed 4 feet in width), stairway landings (which do not exceed 6 feet in width or 
length), or a tram shall be allowed to encroach within Ihe buffer. The buffer shall be a minimum of 
25 feel in slope dis/ance from the high water mark of the water body. For purposes of this 
Ordinance, high water marks shall be considered to be the following elevations: 
Coeur d'Alene Lake 2125.0 (N.G. V.D. 1929 datum) 
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3.02 Building and Planning Department Fee Schedule per Resolution No. 2006-111; Appeal of 
Administrative Determination, Rescheduling Hearing 
Reschedule Hearing 
Public Notice 
$200.00 
$ 40.00 
IV HEARING EXAMINER ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS (from Hearing Examiner report) 
In the matter of the appeal of Douglas Stafford, regarding the issuance of code violation CV07 -0092, a site 
disturbance code violation, Mr. Magnuson requests the estoppel of the notice of violation, as based upon the 
following: 
4.0 I Mr. Magnuson claims that the County has waived its right to claim a violation based upon their de 
facto prior approval of development in the no disturbance buffer. The evidence presented by 
theBuilding & Planning Department supports a finding that the vast majority of the violations 
occurred after the issuance of their 2000 building permit, and the release of the site disturbance 
surety in association with that permit. Granting of the 2007 building permit for the addition was 
irrelevant with respect to pre-existing violations, particularly in light of Section R 105.4 of the 
International Residential Building Code, which clearly states "The issuance or granting of a permit 
shall not be construed to be a permit for, or an approval of, any violation of any provisions of this 
code or any other ordinance of the jurisdiction. " 
4.02 Mr. Magnuson claims that Ordinance 374 does not apply to alleged violations under consideration, 
which occurred prior to the effective date of the ordinance of December 8, 2005, as based upon 
Section 15 of that ordinance, which states that the provisions of Ordinance 374 "shaJI supersede" the 
requirements of the prior Site Disturbance Ordinance No. 283. He argued that Webster's dictionary 
defines the "supersede" as "causing to be set aside and rendered useless, void." Section 16 of 
Ordinance 374, established the effective date as December 12,2005. On this basis, he argued that if 
the prior ordinance was rendered null and void, and the new ordinance did not take effect until a date 
certain, all violations prior to the effective date of the new ordinance were essentially 
"grandfathered. " 
While Mr. Magnuson's definition of "supersede" is, in fact, one of the definitions listed in Webster's 
Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of the English Language, Portland House, New York, 1989, it 
also lists the definition as "to replace in power, authority, effectiveness, acceptance, use, etc., as by 
another person or thing." In the case of Ordinance 374 "superseding" prior Site Disturbance 
Ordinances that would generally and reasonably be interpreted to mean that Ordinance 374 
"replaced" prior Site Disturbance Ordinances in use after its effective date. Therefore, Mr. 
Magnuson's argument that Ordinance 374 rendered Ordinance 251 nuIJ and void, thus 
grandfathering any pre-existing violations, appears to be without merit. 
4.03 Mr. Magnuson claims that the alleged violations are otherwise unsupported in fact and/or in law. 
The argument that sand, basalt boulders, lawn and other "re-greening" were natural and allowed 
under the ordinance appears to have no merit, as the intent of "Undisturbed Natural Vegetation 
Buffer" in both Ordinance 251 and 3 74 is quite explicit in the definition, which appears in both 
ordinances: "An area where no development activity has occurred or will occur, including but not 
limited to, logging, construction of utility trenches, roads, structures, or surface and storm water 
facilities. Buffer areas shall be left in their natural state." Section 8 of both those ordinances, 
which addresses Disturbance Restrictions, is also quite explicit as to the location of the undisturbed 
natural vegetation buffer for waterfront properties, actually citing the high water mark from which 
this buffer distance sha/l be measured specifica/ly for Lake Coeur d'Alene. Photos taken by the 
Assessor, as well as the Hearing Examiner's site visit, confirm that activities, landscaping, and 
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development not in conformance with the Site Disturbance Ordinance have, in fact, occurred within 
the required 25' Undisturbed Natural Vegetation Buffer. 
As a separate issue brought forward at the hearing, Mr. Magnuson sought a refund of a $240 rescheduling 
fee. 
4.04 Mr. Magnuson claims that the hearing originally scheduled for August 2 I, 2008 was effectively 
rescheduled by County staff, aftei he refused to pay the fee that was required by a date specific as a 
condition of his rescheduling. On this basis, he argues that the County lacked the authority to 
impose the $240 re-scheduling fee. The County clearly has the authority to charge a rescheduling 
fee for applicant-initiated re-scheduled hearings, as based on Resolution No. 2006-1 J 1. Based upon 
the record established by Mr. Magnuson through correspondence with Roxanne Webb, he contacted 
the Building & Planning Department on August 18, 2008, prior to the scheduled hearing, requesting 
that the hearing be rescheduled. On August 19, 2008, he was faxed a letter from Building and 
Planning, stating the hearing would be rescheduled if he provided a check in the amount of $420 by 
4 pm that same day (August 19). He provided evidence that he in fact e-mailed and faxed a letter to 
the Building & Planning Department on August 19 refusing to pay the fee and rescinding the request 
to reschedule. He was then told that the hearing had already been pulled from the agenda, and that a 
retraction could not be granted due to the newspaper deadline for public notice cancellation. These 
facts were corroborated by Roxanne Webb's timeJine (Exhibit HE-I002). As based upon the letter 
from Ms. Webb, faxed to Mr. Magnuson on August 19, Mr. Magnuson testified that he understood 
this to mean that the hearing would not be rescheduled if he was unwilling or unable to pay the fee 
by 4 pm that day. His response on August 19 clearly stated that he was "rescinding his request" to 
have the hearing rescheduled and that he was unwilling to pay the fee. The fact is that he responded 
within the deadline established by Ms. Webb and withdrew that request for re-scheduling. It appears 
that the County chose to go ahead with the rescheduling (regardless of the reason), and therefore, it 
appears unwarranted to charge the appellant[s] the cost associated with the rescheduled hearing. 
V HEARING EXAMINER RECOMMENDA TION (from Hearing Examiner report) 
5.01 In the case of APP08-002, an appeal by Douglas Stafford regarding the issuance of code violation 
CV07-0092, as based upon the Analysis and Findings set forth in this document, and the 
Appellant[s]' failure to present facts or evidence to support overturning the Director's notice of 
violation, the AppeJlant[s'] request to estop the notice of violation CV07-0092, and any enforcement 
actions undertaken pursuant thereto, is hereby DENIED. 
5.02 In regard to the imposition of the $240 re-scheduling, as based upon the findings and analysis 
contained herein, the Hearing Examiner hereby finds that $240 fee for re-scheduling was improperly 
levied against the Appellant[s], and hereby recommends to the Kootenai County Board of 
Commissioners that the $240 fee be refunded. 
VI BOARD ANALYSIS 
6.0 I At the appeal hearing, the Board received testimony and evidence from Mr. Magnuson, Dr. Stafford, 
Mrs. Stafford and Building and Planning Department Staff. They also reviewed the letter in 
reference to the appeal submitted by Mr. Magnuson, and reviewed the Staff Report, Hearing 
Examiner Report and the documentary and photographic evidence admitted into the record at the 
appeal hearing before the Hearing Examiner. 
6.02 The testimony and evidence admitted at the appeal hearing clearly shows that there is site 
disturbance in the 25 foot no-disturbance zone. This disturbance is not in compliance witil Site 
Disturbance Ordinance No.3 74. Appellants failed to prove by a preponderance of evidence that any 
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of these disturbances predated the enactment of Site Disturbance Ordinance No. 251, when this no-
disturbance zone was first established. 
6.03 In regards to the definition of "supersede," the Board concurs with the Hearing Examiner's analysis 
of this issue, as set forth in section 4.02 above. 
6.04 The code violation which is the subject of this appeai may be remedied through the approval and 
completion of a remediati on site disturbance plan. 
6.05 Since the BBQ fire pit shown in the site disturbance plan, permit #40613 was approved and issued 
on July 25, 2006, it will therefore, be allowed to stay as shown on the plan. 
6.06 After receiving testimony and evidence admitted at the appeal hearings before the Hearing Examiner 
and the Board in regards to the $240.00 rescheduling fee, the Board concurs with the Hearing 
Examiner's analysis and recommendation on. this issue. The letter to the appellant is clear that 
County stafr-would reschedule the hearing if the County received the appropriate rescheduling fee. 
Because the applicant did not pay the required fee and staff nevertheless cancelled the hearing, it is 
appropriate for the County to bear this cost. 
VIJ CONCLUSIONS OF LA W 
7.01 The applicable ordinance under consideration in this appeal is Site Disturbance Ordinance No. 374, 
codified at Title II, Chapter 2, Kootenai County Code. 
7.02 The Appellant received sufficient notice of the nature of the violation and of necessary measures to 
bring the property into compliance with the applicable requirements of the Site Disturbance 
Ordinance. 
7.03 The Department properly determined that the development on site is not in conformance with the 
applicable requirements of the Site Disturbance Ordinance. Specifically, the un-permitted 
development of, including but not limited to, a waterfall, lawn, bulkhead, swales and sand within the 
25 foot no disturbance zone. 
7.04 The code violation which is the subject of this appeal may be remedied through the approval and 
completion of a remediation site disturbance plan. 
7.05 Rescheduling fees were inappropriately charged under the Building and Planning Department Fee 
Schedule. The Appellant responded within the deadline established and withdrew that request for re-
scheduling. 
VIII OIUJER OF DECISION 
Based upon the Findings of Fact, Board Analysis, and Conclusion of Law set forth in this document, and on 
the record of proceedings in this appeaJ, the Kootenai County Board of Commissioners hereby ORDERS 
that the issuance ofthe Notice of Violation in Case No. CY07-0092 be, and hereby is, AFFIRMED. 
The Board further ORDERS as follows; 
8.01 The Appellants, Dr. and Mrs. Douglas Stafford, shall submit and receIve approval for a Site 
Disturbance remediation plan and pay all associated fees. 
8.02 The Board of County Commissioners hereby sets a compliance timeline of sixty (60) days from the 
date of signing to bring the site into compliance with Kootenai County Ordinances. 
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8.03 The rescheduling fee of$240.00 shall be refunded to the Appellants. 
IX NOTICE OF RIGHTS 
You have the right to request a regulatory takings analysis pursuant to Idaho Code § 67-8003. Any such 
request must be submitted to the Kootenai County Building and Planning Department within twenty-eight 
(28) days from the date of mailing this decision. 
',~ 
" 
You also have twenty-eight (28) days from the date of mailing to appeal this decision to the District Court. 
Any such appeal must be taken in accordance with Title 67, Chapter 52, Idaho Code and Rule 84 of the 
ldaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Dated this 19th day of March 2009 
BY ORDER OF THE KOOTENAI COUNTY 
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS 
Yea Nay 
o 
Elmer R. Currie, ~ 
o ,4 n 
o 
C: Prosecuting Attorney (Civil Division) 
John F. Magnuson, Attorney at Law 
-
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BEFORE THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF KOOTENAI COUNTY, IDAHO 
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPEAL 
OF DOUGLAS STAFFORD, 
REGARDING AN ADMINISTRATIVE 
DECISION OF KOOTENAI COUNTY 
SITE DISTURBANCE ORDINANCE . 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
CASE NO. APP08-0002 
(Pertaining to Case No. CV07-0092) 
AMENDED 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
APPLICABLE LEGAL ST ANDARDS~ 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
ORDER OF DECISION 
I BACKGROUND AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
1.0 I The site which is the subject of this appeal and of the underlying code violation proceedings, Case 
No. CV07-0092 ("the subject property") is owned by Dr. and Mrs. Douglas Stafford ("the 
Staffords") and is located at 2707 E. Mockingbird Loop, Harrison, Idaho 83833, Parcel Number 0-
1450-001-01S-A, Lots 15 and 16 Block 1, Cd'A Lake Estates (Amended). 
1.02 On August 29, 2007, the Kootenai County Building and Planning Department ("the Department") 
issued a Notice of Violation of Site Disturbance Ordinance No. 374 for a disturbance in the twenty-
five foot (25') undisturbed natural vegetation buffer ("the no-disturbance zone"). (Exhibit 8-1, 
Notice) 
1.03 On September 6, 2007, an inspection was performed and attended by then-Department employees 
Stephanie Blalack and Sandy Young, landowner Michelle Stafford and representatives from Aspen 
Homes, Steve Swaim and Joe Coulter. At that time Ms. Blalack and Ms. Young were informed by 
Ms. Stafford that the boulders, sand and lawn had recently been placed within the no-disturbance 
zone, which immediately prompted discussions regarding the necessary actions for remediation and 
compliance. As a result, verbal agreement was reached that a remediation plan would be 
forthcoming for this site. 
1.04 On November 9, 2007, the Department received a letter from the Staffords' remediation design 
professional, Todd Walker of CDF Landscape, in reference to his site visit on September 20, 2007, 
which clarified the need of the remediation to comply with the Site Disturbance Ordinance. (Exhibit 
A-I2, Letter) 
1.05 On November 21,2007, Department Director Scott Clark ("the Director") received a letter from the 
Staffords' attorney, John Magnuson, suggesting the violation is unmerited and unnecessary. 
(Exhibit A-13a, Letter) 
1.06 On January 15, 2008, the Director provided a responsive letter outlining the historical details of the 
various permits, which did not include m~terials substantiating any allowance or approval for 
disturbance within the no-disturbance zone. Moreover, an offer was extended to the Staffords to 
provide any additional materials they felt would assist in our review of the Code Violation. No 
substantive materials were provided. (Exhibit 8-16, Letter) 
1.07 On January 23,2008, the Director received a letter from Mr. Magnuson advising that the remediation 
plan would be submitted that day. (Exhibit A-18, Letter) 
1.08 On January 23, 2008, the remediation plan was submitted. However, upon review the submission 
was found to be incomplete. As such, Stephanie Blalack returned an e-mail on January 23 rd with a 
list of clarifications and additional information needed for the remediation plan to proceed. As of the 
date of this report, the remediation plan is yet incomplete. (Exhibit S-19, Email) 
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1.09 On March 3, 2008, the Director received a letter from Mr. Magnuson responding to the January 15, 
2008 letter from the Director disputing the need for a site disturbance remediation plan. No 
substantive materials were provided. (Exhibit A-23, Letter) 
1.10 On March 19, 2008, a Notice of Site Disturbance Ordinance Violation letter was mailed, which 
provided 30 days to appeal and 45 days to resolve the violation. (Exhibit S-27, Notice) 
1.11 On March 21, 200S, Mr. Magnuson submitted a letter as a Notice to Appeal on behalf of Dr. and 
Mrs. Douglas Stafford with-respect to the referenced Notice of Violation. (Exhibit A-28, Letter) 
1.12 Pursuant to the Department's offer to meet and resolve the issue prior to conducting the appeal, a 
meeting was held on April 9, 200S with Mrs. Stafford, Mr. Magnuson, the Director and Department 
staff to discuss the code violation. Based on staffs understanding that the Staffords had agreed to 
work with their landscape architect to bring the site into compliance, it is unclear why the appeal 
process has continued. 
1.13 In a letter dated May 9, 2008, Mr. Magnuson requested that the County proceed with the appeal. 
1.14 Staff received a telephone call and a letter from Mr. Magnuson during the afternoon of August IS, 
200S. Mr. Magnuson stated there was no possibility he would be able to attend the hearing 
scheduled for August 21, 2008 as he would be in Boise and could not get back in time for the 6:00 
p.m. hearing. Mr. Magnuson later rescinded his request for rescheduling when he was informed of 
the necessary rescheduling fee. Nevertheless, County staff pulled the Hearing Examiner packet was 
pulled from the August 18th afternoon mail and rescheduled the hearing. (Exhibits A-43 and S-52, 
Letters) 
1.15 A letter dated August 27, 2008, to Mr. Magnuson clarified the basis for canceling the hearing, 
proceeding with rescheduling and charging the appropriate fees. (Exhibit S-49, Letter) 
1.16 Notice of the hearing on appeal was published in the Coeur d'Alene Press on September 3, 200S. 
1.17 On October 2, 2008, a hearing was held before the Kootenai County Hearing Examiner. Roxy Webb 
presented the County's position. She testified that the Staffords were cited for site disturbance 
ordinance violations in August, 2007, based upon installation of a lawn, landscaping, a water feature, 
sand and boulders in the 25 foot no disturbance zone. Based upon dated Assessor's photos, she 
stated that staff had determined that the improvements had been installed after the 2000 permit. She 
showed Assessor's photos dated July, 200], showing work be done in the no-disturbance zone, in 
violation of the conditions of the 2000 building permit (which she stated were based upon Ordinance 
251). She testified that since the beginning of development of this project, the site disturbance zone 
ordinance has not changed, and that waterfront properties are required to maintain a no disturbance 
zone 25 feet from the ordinary high water mark, which is at an elevation of 2125.0 feet above sea 
level for Lake Coeur d' Alene. She noted that those areas must be maintained in a natural vegetative 
state, with no logging, construction, utility trenches, roads, structures, or surface or storm water 
facilities, excepting one stairway, walkway or tram of a specified width. She testified that according 
to staff notes in the Departmental records; Ms. Stafford had indicated to both Ms. Blalack and Ms. 
Young that grass, sand and boulders had recently been placed on the site when the two staff 
members were conducting a site visit. She submitted into the record a Section RI05.4 of the 
International Residential Building Code, which states "The issuance or granting of a permit shall not 
be construed to be a permit for, or an approval of any violation of any provisions of this code or any 
other ordinance of the jurisdiction." It also states "The building offiCial is also authorized to 
prevent occupancy or use of a structure where in violation o/this code or of any other ordinances of 
this jurisdiction. " (Exhibit HE-lOOO, International Residential Building Code) 
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Mr. Magnuson, Appellants' representative, testified that natural rocks and sand placed to supplement 
that which already existed on site would have no adverse impact to the natural environment. He 
noted that the County base site plan map shows the 25' no disturbance line running right through the 
existing BBQ pit, which was approved in 2005. He also noted that the silt fence shown in photo 6, 
dated August 28, 2008, was installed and inspected prior to work commencing on the addition. He 
testified that the Stafford's had submitted a remediation plan (Exhibit A-12) on January 23, 2008, 
after not hearing from the County "for months." 
When questioned about the meeting in April of 2008, Mr. Magnuson stated that considerable 
information had been discussed regarding additional remediation, beyond what had been proposed in 
their plan. 
Mr. Magnuson argued that Section 15 of Ordinance 374 states that the subject ordinance 
"supercedes" all prior ordinances, stating that Webster's dictionary defines the term as "causing to be 
set aside and rendered useless, void." Section 16 of-Ordinance 374, established the effective date as 
December 12,2008. On this basis, he argued that if the prior ordinance was rendered null and void, 
and the new ordinance did not take effect until a date certain, all violations prior to the effective date 
of the new ordinance were essentially "grandfathered." 
He also argued that sand and basalt boulders were not explicitly prohibited by the ordinance, and that 
the general purpose of the ordinance was specifically to protect against adverse effects. He noted 
that the definition implied that man-made activities/materials were prohibited. He argued that rocks 
and sand are natural materials that are appropriate. 
He also argued that a $240 "rescheduling fee" was improperly charged by the Building and Planning 
Department. He testified that the hearing was originally scheduled for late August, and that he 
contacted the Building and Planning Department on the Monday before the hearing, notifYing them 
of his inability to attend the hearing, and requesting that it be rescheduled. On Tuesday, he was 
faxed a letter from Building and Planning, stating the hearing would be rescheduled if he provided a 
check in the amount of $420 by 4 pm that same day (August 19th). He understood this to mean that 
the hearing would not be rescheduled if he was unwilling or unable to pay the fee by 4 pm that day. 
He testified that he e-mailed and faxed a letter to the Building and Planning Department on that same 
day (August 19th) refusing to pay the fee and rescinding the request to reschedule. He was told that 
the hearing had already been pulled from the agenda, and that a retraction could not be granted due 
to the newspaper deadline for public notice cancellation. 
Appellant Dr. Doug Stafford also testified. He stated that he and his wife had built the home, and 
had lived there since 2000. He noted that the waterfront area on this property was a "mess," that 
property had been logged and subdivided, and when they purchased the property, the waterfront was 
trash strewn and sported a 6' high slash pile; vegetation was sparse, and mostly consisted of noxious 
weeds - knapweed and thistle. He stated that in 200], he interviewed professional landscapers and 
discussed their plans; when he asked if the planned lawn and landscaping was allowed, the 
landscaper said he did this type of work all the time. He testified that he asked at the front desk of 
Building and Planning, and was told that grass and trees, and that it was never an issue to "re-green" 
a site. He also stated that the second photo, dated July 2001, was labeled wrong, because the 
landscaping depicted in that picture was not completed until October of 200 I. He also testified that 
the natural vegetation seen in the picture taken from shore in July, 2000 was stiIl in place. He stated 
that they had not done any work since October of2001, and that while they have received a permit 
for an addition in 2007, and that did not address erosion control. He said that the statement that 
rocks and sand had recently been placed was simply not true, they had been installed in 2001, though 
the grassy swale was installed as part of the 2007 improvements. He also stated that a good portion 
of the shoreline is still in a natural vegetative state. 
047 
Order of Decision Stanord Appeal- Case No. APP08-0002 Page 4 of9 
In rebuttal, Roxy Webb simply referenced the Assessor's photos, which came from the Assessor's 
records, and that the dates were clearly identified in the e-mail included in the Hearing Examiner's 
packet. She also submitted into the record a letter dated September 27, 2008 providing an "event 
timeline" for the fee issue (Exhibit HE-t002). She also introduced into the record an area map, 
giving an overview of the area (Exhibit HE-t003). 
Scott Clark also provided rebuttal testimony. He stated that the definition of "Undisturbed Natural 
Vegetation Buffer" in both Ordinance 251 and 374 reads "An area where no development activity 
has occurred or will occur, including but not limited to , logging, construction of utility trenches, 
roads, structures, or surface and stormwater facilities. Buffer areas shall be left in their natural 
state. " 
He noted that in Exhibit C-2, the Appellants' depiction of the "no disturbance line" was actually the 
lake line, not the high water mark. He questioned the validity of Mr. Magnuson's definition of 
supercede, and also questioned how that would affect conditions of pre-existing permits. No other 
testimony was heard and the hearing was closed. 
1.18 An appeal hearing was held before the Kootenai County Board of Commissioners on February 12, 
2009, at 10:00 a.m. Douglas and Michelle Stafford and their representative John Magnuson were 
present and testified. Their testimony at the hearing before the Board was consistent with their 
testimony before the Hearing Examiner, as summarized above. Bret Bowers and Greg Delevan also 
requested to testiry as individuals and as representatives of the Coeur d'Alene Lakeshore Owners 
Association. Although the Board provided each 9f them with the opportunity to demonstrate how 
they were affected by the issues raised in this appeal, the Board found that they did not meet the 
definition of "affected person" under Idaho Code § 67-6521 or of "affected party" under Section 9-
22-8 of the Zoning Ordinance, and they were therefore not allowed to testiry to the merits of the 
appeal. 
II FINDINGS OF FACT 
2.01 The original Building Permit, #30796, was issued on July 27, 1999 on a 0.750 acre parcel. There 
was a financial guarantee for site disturbance activity in the amount of $2,700.00. The site plan 
submitted with the Application for Permit #30796 shows 50' from the deck on the house to ordinary 
high water mark. Placement of the Grassy Infiltration Area (GIA) is specifically addressed as 
condition of that permit, which states: "Lake City Engineering need to move GIA ouf oj 25 JOOf 
buffer zone." The single family residence for Building Permit #30796 was issued a Certificate of 
Occupancy on March 23,2000 and the $2,700.00 financiai guarantee was refunded on June 7,2000. 
(Exhibit 8-5, Permit) 
2.02 Site Disturbance Ordinance No. 25 I, Section 8(B) was in effect at the time the original single family 
residence building permit (#30796) was submitted and approved. Ordinance No. 251 required a 25' 
no disturbance buffer from the ordinary high water mark. (Exhibit 8-6, Ordinance 251) 
2.03 Permit #40613, which was for an addition/alteration to the previously approved single family 
residence, was issued July 25, 2006. The site plan submitted with the application and the engineered 
Site Disturbance Plan both show 50' setback from ordinary high water mark (OHWM) with no plans 
shown for any development or activity within the no-disturbance zone. (Exhibit 8-7, Permit) 
2.04 Site Disturbance Ordinance No. 374, Section 8(B) was in effect at the time the second building 
permit, #40613 was issued. Ordinance No. 374 still required a 25' no disturbance buffer from the 
ordinary high water mark. (Exhibit S-8, Ordinance 374) 
048 
Order of Decision Starford Appeal - Case No. APP08-0002 Page 5 of9 
2.05 During the recent investigation of Code Violation CV07-0092, it has been discovered through review 
of Assessor photography that four months after the certificate of occupancy (CO) and the release of 
the site disturbance bond on permit #30796, the site clearly reveals natural vegetation still existing 
within the no-disturbance zone, which appears consistent with County approvals and the application 
materials provided by the applicant to that date. (Exhibit 8-3a, Photograph) 
2.06 Site inspection photographs . dated August 28, 2007 and A~gust 29, 2007 show un-permitted 
waterfall, manicured lawn, bulkhead, swales and sand within the no-disturbance zone. (Exhibit 8-4, 
Photographs) 
2.07 The July 11, 2001 Assessor photographs reveals site disturbance work within the no-disturbance 
zone without the benefit of submission of new application materials. (Exhibit 8-3b, Photograph) 
2.08 Assessor pictures dated July 17, 2002 show both manicured lawn and the installation of a rock 
bulkhead within the no-disturbance zone, which is inconsistent with both of the applicable County 
Site Disturbance Ordinances, as well as the site plans submitted and approved for permits #30796 
and #40613. (Exhibits S-3c, d, e, f, Photographs) 
2.09 The photographic evidence provided during the course of this violation along with testimony and 
research by staff, clearly show that there is a violation of the site disturbance ordinance. 
III APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS 
3.0 I Kootenai County Site Disturbance Ordinance No. 374, adopted December 12, 2005, codified at Title 
11, Chapter 2, Kootenai County Code 
Site Disturbance Ordinance No. 251, adopted January I, 1997 
Site Disturbance Ordinance No. 283, adopted July 26, 1999 
The following language pertaining to this violation is contained in the current Site Disturbance 
Ordinance, Ordinance No. 374, and is unchanged from that contained in the previous Site 
Disturbance Ordinances, Ordinance No. 251 and Ordinance No. 283: 
Section 4: 
Undisturbed Natural Vegetation Bu([er - An area where no development activity has occurred or 
will occur, including, but not limited to, logging, construction of utility trenches, roads, structures, 
or surface and stormwater facilities. Buffer areas shall be left in their natural state. 
Section 8(B): 
Waterfront Lots:For lots with/rontage on a recognized lake or the Coeur d'Alene or Spokane Rivers, 
an undisturbed natural vegetation buffer shall be retained at the waterfront. A stairway or walkway 
(which does not exceed 4 feet in width), stairway landings (which do not exceed 6 feet in width or 
length), or a tram shall be allowed to encroach within the buffer. The buffer shall be a minimum of 
25 feet in slope distance from the high water mark of the water body. For purposes 0/ this 
Ordinance. high water marks shall be considered to be the following elevations: 
Coeur d'Alene Lake 2125.0 (N.G. v.D. 1929 datum) 
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3.02 Building and Planning Department Fee Schedule per Resolution No. 2006-111; Appeal of 
Administrative Determination, Rescheduling Hearing 
Reschedule Hearing 
Public Notice 
$200.00 
$ 40.00 
IV HEARING EXAMINER ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS (from Hearing Examiner report) 
In the matter of the appeal of Douglas Stafford, regarding the issuance of code violation CV07-0092, a site 
disturbance code violation, Mr. Magnuson requests the estoppel of the notice of violation,as based upon the 
following: 
4.01 Mr. Magnuson claims that the County has waived its right to claim a violation based upon their de 
facto prior approval of development in the no disturbance buffer. The evidence presented by 
theBuilding & Planning Department supports a finding that the vast majority of the violations 
occurred after the issuance of their 2000 building permit, and the release of the site disturbance 
surety in association with that permit. Granting of the 2007 building permit for the addition was 
irrelevant with respect to pre-existing violations, particularly in light of Section RI05.4 of the 
International Residential Building Code, which clearly states "The issuance or granting of a permit 
s hall not be construed to be a permit for, or an approval of, any violation of any provisions of this 
code or any other ordinance of the jurisdiction. " 
4.02 Mr. Magnuson claims that Ordinance 374 does not apply to alleged violations under consideration, 
which occurred prior to the effective date of the ordinance of December 8, 2005, as based upon 
Section 15 of that ordinance, which states that the provisions of Ordinance 374 "shall supersede" the 
requirements of the prior Site Disturbance Ordinance No. 283. He argued that Webster's dictionary 
defines the "supersede" as "causing to be set aside and rendered useless, void." Section 16 of 
Ordinance 374, established the effective date as December 12,2005. On this basis, he argued that if 
the prior ordinance was rendered null and void, and the new ordinance did not take effect until a date 
certain, all violations prior to the effective date of the new ordinance were essentially 
"grandfathered. " 
While Mr. Magnuson's definition of "supersede" is, in fact, one of the definitions listed in Webster's 
Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of the English Language, Portland House, New York, 1989, it 
also lists the definition as "to replace in power, authority, effectiveness, acceptance, use, etc., as by 
another person or thing." In the case of Ordinance 374 "superseding" prior Site Disturbance 
Ordinances that would generally and reasonably be interpreted to mean that Ordinance 374 
"replaced" prior Site Disturbance Ordinances in use after its effective date. Therefore, Mr. 
Magnuson's argument that Ordinance 374 rendered Ordinance 251 null and void, thus 
grandfathering any pre-existing violations, appears to be without merit. 
4.03 Mr. Magnuson claims that the alleged violations are otherwise unsupported in fact andlor in law. 
The argument that sand, basalt boulders, lawn and other "re-greening" were natural and allowed 
under the ordinance appears to have no merit, as the intent of "Undisturbed Natural Vegetation 
Buffer" in both Ordinance 251 and 374 is quite explicit in the definition, which appears in both 
ordinances: "An area where no development activity has occurred or will occur, including but not 
limited to, logging, construction of utility trenches, roads, structures, or surface and stormwater 
facilities. Buffer areas shall be left in their natural state." Section 8 of both those ordinances, 
which addresses Disturbance Restrictions, is also quite explicit as to the location of the undisturbed 
natural vegetation buffer for waterfront properties, actually citing the high water mark from which 
this buffer distance shall be measured specifically for Lake Coeur d'Alene. Photos taken by the 
Assessor, as well as the Hearing Examiner's site visit, confirm that activities, landscaping, and 
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development not in conformance with the Site Disturbance Ordinance have, in fact, occurred within 
the required 25' Undisturbed Natural Vegetation Buffer. 
As a separate issue brought forward at the hearing, Mr. Magnuson sought a refund of a $240 rescheduling 
fee. 
4.04 Mr. Magnuson c.iaims that the hearing originally scheduled for August 21, 2008 was effectively 
rescheduled by County staff, after he refused to pay the fee that was required by a date specific as a 
condition of his rescheduling. On this basis, he argues that the County lacked the authority to 
impose the $240 re-scheduling fee. The County clearly has the authority to charge a rescheduling 
fee for applicant-initiated re-scheduled hearings, as based on Resolution No. 2006-111. Based upon 
the record established by Mr. Magnuson through correspondence with Roxanne Webb, he contacted 
the Building & Planning Department on August 18, 2008, prior to the scheduled hearing, requesting 
that the hearing be rescheduled. On August 19, 2008, he was faxed a letter from Building and 
Planning, stating the hearing would be rescheduled if he provided a check in the amount of $420 by 
4 pm that same day (August 19). He provided evidence that he in fact e-mailed and faxed a letter to 
the Building & Planning Department on August 19 refusing to pay the fee and rescinding the request 
to reschedule. He was then told that the hearing had already been pulled from the agenda, and that a 
retraction could not be granted due to the newspaper deadline for public notice cancellation. These 
facts were corroborated by Roxanne Webb's timeline(Exhibit HE-l002). As based upon the letter 
from Ms. Webb, faxed to Mr. Magnuson on August 19, Mr. Magnuson testified that he understood 
this to mean that the hearing would not be rescheduled if he was unwilling or unable to pay the fee 
by 4 pm that day. His response on August 19 clearly stated that he was "rescinding his request" to 
have the hearing rescheduled and that he was unwilling to pay the fee. The fact is that he responded 
within the deadline established by Ms. Webb and withdrew that request for re-scheduling. It appears 
that the County chose to go ahead with the rescheduling (regardless of the reason), and therefore, it 
appears unwarranted to charge the appellant[ s] the cost associated with the rescheduled hearing. 
V HEARING EXAMINER RECOMMENDATION (from Hearing Examiner report) 
5.01 In the case of APP08-002, an appeal by Douglas Stafford regarding the issuance of code violation 
CV07-0092, as based upon the Analysis and Findings set forth in this document, and the 
AppelJant[s]' failure to present facts or evidence to support overturning the Director's notice of 
violation, the Appellant[s'] request to estop the notice of violation CV07-0092, and any enforcement 
actions undertaken pursuant thereto, is hereby DENIED. 
5.02 In regard to the imposition of the $240 re-scheduling, as based upon the findings and analysis 
contained herein, the Hearing Examiner hereby finds that $240 fee for re-scheduling was improperly 
levied against the Appellant[s], and hereby recommends to the Kootenai County Board of 
Commissioners that the $240 fee be refunded. 
VI BOARD ANALYSIS 
6.01 At the appeal hearing, the Board received testimony and evidence from Mr. Magnuson, Dr. Stafford, 
Mrs. Stafford and Building and Planning Department Staff. They also reviewed the letter in 
reference to the appeal submitted by Mr. Magnuson, and reviewed the Staff Report, Hearing 
Examiner Report and the documentary and photographic evidence admitted into the record at the 
appeal hearing before the Hearing Examiner. 
6.02 The testimony and evidence admitted at the appeal hearing clearly shows that there is site 
disturbance in the 25 foot no-disturbance zone. This disturbance is not in compliance with Site 
Disturbance Ordinance No. 374. Appellants failed to prove by a preponderance of evidence that any 
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of these disturbances predated the enactment of Site Disturbance Ordinance No. 251, when this no-
disturbance zone was first established. 
6.03 In regards to the definition of "supersede," the Board concurs with the Hearing Examiner's analysis 
ofthis issue, as set forth in section 4.02 above. 
6.04 The code violation which is the subject of this appeal may be remedied through the approval and 
completion of a site disturbance remediation plan. 
6.05 Since the BBQ fire pit shown in the site disturbance plan, permit #40613 was approved and issued 
on July 25, 2006, it will therefore be allowed to stay as shown on the plan. 
6.06 After receiving testimony and evidence admitted at the appeal hearings before the Hearing Examiner 
and the Board in regards to the $240.00 rescheduling fee, the Board concurs with the Hearing 
Examiner's analysis and recommendation on this issue. The letter to the appellant-is clear that 
County staff would reschedule the hearing if the County received the appropriate rescheduling fee. 
Because the applicant did not pay the required fee and staff nevertheless cancelled the hearing, it is 
appropriate for the County to bear this cost. 
VII CONCLUSIONS OF LA W 
7.01 The applicable ordinance under consideration in this appeal is Site Disturbance Ordinance No. 374, 
codified at Title 11, Chapter 2, Kootenai County Code. 
7.02 The Appellant received sufficient notice of the nature of the violation and of necessary measures to 
bring the property into compliance with the applicable requirements of the Site Disturbance 
Ordinance. 
7.03 The Department properly determined that the development on site is not in conformance with the 
applicable requirements of the Site Disturbance Ordinance. Specifically, the un-permitted 
development of, including but not limited to, a waterfall, lawn, bulkhead, swales and sand within the 
25 foot no disturbance zone. 
7.04 The code violation which is the subject of this appeal may be remedied through the approval and 
completion of a site disturbance remediation plan. 
7.05 Rescheduling fees were inappropriately charged under the Building and Planning Department Fee 
Schedule. The Appellant responded within the deadline established and withdrew that request for re-
scheduling. 
VIII ORDER OF DECISION 
Based upon the Findings of Fact, Board Analysis, and Conclusion of Law set forth in this document, and on 
the record of proceedings in this appeal, the Kootenai County Board of Commissioners hereby ORDERS 
that the issuance of the Notice ofYiolation in Case No. CY07-0092 be, and hereby is, AFFIRMED. 
The Board further ORDERS as follows: 
8.01 The Appellants, Dr. Douglas Stafford and Ms. Michelle Stafford, shall submit and receive approval 
for a Site Disturbance Remediation Plan and pay all associated fees. The proposed Site Disturbance 
Remediation Plan shall be submitted, and all associated fees shall be paid, within sixty (60) days 
from the date of signing of this Amended Order. 
('\ 5 I) U L. 
Barry McHugh, Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney 
Patrick M. Braden, Civil Deputy, ISB #6020 
451 N. Government Way 
P.O. Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-9000 
Telephone: (208) 446-1620 
Fax: (208) 446-1621 
Attorney for Defendants/Respondents 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
DOUGLAS AND MICHELLE STAFFORD, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs/Petitioners, 
vs. 
KOOTENAI COUNTY, a political 
subdivision of the State of Idaho, acting 
through the KOOTENAI BOARD OF 
COMMISSIONERS; and ELMER R. 
"RICK" CURRIE, RICH PIAZZA, and 
TODD TONDEE. COMMISSIONERS, in 
their official capacities, 
Defendants/Respondents. 
Case No. CV-09-2S16 
NOTICE OF LODGING OF 
TRANSCRIPT AND AGENCY 
RECORD 
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 84, that a certified copy of 
the Agency Record (Volumes 1 through 7) in the above-captioned matter is available for 
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pick up at the Office of the Board of County Commissioners of Kootenai County, 451 N. 
Government Way, Third Floor, Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816. 
YOU ARE FURTHER NOTIFIED, pursuant to LR.C.P. 84, that a certified copy of 
the Transcript (Volume 1 of 1) of the hearings before the Board of County 
Commissioners of Kootenai County, Idaho, held on October 2, 2008, February 12, 
2009, March 19,2009, and April 16, 2009, in the above-captioned matter pertaining to 
Case No. APP08-0002, is available for pickup at the Office of the Board of County 
Commissioners of Kootenai County, 451 N. Government Way, Third Floor, Coeur 
d'Alene, Idaho 83816. 
YOU ARE FURTHER NOTIFIED, pursuant to LR.C.P. 84, that the total cost for 
the Agency Record and Transcript is $867.95, as documented by the actual cost 
statement attached hereto as Exhibit "An and made a part hereof by reference. The 
sum of $853.30 was paid by the Petitioner, leaving a balance due of $14.45. 
Respondent requests that Petitioners make payment to the Kootenai County Building & 
Planning Department. 
YOU ARE FURTHER NOTIFIED, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 840), that you have 
fourteen (14) days from the date of mailing of this notice in which to file with the Board 
of County Commissioners of Kootenai County any objections to the Transcript or to the 
Agency Record. The Transcript shall be deemed settled if no objection thereto is made 
within fourteen (14) days after the date of service of this notice. The Agency Record 
shall be deemed settled if no objection thereto is made within fourteen (14) days after 
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the date of service of this notice. 
DATED this 'LrtJ day of July, 2009. 
Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney 
Patrick M. Braden, Civil Deputy 
Attorney for Defendants/Respondents 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ~,) day of July, 2009, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing via facsimile (FAX) to the following persons: 
John F. Magnuson 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 2350 
1250 Northwood Center Court, Suite A 
Coeur d'Alene, JD 83814 
Fax: (208) 667-0500 
Patrick M. Braden 
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I KOOT NAI COUNTY BUILDING & PLANNING 
DEPARTMENT 
Memo 
To: John F. Magnuson r rnA'" .1 __ 0l.NVl~ 6i/~ 
From: Sandi Gilbertson, Administrative Supervisor 
Re: Actual Cost - Preparation of Record and Transcript 
District Court Case No. 09-2516 
Building and Planning Case Nos. APP08-0002 and CV-07-0092 
Date: July 2, 2009 
The following is the actual cost for preparation of the transcript and record pertaining to Case No. APPOS-0002 
and CV-07-0092. 
Case No. APPOS-0002 was heard on the following dates: 
10/02/0S 
02/12/09 
03/19/09 
04/16/09 
Hearing Examiner Appeal Hearing 
BOCC Appeal Hearing 
BOCC Signing 
BOCC Signing of Amended Order 
Actual length of transcript = 110 pages @ $4.50 per page 
Two additional copies @ $0.05/page 
TRANSCRIPT TOTAL (3 SETS) 
Actual for copies of Case Files 
1293 black & white pages @ $0.05/page 
120 color pages @ $0.25/page 
Maps (24" x 36") North Idaho Blueprint 
Stafftime/mileage to North Idaho Blueprint for large maps 
Time spent on estimate 1.0 hours @ $25.00/hour 
$ 495.00 
$ 11.00 
$ 64.65 
$ 30.00 
$ 94.65 x 3 sets 
ACTUAL COST TOTAL RECORD & PREPARATION COSTS (3 SETS)= 
ESTIMATED TOTAL RECORD & PREPARA TION COSTS = 
AMOUNT DUE 
C: Pat Braden, Civil Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
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$ 506.00 
$ 283.95 
$ IS.00 
$ 35.00 
$ 25.00 
$ 867.95 
$ 853 .50 
$ 14.45 
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451 Government Way • P.O. Box 9000 • Coeur d' Alene, ID 83816-9000 
Barry McHugh, Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney 
Patrick M. Braden, Civil Deputy, ISB #6020 
451 N. Government Way 
P.O. Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, 1083816-9000 
Telephone : (208) 446-1620 
Fax: (208) 446-1621 
Attorney for Defendants/Respondents 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
DOUGLAS AND MICHELLE STAFFORD, 
husband and wife, 
PIa intiffs/Petitioners, 
vs. 
KOOTENAI COUNTY, a political 
subdivision of the State of Idaho, acting 
through the KOOTENAI BOARD OF 
COMMISSIONERS; and ELMER R. 
"RICK" CURRIE, RICH PIAZZA, and 
TODD TONDEE, COMMISSIONERS, in 
their official capacities, 
Defendants/Respondents. 
Case No. CV-09-2S16 
NOTICE OF SETILEMENT AND 
FILING OF TRANSCRIPT AND 
AGENCY RECORD 
Kootenai County, a political subdivision of the State of Idaho, acting through the 
Kootenai Board of Commissioners, and Elmer R. "Rick" Currie, Rich Piazza, and Todd 
Tondee, Commissioners, in their official capacities (hereinafter referred to as 
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"Respondents"), by and through their attorney of record, Patrick M. Braden, Civil Deputy 
Prosecuting Attorney, hereby provide notice of the following: 
1. The Agency Record (Volumes 1 through 7) and Transcript (Volume 1 of 1) 
in the above-captioned matter, of the hearings before the Board of County 
Commissioners of Kootenai County, Idaho, held on October 2,2008, February 12, 
2009, March 19,2009, and April 16, 2009, in the above-captioned matter, pertaining to 
Case No. APP08-0002, were compiled and lodged with the Board of County 
Commissioners on July 2,2009. 
2. A Notice of Lodging of Transcript and Agency Record was filed with the 
District Court on July 2,2009, and was served via facsimile on counsel for the 
Petitioners on that date. 
3. Pursuant to I.RC.P. 84(j), the parties to this action had fourteen (14) days 
. from the date of service of the Notice of Lodging of Transcript and Agency Record to 
object to the Agency Record and/or Transcript. No objections were received by the 
Board of County Commissioners within the aforementioned time period. Therefore, 
pursuant to I.RC.P. 840), the Agency Record and Transcript are deemed settled. 
4. The settled Agency Record and Transcript in the above-captioned matter 
were filed with the District Court on July 17, 2009, in compliance with I.RC.P. 84(k). 
5. Pursuant to I.RC.P. 84(p) and I.A.R 34(c), except as may be modified by 
stipulation of the parties or subsequent order of the District Court, the briefing schedule 
in the above-captioned matter shall be as follows: 
a. Petitioner's opening brief shall be filed no later than August 21,2009 
(35 days from filing of this notice). 
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b. Respondent's brief shall be filed no later than twenty-eight (28) days after 
the date of service of Petitioner's opening brief. 
c. Petitioner's reply brief, if any, shall be filed no later than twenty-one (21) 
days after the date of service of Respondent's brief. 
6. Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 84(q), the Court is hereby requested to set the above-
captioned matter for oral argument. 
DATED this 17th day of July, 2009. 
Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney 
Patrick M. Braden, Civil Deputy Prosecutor 
Attorney for Defendants/Respondents 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 17th day of July, 2009, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing via facsimile (FAX) to the following persons: 
John F. Magnuson 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 2350 
1250 Northwood Center Court, Suite A 
Coeur d'Alene, 10 83814 
Fax: (208) 667-0500 
Hon. John T. Mitchell 
Delivery to Chambers 
Patrick M. Braden 
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JOHN F. MAGNUSON 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 2350 
1250 Northwood Center Court, Suite A 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
Phone: (208) 667-0100 
Fax: (208) 667-0500 
ISB #4270 
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Petitioners 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
DOUGLAS AND MICHELLE 
STAFFORD, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs/Petitioners, 
vs. 
KOOTENAI COUNTY, a Political 
Subdivision of the State of Idaho, acting 
through the KOOTENAI BOARD OF 
COMMISSIONERS; and ELMER R. 
"RICK" CURRIE, RICH PIAZZA, and 
TODD TONDEE, COMMISSIONERS, in 
their official capacities, 
Defendants/Respondents. 
CASE NO.: 09-2516 
PLAINTIFFS' !PETITIONERS' 
OPENING BRIEF ON APPEAL 
COME NOW Plaintiffs/Petitioners Douglas and Michelle Stafford (hereafter "Stafford"), by 
and through their attorney of record, John F. Magnuson, and respectfully submit this Opening Brief 
in support of their appeal pursuant to the Local Land Use Planning Act, I.e. §§ 67-6521 and the 
Idaho Administrative Procedures Act, I.C. §§ 67-5270 through 67-5277. The Staffords seek review, 
from this Court, sitting in its appellate capacity, of that certain "Amended Findings of Fact, 
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Applicable Legal Standards, Conclusions of Law, and Order of Decision" entered by the Kootenai 
County Commissioners on April 16,2009 in Case No. APP08-00002 (also denominated Case No. 
CV -07-0092). Said Decision, appended to the "First Amended Petition for Review" at Exhibit B, 
is referred to herein as "the Board's Order." This Opening Briefis supported by the Agency Record, 
which is refened to herein by the acronym "AR." This Opening Brief is further supported by the 
Transcript of Record, which is referred to herein by the acronym "Tr." 
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE. 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This case represents an appeal under the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act and the Local 
Land Use Planning Act from a final Order of Kootenai County Board of Commissioners finding that 
Douglas and Michelle Stafford violated Kootenai County Ordinance No. 374 (Kootenai County's 
Site Disturbance Ordinance). The Staffords claim, and in fact have proven, that the actions that 
allege to constitute violations of Ordinance No.3 74 were undertaken and known to the County prior 
to the effective date of said Ordinance. The Staffords contend that they have been improperly and 
retroactively cited under an Ordinance with an effective date that post-dates the actions complained 
of. The Board disagreed and this appeal followed. 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
On September 7,2007, the Kootenai County Building and Planning Department caused to 
be issued to Stafford, under the heading "Case No. CV -07-0092," a "Notice of Violation." See AR, 
Vol. I, p. 005. The Notice of Violation alleged that Stafford had violated Kootenai County's Site 
Disturbance Ordinance (Ordinance No. 374) by causing "site disturbance within twenty-five foot set-
back." Id. 
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On March 19,2008, the Kootenai County Building and Planning Department (hereafter "the 
Department") provided Stafford with a "Notice of Site Disturbance Ordinance Violation." See AR, 
Vol. I, p. 0136. That Notice again alleged that Stafford was in violation of Kootenai County's Site 
Disturbance Ordinance (Ordinance No.3 74). Id. The Department advised Stafford that he had forty-
five (45) days within which to file an administrative appeal from the Department's determination 
that Stafford had violated Ordinance No. 374. 
On March 21,2008, Stafford timely appealed the Department's administrative determination 
that Stafford had violated Kootenai County Ordinance No. 374. See AR, Vol. I, p. 0138. Stafford's 
appeal came on before a Kootenai County Hearing Examiner. See AR, Vol. II, p. 0317. the Hearing 
Examiner rejected Stafford's appeal, finding that Stafford had violated Kootenai County Ordinance 
No. 374. See AR, Vol. III, pp. 0468-0474. 
Stafford appealed the Hearing Examiner's Decision to the Kootenai County Board of 
Commissioners (hereafter "the Board"). Id. at pp. 0475-0476. On March 19, 2009, the Board 
entered its Order of Decision, rejecting Stafford's appeal and finding a violation under Ordinance 
No. 374. See AR, Vol. III, pp. 0615-0624. That Decision was amended on April 16,2009. See AR, 
Vol. III, pp. 0628-0636. This appeal followed. 
C. Statement of Facts. 
1. Ordinance No. 251. 
Kootenai County's "Site Disturbance Ordinance No. 251" is contained in the record at AR, 
Vol. I, p. 0046-0066. Ordinance No. 251 took effect on January 1, 1997. Id. at p. 0062. Ordinance 
No. 251 provided that, with respect to lots with frontage on Lake Coeur d'Alene, that "an 
undisturbed natural vegetation buffer shall be retained at the waterfront. . .. The buffer shall be a 
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minimum of twenty-five feet in slope distance from the high water mark of the water body [elevation 
2125.0 (N.G.V.D. 1929 Datum)]." Id. at pp. 0057-58. 1 
Ordinance No. 251 defines a "undisturbed natural vegetation buffer" as: 
An area where no development activity has occurred or will occur, 
including, but not limited to, logging, construction of utility trenches, 
roads, structures, or surface and storm water facilities. Buffer areas 
shall be left in their natural state. 
See AR, Vol. I, p. 0049. 
The purpose of Ordinance No. 251, as stated therein, is: 
Id. at p. 0046.2 
The purpose of this ordinance shall be to protect property, surface 
water, and ground water against significant adverse effects from 
excavation, filling, clearing, unstable earth works, soil erosion, 
sedimentation, and storm water run-off and to provide maximum 
safety in the development and design of building sites, roads, and 
other surface amenities. 
2. Ordinance No. 283. 
Kootenai County "Site Disturbance Ordinance No. 283" became effective July 26, 1999.3 
The stated "purpose" of Ordinance No. 283 did not differ from that stated in Ordinance No. 
lCoeur d'Alene Lake elevation 2125.0 at N.G.V.D. datum equates to elevation 2128 
using Washington Water Power (now Avista) datum. Elevation 2128 is the level artificially 
maintained during the summer months by the Avista dams on the Spokane River, the natural 
outlet to Lake Coeur d'Alene. 
20rdinance No. 251 provides, at Section 13, that violations may be considered a criminal 
misdemeanor and punishable by a maximum fine of$300 or six (6) months injail, or both. See 
AR, Vol. I, p. 0061. 
3 A copy of Ordinance No. 283 was not included in the Administrative Record but is 
provided herewith both to the Court and counsel as a courtesy. 
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251. The definition of "undisturbed natural vegetation buffer," as contained in Ordinance No. 283, 
did not differ from that contained in Ordinance No. 251. The prohibition against development 
activity within the twenty-five (25) foot set-back from elevation 2128 was also unchanged from that 
contained in Ordinance No. 251. 
3. Ordinance No. 374. 
Kootenai County's "Site Disturbance Ordinance No. 374" was adopted effective December 
12,2005. See AR, Vol. I, p. 0093. The stated "purpose" of the Ordinance did not change from the 
purpose declared in Ordinance Nos. 251 and 283. The definition of "undisturbed natural vegetation 
buffer" also went unchanged. Id. at p. 0081. So too did the prohibition against development activity 
within the twenty-five (25) foot set-back zone from elevation 2128. Id. at p. 0089. 
Ordinance No.3 74 contained the following specific language: 
The provisions of this Ordinance [374] shall supersede the provisions 
of Kootenai County Site Disturbance Ordinance No. 283. 
See AR, Vol. I, p. 0093 (emphasis added). Ordinance No. 374 also specifically stated that it "shall 
take effect and be in full force" on December 12,2005. Id. 
4. The Stafford Property. 
The Stafford property consists of a three-quarter acre lot on Lake Coeur d'Alene. See AR, 
Vol. I, p. 0028. The Staffords purchased the property in 1999. See Tr., Vol. I, p. 0057. 
Dr. Stafford offered unrebutted testimony, before the Board, that development activity had 
occurred within the twenty-five (25) foot set-back zone on the property prior to 1999. 
[W]hen we bought the property in 1999 - that area - the development 
that we're on was logged. Urn, the area down by the Lake actually 
was used as a slash pile. When we bought the property, there was a 
slash pile that they - it appears that they attempted to bury it - dug 
PLAINTIFFS'/PETITIONERS' OPENING 
BRIEF ON APPEAL - PAGE 5 
065 
about a three foot hole and they stuck and filled it up with about eight 
or nine foot slash - slash pile of stumps of logs and things. Urn, the 
property was torn up. It uh - noxious weeds on there. Canadian thistle 
and knapweed. 
See Tr., Vol. I, p. 20. Stafford also offered unrebutted testimony before the Board that his propeliy 
had sand within the twenty-five (25) foot set-back zone at the time he purchased it. See Tr., Vol. I, 
p.0058. 
5. The Staffords' First Building Permit Application. 
The Staffords submitted an application for a building permit on the property in July of 1999. 
See AR, Vol. I, p. 0028. Stafford sought to build a single family residence. Id. The permit was 
issued in July of 1999 and construction began. Id. Construction of the Stafford home was 
completed in 2000. The Department signed off on the Staffords' initial "Certificate of Occupancy" 
on March 23, 2000. Id. at pp. 0039-0040. 
6. Subsequent Work Within the Twenty-Five Foot Set-Back Area. 
In the summer of 2000, as confirmed by photographs offered by the Department, the 
Staffords had accomplished minimal clean-up efforts of the prior development activity that had 
occurred within the twenty-five (25) foot set-back zone. See AR, Vol. I, p. 0010. In 2001, Dr. 
Stafford desired to clean-up the prior development activity that had occurred within the twenty-five 
(25) foot set-back zone on his property. See Tr., Vol. I, p. 0057. 
Prior to undertaking any action, Dr. Stafford went to the Department for advice: 
[W)e finished our house in 2000 and moved in. In the summer of .. 
. 2001, we decided that we would like to do something that would 
clean that up. It was a - it was a mess. At that time, we did hire a 
landscaper. Uh, talked to him - came up with some plans. I personally 
went down to Planning and Zoning and talked to the lady behind the 
counter. I don't know her name, but it was in 2001. And specifically 
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asked her, and told her our situation, it had been torn up uh was there 
a problem with us planting grass and trees. And she told us that re-
greening was never a problem. And okay, so if I plant grass and 
plants and trees down there, its not a problem. She repeated re-
greening is not a problem. So we went ahead .... 
See Tr., Vol. I, pp. 0057-0058. Stafford offered unrebutted testimony that the improvements were 
completed in 2001 : 
I have since cleaned up the beach a little bit and moved some rocks 
around and things like that, but urn, so in 2001, our project was 
completed down there and as the photographs and records show we 
were not trying to hide anything - it was there. 
Id. at p. 0058. Photographs offered by the Department show that by July of 2002, the Stafford 
property had been cleaned up, including areas within the twenty-five (25) foot set-back zone. See 
AR, Vol. I, p. 0013. This included the addition of sand to the sand that previously existed (according 
to Dr. Stafford's unrebutted testimony), "re-greening" as approved by the DepaIiment (through the 
unrebutted testimony of Dr. Stafford), and a portion of a barbeque pit that will be discussed more 
fully below. Illustrative photographs are included in the Agency Record at Vol. I, pp. 0011-0025. 
At the time the improvements were completed (July of200 1), the operative Site Disturbance 
Ordinance in effect was Ordinance No. 283. 
7. The Staffords Apply for a Second Building Permit for an Addition to Their 
Home. 
In August of2005, the Staffords applied for a new building permit to authorize construction 
of an addition to their home. See AR, Vol. I, p. 0067. The permit was approved by Kootenai County 
in October of2005. Id. 
As part of the submittals to Kootenai County, in support of their request for a building permit 
for the addition, the Staffords submitted a "Site Plan" prepared by a professional engineer. See AR, 
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Vol. II, p. 0269. This plan is referred to herein as "the Site Plan." The Site Plan depicts the twenty-
five (2S) foot set-back "from vegetation line" (summer elevation of2128 WWP (Avista datum)). 
Id. That set-back line is shown to run through the center of the barbeque pit that Dr. Stafford 
installed in the summer of2001. Id. The Site Plan (as it will be referred to herein) was signed and 
approved by the Kootenai County Building and Planning Department on October 13, 200S. Id. 
Representatives of the County came out to inspect the Stafford construction project, which, 
pursuant to the Site Disturbance permit issued by the County, included silt fences at or near the 
shoreline. See Tr., Vol. I, p. 00S9. These individuals raised no objection or comment to the 
improvements that Dr. Stafford had made some four or five years earlier. Id. 
Effective December 12, 200S, Kootenai County Ordinance No.3 74 was adopted, specifically 
superseding Ordinance No. 283 (which was in effect when the Staffords completed their 
improvements within the twenty-five (2S) foot set-back zone in July of2001). 
8. The Staffords are Cited for Violating Ordinance No. 374. 
The Staffords made request for a Certificate of Occupancy on the addition to their home that 
was authorized by the 200S building permit. This request came in August of 2007. As part of that 
final inspection, the Department issued a "Notice of Violation" (the Notice of Violation at issue in 
this proceeding), claiming that the Staffords had violated Site Disturbance Ordinance No. 374 
(effective December 12, 200S) based upon the improvements that the Department acknowledges 
were completed in July of 2001 (when Ordinance No. 283 was in effect and had not yet been 
superseded). See AR, Vol. I, p. OOOS. 
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9. The Department Refuses to Issue a Certificate of Occupancy Based Upon the 
Claim that the Staffords Had Violated Ordinance No. 374. 
On November 21,2007, the Staffords, through counsel, wrote the Department's Director. See 
AR, Vol. I, pp. 0106-0108. The Staffords attempted to resolve the matter, given the pending 
holidays, and the County's position that they could not occupy their completed addition to their 
home based upon alleged site disturbance violations occurring six (6) years earlier (and prior to the 
adoption and effective date of the Ordinance (Ordinance No. 374) relied upon by the County. The 
County did not respond. 
On December 5, 2007, the Staffords renewed their request to resolve the matter. See AR, 
Vol. I, p. 0105. The County did not respond. 
On January 15, 2008, after the holidays had passed, and some two (2) months later, the 
County responded, refusing to consider the issuance of the Certificate of Occupancy. See AR, Vol. 
I, pp. 0113-0114. 
After subsequent efforts to resolve the matter failed, the Department gave the Staffords notice 
that the Department would be recording the "Notice of Violation," alleging a violation under 
Ordinance No. 374. See AR, Vol. I, pp. 0127-0130. The Staffords then filed their appeal which 
gives rise to this proceeding. Id. at p. 0138. 
10. Proceedings Before the Board of County Commissioners. 
The Staffords argued to the Board that they had been improperly cited under Ordinance No. 
374. Ordinance No.3 74, effecti ve Decem bel' 12, 2005, specifically "superseded" Ordinance no. 283. 
Ordinance No. 283 was in effect in the summer of 2001 when the subject improvements were 
completed. Ordinance No. 374 could not form the basis for a violation based upon action that 
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preceded the effective date of the Ordinance. 
The Board rejected the Staffords argument.4 The Staffords argued at hearing to the Board in 
part as follows: 
It is important to note that the process that we are involved in ... the 
charge against the Staffords is a violation of Ordinance 374. That is 
what they have been charged with. Now, if somebody makes a claim 
about a violation of 283 or 251, that's not the violation alleged here 
today and then there will be an argument in that context as well, but 
this is 374 only. 
See Tr., Vol. I, p. 0087. 
The Board noted that Ordinance No. 283 was in effect at the time the subject improvements 
were completed. Commissioner Tondee stated: 
The new ordinance going forward would be 3 74. That does not negate 
that the time period that ordinance was in effect prior or the previous 
ordinance 283 was in effect prior to that ... [TJhe work was done 
there was an ordinance in effect that did not allow the work that was 
done in 200 I. Vh, and the work that was done in 200 I was done 
without a permit .... We're saying the work was done without a 
permit and it's in violation of our ordinances to do work in that area 
so from my understanding ... there needs to be a remediation plan 
and it needs to put it back. 
See Tr., Vol. I, pp. 0091-0092. 
Commissioner Piazza agreed. "I do believe that 283 was in effect at the time [the 
improvements were completed)." See Tr., Vol. I, p. 0095. 
4The Board did find that the Staffords would not be required to move the barbeque pit 
that was specifically depicted on the Site Plan approved by the Department as part of the remodel 
application. See AR, Vol. II, p. 0269. See also, Tr., Vol. I, p. 0083. 
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II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL. 
A. Whether the Board's order of decision denying the Staffords' appeal was 
erroneous as a matter of law? 
B. Whether the Board's order of decision denying the Staffords' appeal was 
arbitrary, capricious, and/or an abuse of discretion or unsupported by 
substantial evidence? 
e. Whether the County is estopped to claim a violation of Ordinance No. 3747 
III. ARGUMENT. 
A. Applicable Standards on Appeal. 
The Staffords bring this appeal from the Board's Order of Decision pursuant to the Idaho 
Administrative Procedure Act, I.e. § 67-5201, et seq. Pursuant to I.C. § 67-5279, the Board's Order 
of Decision is subject to reversal if this COUl1 finds that the Board's "findings, inferences, 
conclusions, or decisions" are: 
(1) In violation of Constitutional provisions; 
(2) Made upon unlawful procedure; 
(3) Not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or 
(4) Arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. 
See I.e. § 67-5279(3)(a), (c), (d), and (e). 
The role of this Court, in its appellate capacity, in reviewing the Agency record for 
compliance with § 67-5279, has previously been set forth by the Idaho Supreme Court. This Court 
is to independently review the record for compliance with the standards set forth in the 
Administrative Procedures Act. Brett v. Eleventh Street Dock Owners Assn., 141 Idaho 517, 521, 
112 P.3d 805 (2005). 
The Court's role is to review the matter to ensure compliance with the 
applicable standards .... If these standards are not met, the agency 
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action " ... shall be set aside, in whole or in part, and remanded for 
further proceedings as necessary" in accordance with the Court's 
discretion .... 
Brett v. Eleventh Street Dock Owners Assn., 141 Idaho at 521 (citations omitted). 
B. The Board's Decision Sustaining the Violation Alleged Under Ordinance No. 
374 Is Erroneous as a Matter of Law. 
1. The Adoption of Ordinance No. 374 Post-Dated the Conduct 
Alleged to Constitute the Violation. 
Ordinance No. 374 was adopted effective December 12,2005. See AR, Vol. I, p. 0093. 
There is no dispute that the actions giving rise to the violation were performed in the summer of 
2001. Dr. Stafford has so testified. See Tr., Vol. I, p. 0057. The Department's photographs confirm 
the same. See AR, Vol. I, pp. 0009-0019. Since the charging Ordinance (No. 374) was effective 
prospectively from December 12, 2005, and since the complaint of conduct is conceded by the 
County to have occurred in July of200 1, the charge under the ordinance relied upon by the County 
cannot stand. The Board's Decision to the contrary was in error as a matter oflaw. 
2. Ordinance No. 283 is Irrelevant to this Proceeding. 
The Commissioners, in deliberations reflected by the transcript, seemingly determined that 
there was "no harm - no foul" since Ordinance No. 283, in effect between July 26, 1999 and 
December 11,2005 (which encompasses the period when the encroachments were placed in service) 
has similar language to Ordinance No. 374. This too was in error as a matter oflaw. 
First, the Staffords were not charged under Ordinance No. 283. The charging document, 
which carries criminal penalties, was based solely upon Ordinance No. 374. See AR, Vol. I, p. 0005. 
Second, although not essential to the granting of the relief requested on appeal by the 
Staffords, Ordinance No. 283 no longer exists. Ordinance No. 374 specifically provided that it 
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"superseded" Ordinance No. 283. See AR, Vol. I, p. 0093. "Supersede" in this context, is distinct 
from "amend." It is noteworthy that the word "amend" was not used. 
"Supersede" is defined by Black's Law Dictionary as follows: 
"Obliterate, set aside, annul, replace, make void, inefficacious or 
useless, repealed." 
"Annul," one of the alternative definitions for "supersede," is defined by Black's Law Dictionary as: 
"To make void or of no effect." 
"Amend" to the contrary, is defined as "to change, correct, revise, improve." The difference 
between "supersede" and "amend," in the legal sense, is that "supersede" undoes all that went before 
it and starts anew. "Amend," on the other hand, keeps what was done before but simply changes it. 
The use of the term "supersede" in Section 15 of Ordinance No. 374 "obliterated," 
"annulled," and "rendered of no force and effect" the prior Site Disturbance Ordinance (Ordinance 
No. 283). Ordinance No. 374, the very Ordinance upon which the subject violation is based, is 
effective only from December 12, 2005 forward. In other words, and without conceding the same, 
ifthere was an arguable violation of the prior Site Disturbance Ordinance, and if that violation was 
not pursued administratively to a conclusion prior to December 12,2005, the violation is essentially 
"grandfathered" through the adoption of Ordinance No.3 74. 5 
5The resolution of this issue is not essential to finding in the Staffords favor. It is enough 
for this Court to determine that the Staffords were charged under the incorrect Ordinance. It is 
noteworthy, however, that since the Staffords were charged with a criminal violation under 
Ordinance No. 374, and since that violation has proceeded to a final determination, the Staffords 
might well be subjected to double jeopardy in violation of the U.S. Constitution in the event the 
County hereafter attempts to cite them in subsequent proceedings under Ordinance No. 283 
(notwithstanding the fact that Ordinance No. 283 has been "superseded," "annulled," and "made 
void or of no effect"). 
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3. The Board's Determination is Contrary to the Language of 
Ordinance No. 374 as Applied to These Facts. 
The stated purpose of Ordinance No. 374 is "to protect property, surface water, and ground 
water against significant adverse effects from excavation, filling, clearing, unstable earthworks, soil 
erosion, sedimentation, and storm water run-off ... " See AR, Vol. I, p. 0078. There is no showing 
on these facts that the placement of a barbeque pit (specifically authorized and condoned by the 
Department), the replacement of previously-existing sand (an undisputed proposition based upon the 
facts of record), the placement of basalt rocks indigenous to the very property (another point not 
disputed by the record), and the placement of lawn upward from the Lake (but within the twenty-five 
(25) foot set-back) with the County's oral permission and knowledge, creates any "significant 
adverse effects." 
Moreover, the County claims that Ordinance No. 374 was to promote an "undisturbed natural 
vegetation buffer." Yet an "undisturbed natural vegetation buffer" is defined as "an area where no 
development activity has occuned or will occur, including, but not limited to, logging .... " See 
AR, Vol. I, p. 0081. 
There is no dispute, based upon Dr. Stafford's testimony, which was unrebutted, that the 
subject property, prior to the Staffords' purchase of the same in 1999, was logged, developed, and 
used, all within the twenty-five (25) foot set-back zone, for what is defined by the Ordinance as 
"development activity." If the purpose of leaving an undisturbed natural vegetation buffer is to 
preclude development activity, then that purpose is irrelevant when development activity has already 
occurred. Does the County really suggest that the Staffords are to leave an undisturbed slash pile and 
noxious weeds on the property? There wasn't an "undisturbed natural vegetation buffer" in place 
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when Ordinance No. 374 (or Ordinance No. 283 for that matter) became effective based on the facts 
of this case. Hence, there was no "undisturbed natural vegetation buffer" to maintain. 
C. The Board's Determination Was Arbitrary, Capricious, and Constituted an 
Abuse of Discretion. 
The Board's Decision, based upon the factors and authorities set forth above, would primarily 
consist of the specific language of Ordinance No. 374 and well-accepted principles of statutory 
construction, suggests that the Board's application ofthe Ordinance to support a violation under the 
facts at bar was arbitrary, capricious, and to the extent necessary, constituted an abuse of discretion. 
At the very least, the application of Ordinance No. 374 to these facts, sufficient to find a violation, 
was unsuppOIted by substantial evidence or, essentially, any evidence. 
D. The County is Estopped to Claim a Violation Under Ordinance No. 374. 
It is a general proposition that estoppel does not apply to governmental agencies. However, 
it has been held that the people in their collective and sovereign capacity ought to observe the same 
rules of honesty and fair dealing that is expected of a private citizen, and should no more be allowed 
to lull a citizen to repose and confidence in what would otherwise be a false and erroneous position 
than should the private citizen. See Murtaugh Highway Dist. v. Twin Falls Highway Dist., 65 Idaho 
260, 142 P.2d 579 (1943). Consider the facts at bar. 
Dr. Stafford, upon moving into his house, goes to the Kootenai County Building and 
Planning Department and asks what he can do within the twenty-five (25) foot set-back zone. He 
asks if he can plant vegetation. He is specifically advised that "re-greening" is not a problem. He 
asks a second time. He is again told that "re-greening" is not a problem. See Tr., Vol. I, p. 0066. 
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Based on the foregoing, Dr. Stafford plants vegetation within the twenty-five (25) foot set-
back zone. He also replaces or adds to previously-existing sand (a point established by the record) 
and places basalt boulders indigenous to the area within the twenty-five (25) foot set-back zone. He 
also completed the installation of a barbeque pit that is only partially within the twenty-five (25) foot 
set-back zone. 
And what does the County do? The County sends someone out to take pictures of the 
Stafford property in 2001 and 2002. See AR, Vol. I, pp. 0009-0019. Armed with photographs of 
the very substance of what it now claims to constitute a violation, what does the County do? 
Nothing. Five years pass. 
In the interim, the Staffords apply for a permit to build an addition to their home. This 
requires a second Site Disturbance permit. Silt fences are placed at or near the twenty-five (25) foot 
set-back zone. The County inspects the project. No one says anything. In fact, the County actually 
signs off on a Site Plan submitted by the Staffords that shows that the barbeque pit, placed in service 
five years earlier, partially lies within the twenty-five (25) foot set-back zone. See AR, Vol. II, p. 
0269. 
It is only when the Staffords request a Certificate of Occupancy, and the home addition is 
completed, that the County claims a violation of an Ordinance (374) that wasn't even in effect when 
the County took the pictures of the offending encroachments (in 2001 and 2002) but chose to do 
nothing. 
This isn't a case where the Staffords have been charged with violating Ordinance No. 283. 
The inapplicability of Ordinance No. 374 has been raised and noticed to the County at all times 
through proceedings below, but the County has done nothing but press onward under an Ordinance 
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that unquestionably post-dates the offense charged. 
Under these unique facts, the County should be estopped to claim a violation under 
Ordinance No. 374. The Court should so hold. 
IV. CONCLUSION. 
Based upon the reasons and authorities set forth above, Appellants Douglas and Michelle 
Stafford respectfully requests that the Court reverse the Order of Decision of the Kootenai County 
Board of Commissioners, find that, as a matter oflaw, their has been no violation of Ordinance No. 
374 shown (the same Ordinance being inapplicable to the facts at bar), and enter an order remanding 
the matter with instructions that the violation be dismissed. The Staffords also request an award of 
reasonable attorney fees and costs as incurred herein pursuant to Idaho law, including I.e. §§ 12-117 
and 12-121. 
DA TED this 17th day of September, 2009. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was served upon the 
following by hand delivery addressed as follows, this 17th day of September, 2009: 
Patrick M. Braden, Deputy Attorney 
Kootenai County Dept. of Legal Services 
451 Government Way 
P.O. Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-9000 
Fax: 446-1621 
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o ORnJll~AL 
Barry McHugh 
Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney 
By: Patrick M. Braden, ISB #6020 
Civil Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
451 N. Government Way 
P.O. Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, 1083816-9000 
Phone: (208) 446-1620 
Fax: (208) 446-1621 
Attorney for Defendants/Respondents 
·.sTA~E ijf iDAHO \ ~ 
COUNTY OF KOOTENAd S;, 
FILED: 
?U~~ OCT -9 PH I: 28 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
DOUGLAS AND MICHELLE STAFFORD, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs/Petitioners, 
vs. 
KOOTENAI COUNTY, a political 
subdivision of the State of Idaho, acting 
through the KOOTENAI COUNTY BOARD 
OF COMMISSIONERS; and ELMER R. 
"RICK" CURRIE, RICH PIAZZA, and 
TODD TONDEE, COMMISSIONERS, in 
their official capacities; 
Defendants/Respondents. 
Case No. CV-09-2516 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
COME NOW the Defendants/Respondents, KOOTENAI COUNTY, a political 
subdivision of the State of Idaho, acting through the KOOTENAI COUNTY BOARD OF 
COMMISSIONERS, ELMER R. "RICK" CURRIE, RICH PIAZZA, and TODD TONDEE, 
Commissioners, in their official capacities (hereinafter referred to as "the County"), by 
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and through their attorney of record, Patrick M. Braden, Civil Deputy Prosecuting 
Attorney, and hereby provide the following response to Plaintiffs'/Petitioners' Opening 
Brief on Appeal filed with the District Court on September 17,2009. 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
The property which is the subject of this appeal and of the underlying code 
violation, Code Violation No. CV07-0092 (hereinafter referred to as "the subject 
property"), is owned by Dr. Douglas Stafford and Michelle Stafford (hereinafter 
collectively referred to as "Stafford" or individually as "Dr. Stafford" and "Ms. Stafford," 
respectively) and is located at 2707 E. Mockingbird Loop, Harrison, Idaho 83833. The 
subject property is legally described as Lots 15 and 16, Block 1, Amended Plat of Coeur 
d'Alene Lake Estates, according to the plat recorded at Book "G" of Plats, Page 479A, 
Records of Kootenai County, Idaho. This property has been assigned Parcel Number 
01450001 015A by the Kootenai County Assessor. A.R. p. 5-8,629. 
The first Kootenai County Site Disturbance Ordinance, Ordinance No. 251, was 
adopted on October 15, 1996. AR. p. 46-66. Ordinance No. 283, which replaced 
Ordinance No. 251, was adopted on July 21, 1999. See Appendix to Petitioners' 
Opening Brief on Appeal. Ordinance No. 374, which replaced Ordinance No. 283, was 
adopted on December 8, 2005. AR. p. 78-97. Section 8(8) of all three of these 
ordinances provides for an undisturbed natural vegetation buffer of at least twenty-five 
feet (25') in slope distance from the ordinary high water mark (hereinafter referred to as 
the "no-disturbance zone"). AR. p. 57-58, 89; Appendix to Petitioners' Opening Brief on 
Appeal, p. 13. 
080 
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A building permit was issued to the subject property on July 27, 1999 (Permit No. 
30796). The site plan submitted with the Application for Permit No. 30796 showed that 
there was fifty feet (50') from the deck on the house to the ordinary high water mark of 
Lake Coeur d'Alene. A condition of that permit specifically addressed the placement of 
a Grassy Infiltration Area (GIA) on the property as follows: "Lake City Engineering 
need{s] to move {the] GIA out of {the] 25 foot buffer zone." The single family residence 
for Permit No. 30796 was issued a Certificate of Occupancy on March 23,2000, and the 
financial guarantee posted by the property owner was refunded on June 7, 2000. AR. 
p.28-45. 
A building permit for an addition and/or alteration to the previously approved 
single family residence was issued on July 25, 2006 (Permit No. 40613). The site plan 
and the engineered Site Disturbance Plan submitted with that application both show a 
fifty foot (50') setback from the ordinary high water mark (OHWM) of Lake Coeur 
d'Alene. These plans did not depict any development or activity within twenty-five feet 
(25') of the OHWM. AR. p. 67-77. 
A photograph taken by Kootenai County Assessor's Office staff in 2000, 
approximately four months after the certificate of occupancy was issued in conjunction 
with Permit No. 30796, showed that there was still natural vegetation existing within the 
no-disturbance zone, consistent with County approvals and the application materials 
provided by the owner at that time. AR. p. 9-10. A photograph taken by Assessor's 
Office staff on July 11, 2001, however, showed that site disturbance work was ongoing 
within the no-disturbance zone even though no application for a site disturbance permit 
for such activities had been submitted. AR. p. 11-12. Photographs taken by 
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Assessor's Office staff on July 17, 2002 show that both a manicured lawn and a rock 
bulkhead had been placed within the no-disturbance zone in a manner inconsistent with 
the site plans submitted and approved for Permit Nos. 30796 and 40613, and in 
violation of section 8(B) of the Site Disturbance Ordinance. AR. p. 12A-20. 
Photographs of the subject property taken by Kootenai County Building and Planning 
Department (hereinafter referred to as the "Department") staff on August 28, 2007 and 
August 29,2007 show that an unpermitted waterfall, manicured lawn, bulkhead, swales, 
sand and boulders had all been placed within the no-disturbance zone. AR. p. 20-27. 
On August 29, 2007, the Department issued a Notice of Site Disturbance 
Ordinance Violation for violations of the no-disturbance zone. AR. p. 5-6. After this 
Notice of Violation was issued, there were discussion and correspondence between 
Stafford's representatives and the Department concerning whether a remediation plan 
to return the no-disturbance zone to a natural state was necessary, and concerning 
what such a plan would require. AR. p. 100-26. 
The Department mailed a second Notice of Site Disturbance Ordinance Violation 
letter to Stafford on March 19, 2008. This notice stated that Stafford had thirty (30) days 
to appeal the violation, and absent an appeal, had forty-five (45) days to resolve the 
violation. A.R. p. 127-32. On March 21, 2008, John Magnuson, legal counsel for 
Stafford, submitted an appeal of the March 19, 2008 Notice of Violation. A.R. p. 138. 
An appeal hearing was held before Kootenai County Hearing Examiner Lisa Key 
on October 2, 2008. A.R. p. 317-22; Tr. p. 1-36. At that appeal hearing, Ms. Key 
received testimony and evidence from Mr. Magnuson, Dr. Stafford, and from Building 
and Planning Department staff. AR. p. 200-316,328-92,394-467; Tr. p. 3-35. Ms. Key 
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issued a decision denying the appeal and affirming the Department's issuance of the 
Notice of Violation on October 15,2008, though she did recommend that a rescheduling 
fee in the amount of $240 be refunded. AR. p. 468-83. 
The Kootenai County Board of Commissioners (hereinafter referred to as the 
"Board") held an appeal hearing on this matter on February 12, 2009. AR. p. 586-91; 
Tr. p. 37-99. At that appeal hearing, the Board received testimony and evidence from 
Mr. Magnuson, Dr. Stafford, Ms. Stafford, and from Building and Planning Department 
staff. AR. p. 596-610; Tr. p. 38-70,75-89. Bret Bowers and Greg Delevan were given 
the opportunity to explain why they were "affected persons," but were not allowed to 
testify to the merits of the appeal. Tr. p. 70-74. 
After hearing testimony and receiving evidence, the Board conducted 
deliberations on the appeal. Tr. p. 90-98. The Board found that the testimony and 
evidence showed that there had been disturbances dating back to 2001 within the no-
disturbance zone required under section 8(B) of Ordinance No. 283, the Site 
Disturbance Ordinance in effect at that time. The Board further found that the state of 
this buffer was an ongoing violation of the provisions of the Site Disturbance Ordinance 
as set forth in both Ordinance No. 283 and Ordinance No. 374 (and which was originally 
set forth in Ordinance No. 251). The Board also found that the work performed within 
the no-disturbance zone did not predate the enactment of Ordinance No. 251, which 
was when the no-disturbance zone was first established. The Board concurred with the 
Hearing Examiner's analysis of the meaning of the term "supersede," which concluded 
that it was intended to be synonymous with the term "replace," but was not intended to 
be interpreted to mean "render null and void." A.R. p. 622-23; Tr. p. 90-96. 
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The Board required Stafford to have a design professional prepare a plan for the 
remediation of the no-disturbance zone, which would be subject to approval by the 
Department. The work set forth in the plan was then to be completed as weather and 
lake level conditions permitted. AR. p. 623; Tr. p. 97. The Board did specifically allow 
the barbeque pit straddling the boundary of the no-disturbance zone to remain, since it 
had been depicted on plans previously approved by the Department. AR. p. 623; Tr. p. 
92-93, 97. The Board also concurred with the Hearing Examiner's recommendation that 
the $240.00 rescheduling fee be refunded to Stafford. AR. p. 623-24; Tr. p. 90-91, 97. 
The Board issued a written Order of Decision denying the request on March 19, 
2009. A.R. p. 616-24; Tr. p. 100-03. The Board issued an Amended Order of Decision 
changing the timeline for compliance on April 16, 2009. AR. p. 742-50; Tr. p. 104-08. 
Stafford timely filed a Petition for Judicial Review of the Board's decision on March 27, 
2009, and filed a First Amended Petition for Judicial Review on April 24, 2009. AR. p. 
722-32,751-61. 
II. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the decision of the Board in Case No. APP08-0002 was in 
violation of constitutional or statutory provisions, or provisions of county ordinance. 
2. Whether the decision of the Board in Case No. APP08-0002 was arbitrary, 
capricious, or an abuse of discretion, and/or not supported by substantial evidence on 
the record as a whole. 
3. Whether the County should be estopped from citing Stafford for a violation 
of Ordinance No. 274. 
on/1 
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III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Judicial review of planning and zoning decisions made by a board of county 
commissioners under the Local Land Use Planning Act (LLUPA), Idaho Code § 67-6501 
et seq., is to be made the same manner as that of any administrative determination or 
order in accordance with the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act, Idaho Code § 67-
5201 et seq (IAPA). See Idaho Code § 67-6519. Thus, in such cases, the board of 
county commissioners is the "agency" for purposes of judicial review under the IAPA. 
The scope of judicial review of administrative decisions is as follows: 
(1) The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the 
weight of the evidence on questions of fact. 
(3) When the agency was required by the provisions of this chapter or by 
other provisions of law to issue an order, the court shall affirm the agency 
action unless the court finds that the agency's findings, inferences, 
conclusions, or decisions are: 
(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; 
(b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency; 
(c) made upon unlawful procedure; 
(d) not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or 
(e) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. 
If the agency action is not affirmed, it shall be set aside, in whole or in 
part, and remanded for further proceedings as necessary. 
(4) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (2) and (3) of this section, 
agency action shall be affirmed unless substantial rights of the appellant 
have been prejudiced. 
Idaho Code § 67-5279; see also Neighbors for a Healthy Gold Fork v. Valley County, 
145 Idaho 121,126,176 P.3d 126,131 (2007). 
LLUPA requires counties to submit written decisions in all planning and zoning 
matters, and include findings of fact and conclusions of law in such decisions. Idaho 
Code § 67-6535(b). Judicial review of such orders is limited to the record. Balser v. 
Kootenai County, 110 Idaho 37, 39, 714 P.2d 6, 8 (1986). As to the weight of the 
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evidence on questions of fact, the Court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the 
zoning agency. Neighbors, 145 Idaho at 126,176 P.3d at 131. Instead, the Court must 
defer to the county's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. Id. Planning 
and zoning decisions are entitled to a strong presumption of validity, including the 
agency's application and interpretation of its own zoning ordinances. Id. 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. The decision of the Board in Case No. APP08-0002 was not in violation of 
constitutional or statutory provisions, or provisions of county ordinance. 
1. The conduct at issue constitutes an ongoing violation of Section 8(8) of 
the Site Disturbance Ordinance then in effect from the summer of 2001 to 
date. 
The first Kootenai County Site Disturbance Ordinance, Ordinance No. 251, was 
adopted on October 15, 1996. A.R. p. 46-65. Ordinance No. 283, which replaced 
Ordinance No. 251, was adopted on July 21, 1999. See Appendix to Petitioners' 
Opening Brief on Appeal. Ordinance No. 374, which replaced Ordinance No. 283, was 
adopted on December 8,2005. A.R. p. 78-97. 
Section 8(8) of Ordinance No. 251 reads, in pertinent part, as follows: 
Waterfront Lots For lots with frontage on a recognized lake or the Coeur 
d'Alene or Spokane Rivers, an undisturbed natural vegetation buffer sha/l 
be retained at the waterfront. A stairway or walkway (which does not 
exceed 4 feet in width), stairway landings (which do not exceed 6 feet in 
width or length), or a tram sha/l be a/lowed to encroach within the buffer. 
The buffer sha/l be a minimum of 25 feet in slope distance from the high 
water mark of the water body. For purposes of this Ordinance, high water 
marks sha/l be considered to be the fo/lowing elevations: 
Coeur d'Alene Lake 2125.0 (N.GV.D. 1929 datum) .... 
A.R. p. 57-58. Section 8(8) of Ordinance No. 283 reads, in pertinent part, as fo/lows: 
Waterfront Lots For lots with frontage on a recognized lake or the Coeur 
d'Alene or Spokane Rivers, an undisturbed natural vegetation buffer sha/l 
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be retained at the waterfront. A stairway or walkway (which does not 
exceed 4 feet in width), stairway landings (which do not exceed 6 feet in 
width or length), or a tram shall be allowed to encroach within the buffer. 
The buffer shall be a minimum of 25 feet in slope distance from the high 
water mark of the water body. For purposes of this Ordinance, high water 
marks shall be considered to be the following elevations: 
Coeur d'Alene Lake 2125.0 (N.G.v.D. 1929 datum) .... 
Appendix to Petitioners' Opening Brief on Appeal, p. 13. Section 8(8) of Ordinance No. 
374 (codified at section 11-2-6(8) of the Kootenai County Code) reads, in pertinent part, 
as follows: 
Waterfront Lots For lots with frontage on a recognized lake or the Coeur 
d'Alene or Spokane Rivers, an undisturbed natural vegetation buffer shall 
be retained at the waterfront. A stairway or walkway (which does not 
exceed 4 feet in width), stairway landings (which do not exceed 6 feet in 
width or length), or a tram shall be allowed to encroach within the buffer. 
The buffer shall be a minimum of 25 feet in slope distance from the high 
water mark of the water body. For purposes of this Ordinance, high water 
marks shall be considered to be the following elevations: 
Coeur d'Alene Lake 2125.0 (N.G.v.D. 1929 datum) .... 
A.R. p. 89. It is readily apparent that the language of the Site Disturbance Ordinance 
regarding the no-disturbance zone is identical in Ordinance Nos. 251,283, and 374. 
Department staff documented, through testimony and photographs obtained from 
the County Assessor in 2001 and photographs taken by Department staff in 2008, that 
Stafford caused site disturbances to occur, and work to be performed, within the no-
disturbance zone during the summer of 2001. See A.R. p. 9-27. Stafford admitted as 
much at the hearings on this appeal. Stafford has attempted to argue, however, that 
because the work occurred in 2001, while Ordinance No. 283 was in effect, it should not 
be enforced as a violation of Ordinance No. 374 (notwithstanding the identical relevant 
language). 
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What this argument ignores is the fact that the landscaping within the no-
disturbance zone is an ongoing violation of the Site Disturbance Ordinance in effect at 
any given time. Each ordinance has mandated that a 25-foot "undisturbed natural 
vegetation buffer shall be retained at the waterfront" on all property fronting Lake Coeur 
d'Alene. (Emphasis added.) The presence of rock bulkheads, waterfalls, manicured 
lawns, swales, sand and boulders all violate this clear mandate, and do so every day 
they continue to be present within this no-disturbance zone, regardless of however 
aesthetically pleasing these features may be. Therefore, it was perfectly lawful and 
appropriate to cite Stafford for an ongoing violation of this provision of the Site 
Disturbance Ordinance currently in effect, Ordinance No. 374. 
2. The ongoing nature of this violation renders the argument over the 
meaning of the term "supersede" moot. Alternatively, this term should be 
construed to mean "replace" rather than "render null and void." 
Stafford also argues that the Board's determination that the Stafford property was 
in violation of the no-disturbance zone requirement of the Site Disturbance Ordinance 
was improper because the enactment of Ordinance No. 374 "superseded" Ordinance 
No. 283. As discussed above, however, this ignores the fact that the violation at issue 
is ongoing in nature. A violation of Ordinance No. 283 occurred every day from the time 
the first disturbance occurred in the summer of 2001 until Ordinance No. 374 took effect 
on December 12, 2005, and a violation of Ordinance No. 374 has occurred every day 
from that date forward. Therefore, this issue of the meaning of "supersede" as used in 
Ordinance No. 374 is moot. 
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In addition, this language must be read in conjunction with section 1-2-3 of the 
Kootenai County Code, which was adopted via the enactment of Ordinance No. 337, 
effective as of August 30,2004. This section reads, in pertinent part, as follows: 
No new ordinance shall be construed or held to repeal a former ordinance 
whether such former ordinance is expressly repealed or not, as to any 
offense committed against such former ordinance or as to any act done, 
any penalty, forfeiture or punishment so incurred, or any right accrued or 
claim arising under the former ordinance, or in any way whatever to affect 
any such offense or act so committed or so done, or any penalty, forfeiture 
or punishment so incurred or any right accrued or claim arising before the 
new ordinance takes effect.. .. 
K.C.C. § 1-2-3.1 This language specifically provides that an ordinance violation may 
continue to be prosecuted even after a new ordinance is enacted which has the effect of 
replacing or superseding the ordinance in effect at the time of the violation, or even if 
the new ordinance expressly repeals the ordinance previously in effect. Therefore, the 
discussion of the effect of the enactment of Ordinance No. 374 as superseding 
Ordinance No. 283 is of no import. 
Even if the Court were to consider the fact that Ordinance No. 374 superseded 
Ordinance No. 283 to be relevant to its decision, the citation for violating the no-
disturbance zone requirement was proper nevertheless. No Idaho appellate opinion 
has· provided a definitive definition for the word "supersede." However, a recent 
decision of the Montana Supreme Court employed the following definition: "Supersede 
is defined in Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary as '2: to take the place, room, or 
position of; 3: to displace in favor of another.'" Pula v. State, 40 P.3d 364, 374 (Mont. 
2002).2 This definition more accurately describes the effect of the adoption of 
1 A true and correct copy of Ordinance No. 337, with section 1-2-3 of the Kootenai County Code attached, 
is provided as Appendix "Au to this brief. 
2 A copy of Pula is provided as Appendix "S" to this brief. 
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Ordinance No. 374, as it pertained to the same subject matter and replaced Ordinance 
No. 283 as of its effective date of December 12, 2005. 
It is true that from that date forward, Ordinance No. 283 had no further force or 
effect. This does not change the fact that Ordinance No. 283 was in full force and effect 
until December 12, 2005, however. Any other interpretation would lead to the absurd 
result of making conduct which was unlawful at the time it occurred suddenly lawful as a 
nonconforming use. A nonconforming use is in fact a use of property which was lawful 
at the time it was established but is not in compliance with ordinance provisions 
currently in effect. Baxter v. City of Preston, 115 Idaho 607, 608-09, 768 P.2d 1340, 
1341-42 (1989). This "grandfather right" simply "protects the owner from abrupt 
termination of what had been a lawful condition or activity on the property" but "does not 
extend beyond this purpose." Bastian v. City of Twin Falls, 104 Idaho 307, 309, 658 
P.2d 978, 980 (Ct. App. 1983) (emphasis added). Thus, the interpretation of the effect 
of the word "supersede" advanced by Stafford would turn the longstanding legal 
principle of nonconforming uses on its head. 
3. The decision of the Board properly applied the language of Section 8(B) of 
the Site Disturbance Ordinance to the facts of this case. 
Stafford argues that the Board's determination that the Stafford property was in 
violation of the no-disturbance zone requirement of the Site Disturbance Ordinance was 
improper because the Department failed to show that the work performed within the no-
disturbance zone had any significant adverse effects. Stafford also contends that the 
work actually had a beneficial effect, as it cleaned up the pre-existing slash pile and 
noxious weeds which were present in that area. 
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These arguments miss the point, which is that this property is required, and at all 
relevant times has been required, to maintain a 25-foot undisturbed natural vegetation 
buffer from the ordinary high water mark of Lake Coeur d'Alene (defined as 2,125' per 
N.G.V.D. 1929 datum, which is equivalent to 2,128' per Avista datum). The no-
disturbance zone serves the purpose of the Site Disturbance Ordinance by minimizing 
the risk of erosion, sedimentation and runoff (whether from stormwater or human 
activity) into Kootenai County's lakes, and particularly Lake Coeur d'Alene, from 
whatever source. See AR. p. 78. It is not necessary, however, to prove actual 
"significant adverse effects" in order to cite a property owner for a violation of any 
provision of this ordinance, including the no-disturbance zone mandate - particularly 
when the facts supporting the citation are undisputed. 
With respect to the alleged beneficial effect of the features placed within the no-
disturbance zone, it may well be that these features are more aesthetically pleasing 
than was the case prior to their placement within the no-disturbance zone. However, 
when one looks below the surface, such features in such close proximity to the lake are 
not necessarily beneficial. Added sand quickly washes into the lake, particularly during 
periods of high water. Lawns typically are watered, and are often fertilized. Thus, the 
Site Disturbance Ordinance requires that stormwater treatment occur landward of the 
no-disturbance zone. See AR. p. 87, 89. Otherwise, nutrients would flow unchecked 
into the lake. Water features such as the one on the Stafford property are not allowed 
in the no-disturbance zone for the same reasons. See AR. p. 27. Rock walls and 
boulders also slowly erode over time. The Board recognized that what may be 
aesthetically pleasing is not necessarily beneficial to the environment, and thus ordered 
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that the no-disturbance zone be remediated to a more natural state as determined by a 
design professional, as defined in the Site Disturbance Ordinance, in a remediation plan 
approved by the Department. See A.R. p. 79, 623, 626. 
The undisputed evidence shows that there is an ongoing violation of the no-
disturbance zone mandate of the Site Disturbance Ordinance on the Stafford property, 
regardless of whether this violation has itself caused any "significant adverse effects" on 
Lake Coeur d'Alene. Therefore, the Board correctly applied the language of the Site 
Disturbance Ordinance, which has remained unchanged since the activities at issue 
began, to the facts of this case. Accordingly, its decision that Stafford was properly 
cited for a violation of the Site Disturbance Ordinance should be affirmed. 
B. The decision of the Board in Case No. APP08-0002 was supported by 
substantial evidence in the record as a whole, and was not arbitrary, 
capricious, or an abuse of the Board's discretion. 
1. The decision of the Board was supported by substantial, undisputed 
evidence in the record. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has defined "substantial evidence" as "relevant 
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion." Lamar Corp 
v. City of Twin Falls, 133 Idaho 36, 42-43, 981 P.2d 1146, 1152-53 (1999). It is "less 
than a preponderance of evidence, but more than a mere scintilla." Cowan v. Fremont 
County, 143 Idaho 501, 517, 148 P.3d 1247, 1263 (2006). Substantial evidence "need 
not be uncontradicted, nor does it need to necessarily lead to a certain conclusion; it 
need only be of such sufficient quantity and probative value that reasonable minds 
could reach the same conclusion as the fact finder." Id. 
As discussed above, the undisputed evidence in the record shows that a violation 
of the no-disturbance zone mandate of the Site Disturbance Ordinance currently exists 
09) 
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on the Stafford property. Therefore, the Board's decision that the Department properly 
issued a citation to Stafford for violating the Site Disturbance Ordinance was based on 
substantial evidence in the record as a whole. 
2. The decision of the Board was neither arbitrary nor capricious. 
A decision of a governing board will be considered "arbitrary and capricious," and 
an abuse of the governing board's discretion, only if it was made "without a rational 
basis, or in disregard of the facts and circumstances, or without adequate determining 
principles." Lane Ranch Partnership v. City of Sun Valley, 145 Idaho 87, 91, 175 P.3d 
776,780 (2007). As long as the governing board has been found to have acted within 
the bounds of its discretion, however, a reviewing court cannot substitute its judgment 
for that of the governing board. Id. Where reasonable minds may differ, "an action is 
not arbitrary or capricious when exercised honestly and upon due consideration, even 
though it may be believed that an erroneous conclusion has been reached." Enterprise, 
Inc. v. City of Nampa, 96 Idaho 734, 739, 536 P.2d 729, 734 (1975). 
As discussed above, the Board took the facts and circumstances set forth in the 
undisputed evidence into account in making the decision that a violation of the no-
disturbance zone requirement of the Site Disturbance Ordinance did occur and did 
currently exists on the Stafford property, and that the Department properly cited Stafford 
for that violation. This decision thus had a rational basis and was based on adequate 
determining principles. Therefore, the Board's decision that the Department properly 
issued a citation to Stafford for violating the Site Disturbance Ordinance was not 
arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of the Board's discretion. 
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C. The County should not be found to be estopped from citing Stafford for 
violations of the Site Disturbance Ordinance. 
Stafford correctly notes that the doctrine of estoppel is generally not applied 
against governmental entities, and also correctly states that Idaho courts have refused 
to impose an absolute bar on the application of estoppel against governmental entities, 
particularly if the entity is acting in a proprietary or business capacity. See Murtaugh 
Hwy. Dist. v. Twin Falls Hwy. Dist., 65 Idaho 260, 142 P.2d 579, 582 (1943). The 
doctrine of estoppel, however, is strongly disfavored in cases involving a governmental 
entity acting in a governmental or discretionary capacity, as is the case when it is acting 
to enforce duly enacted land use ordinances. 
In Harrell v. City of Lewiston, 95 Idaho 243, 506 P.2d 470 (1973), the Idaho 
Supreme Court discussed the history of its prior decisions regarding the application of 
. estoppel against governmental entities, and also discussed the fact that some 
jurisdictions had refused to do so in any circumstance concerning the enactment or 
enforcement of zoning regulations, while other jurisdictions would do so only under 
"extraordinary circumstances." Harrell, 95 Idaho at 247-48, 506 P.2d at 474-75. The 
Harrell Court then adopted the "extraordinary circumstances" rule, and found that no 
exigency existed such as would estop the City of Lewiston from refusing to issue a 
building permit on the basis that the property at issue was zoned F (Farm) rather than 
C-3 (Commercial). 
In a later decision, the Idaho Supreme Court had occasion to apply the Harrell 
rule to facts very similar to those present in this case. Sprenger, Grubb & Associates, 
Inc. v. City of Hailey, 127 Idaho 576, 903 P.2d 741 (1995). That case concerned the 
application of a development agreement originally entered into in 1973, and whether a 
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subsequent rezoning of the property subject to the agreement in 1993 constituted a 
violation of that agreement. Sprenger, 127 Idaho at 578-80,903 P.2d at 743-45. In that 
case, the City of Hailey conceded that the property owner's predecessor in interest had 
fulfilled the terms and conditions of the agreement. Id. at 579, 903 P.2d at 744. The 
then-current property owner had contended that the City of Hailey should have been 
estopped from changing its position as to its obligations under the development 
agreement, since the City had "received the benefit of its bargain." Id. at 582-83, 903 
P.2d at 747-48. The Sprenger Court, however, found that the application of estoppel 
was not appropriate because the City did not breach the agreement, the agreement did 
not impose a "regulatory freeze" on the property in question, and the property owner did 
not rely to its detriment on the prior zoning as opposed to the new zoning. Id. at 582-83 , 
903 P.2d at 747-48. 
Most recently, the Idaho Supreme Court has had occasion to extend the rule 
from Harrell and Sprenger to a case involving a subdivision application. Terrazas v. 
Blaine County, 147 Idaho 193,198-201,207 P.3d 169, 174-77 (2009). In that case, the 
property owners had applied for preliminary subdivision approval based on planning 
staff's interpretation that the property in question did not lie within Blaine County's 
"Mountain Overlay District" (MOD). Id. at 196-97, 207 P.3d at 172-73. They had 
contended that because they had relied on this interpretation to their detriment in the 
form of expenditures of large sums of money in preparing the subdivision application, 
the county should be estopped from denying the application on the basis that the 
property was within the MOD. Id. at 200, 207 P.3d at 176. The Supreme Court, 
however, once again declined to apply the doctrine of estoppel in this matter, expressly 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS - 17 095 
H:\Building and Planning\Stafford CV-09-2516\Brief of Respondents . doc 
2 
finding that to do so would "strip the [governing] boards of their sole statutory authority 
to approve or deny subdivision applications." Id. at 200-01,207 P.3d at 176-77. 
In this case, the police power being exercised by the County is the power to 
enforce its duly enacted ordinances - in particular, the Site Disturbance Ordinance. 
Therefore, the Court should find that the cases which strongly disfavor the application of 
estoppel against a governmental entity acting in a governmental capacity are controlling 
in this case. 
Stafford places much emphasis on the fact that an unnamed Department 
employee told Dr. Stafford that "re-greening is not a problem." See Tr. p. 66. Although 
"re-greening" could be construed to mean planting native vegetation, Dr. Stafford 
apparently took this to mean he could plant what eventually became a manicured lawn 
within the no-disturbance zone. More egregiously, Stafford then went far beyond what 
may have been simply an erroneous or misunderstood statement in also placing such 
features as a rock bulkhead, a water feature flowing directly into the lake, additional 
sand, and basalt boulders within this area. While the County did issue a site 
disturbance permit in conjunction with the building permit for the addition, this permit did 
not authorize either then-existing or future disturbances in the no-disturbance zone. 
Terrazas confirmed once and for all that the Board is the final arbiter of how its 
land use ordinances should be interpreted, and that such pronouncements govern over 
contrary interpretations made by Department staff. See Terrazas, 147 Idaho at 198-
201, 207 P.3d at 174-77. Thus, misunderstood or erroneous advice given by a 
Department staff member or a site inspection which does not immediately lead to a 
citation for an ordinance violation cannot be used as a basis to estop the County from 
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taking action to enforce its land use ordinances. The only potential basis for estoppel 
was taken care of by the Board in its decision allowing the barbeque pit to remain 
notwithstanding the fact that it was partially within the no-disturbance zone, since it was 
depicted as straddling the no-disturbance zone boundary in the site plan approved by 
the Department. Otherwise, the violation of the no-disturbance zone requirement was 
the direct result of actions taken by Stafford, and it is Stafford's responsibility to 
remediate it to where it is in a more natural state. 
v. CONCLUSION 
Because the placement and maintenance of certain features within the Stafford 
property's no-disturbance zone constitutes an ongoing violation of Section 8(B) of the 
Site Disturbance Ordinance then in effect, whether Ordinance No. 283 or Ordinance No. 
374, it is unnecessary to determine the effect of the latter having superseded the 
former. If the Court were to find that the meaning of the term "supersede" is relevant, it 
should find that it means "replace" rather than to "render null and void," as the latter 
meaning would have the effect of legalizing and "grandfathering" actions after the fact 
which were unlawful at the time the act occurred. Thus, the Court should find that the 
Board did not act in violation of constitutional, statutory, or ordinance provisions in 
finding that the Department properly cited Stafford for violating Section 8(B) of the Site 
Disturbance Ordinance. 
The evidence concerning Stafford's activities in the no-disturbance zone is well 
supported in the record, and is generally undisputed. The Board also had a rational 
basis for the decision, and gave serious consideration to the evidence and testimony in 
the record. Therefore, the Court should also find that the Board's decision was 
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supported by substantial evidence in the record, and was not arbitrary, capricious, or an 
abuse of the Board's discretion. In addition, the Court should decline Stafford's 
invitation to find that the Board should be estopped from interpreting its own ordinances 
or exercising its police power in enforcing them in this matter. 
Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, the decision of the Board of County 
Commissioners in Case No. APP08-0002 (pertaining to Code Violation No. CV07 -0092) 
should be AFFIRMED. 
Dated this 9-fh day of October, 2009. 
Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney 
Patrick M. Braden, Civil Deputy 
Attorney for Defendants/Respondents 
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APPENDIX A 
099 
Minutes of Meeting 
August 24, 2004 
2:00 p.m. 
The Kootenai County Board of Commissioners, Chairman Panabaker, Commissioner 
Johnson and Commissioner Currie met in a continuation of the regular meeting of the 
second Monday of August with Deputy Clerk Sandy Maitland present. Also present was 
Chief Legal Counsel Erika Ellingsen. 
Ordinance 337 Adopting the County Code 
The Board met to consider the adoption of Ordinance 337 which officially adopts a 
method of perpetual codification together with the continuous supplement service 
provided by Sterling Codifiers, Inc. From and after the date of passage of this ordinance, 
the County Code of Kootenai County, Idaho prepared by Sterling Codifiers, Inc. containing 
the compilation of all ordinances of a general nature together with the changes made to 
said ordinances, under the direction of the governing body of the County, shall be accepted 
in all courts without question as the official code and law of the County as enacted by the 
County Commissioners. 
Commissioner Currie moved that the Board approve Ordinance 337 Adopting the 
County Code. Commissioner Johnson seconded the motion. 
There being no discussion, Deputy Clerk Sandy Maitland called the roll; 
Commissioner Currie: Aye 
Commissioner Johnson: Aye 
Chairman Panabaker: Aye 
The motion carried. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DANIEL J. ENGLISH, CLERK 
BY:~M,ru±otlrruL 
DeputyCl 
c: Ordinance File 
Sterling Codifiers 
Law Library 
Bldg. & Planning 
KCSO 
Public Defender 
Prosecuting Attorney 
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ORDINANCE NO. 337 
AN ORDINANCE ADOPTING 
THE KOOTENAI COUN1Y, IDAHO COUNTY CODE 
BE IT ORDAINED by the County Commissioners of the County of Kootenai County, 
Idaho, as follows: . 
Section 1: From and after the date of passage of this ordinance, the County Code 
of the County of Kootenai County, Idaho prepared by Sterling Codifiers, Inc. containing 
the compilation of all ordinances of a general nature together with the changes made to 
said ordinances, under the direction of the governing body of the County, shall be accepted 
in all courts without question as the official code and law of the County as enacted by the 
County Commissioners. 
Section 2: There is hereby adopted, as a method of perpetual codification, the 
loose-leaf type of binding together with the continuous supplement service, provided by 
Sterling Codifiers, Inc., whereby each newly adopted ordinance of a general and 
permanent nature amending, altering, adding or deleting provisions of the official County 
Code is identified by the proper catchline and is inserted in the proper place in each of the 
official copies, one copy of which shall be maintained in the office of the County Clerk, 
certified as to correctness and available for inspection at any and all times that said office 
is regularly open. 
Section 3: All ordinances of a gen~ral nature included in this official County Code 
shall be considered as a continuation of said ordinance provision and the fact that some 
provisions have been deliberately eliminated by the governing body shall not serve to 
cause any interruption in the continuous effectiveness of ordinances included in said 
official County Code. All ordinances of a special nature, such as tax levy ordinances, bond 
ordinances, franchises, vacating ordinances and annexation ordinances shall continue in 
full force and effect unless specifically repealed or amended by a provision of the County 
Code. Such ordinances are not intended to be included in the official County Code. 
Ordinance No. 337 
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Section 4: It shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corporation to change or 
amend by. additions or deletions, any part or portion of such code, or to insert or delete 
pages or portions thereof, or to alter or tamper with such code in any manner whatsoever 
which will cause the law of the County to be misrepresented thereby, 
Section 5: All ordinances or parts of ordinances in conflict herewith, are, to the 
extent of such conflict, hereby repealed. 
Section 6: This ordinance and the code adopted by the same shall be recorded 
and shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage, approval and publication as 
provided by law. 
SECfION 32. EFFECfIVE DATE; This Ordinance shall take full force upon its 
approval, passage, and publication on one (1) edition of the Coeur d'Alene Press, a 
newspaper of general circulation within Kootenai County, Idaho. 
APPROVED by the Kootenai County Board of Commissioners on the aY-4.h day of 
AaA~-t , 2004· 
KOOTENAI COUNTY 
ARD OF COMMISSIONERS 
.--"--. 
ATIEST: 
DANIEL J. ENGLISH, CLERK 
Publication Date: __ B_ ...""'80=-.,-_() ...... -f _______ , 2004 
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NOTICE OF ORDINANCE ADOPTION 
The Board of Commissioners of Kootenai County, Idaho, hereby gives notice of the 
adoption of Kootenai County Ordinance No. 337. The full text of the ordinance 
addresses the following subject: 
From and after the date of passage of this ordinance, the County Code of the County of 
Kootenai County, Idaho prepared by Sterling Codifiers, Inc. containing the compilation of 
all ordinances of a general nature together with the changes made to said ordinances, 
under the direction of the governing body of the County, shall be accepted in all courts 
without question as the official code and law of the County as enacted by the County 
Commissioners. 
There is hereby adopted, as a method of perpetual codification, the loose-leaf type of 
binding together with the continuous supplement service, provided by Sterling Coclifiers, 
Inc., whereby each newly adopted ordinance of a general and permanent nature amending, 
altering, adding or deleting provisions of the official County Code is identified by the 
proper catchIine and is inserted in the proper place in each of the official copies, one copy 
of which shall be maintained in the office of the County Clerk, certified as to correctness 
and available for inspection at any and all times that said office is regularly open. 
The full text of Ordinance 337 is available at the Kootenai County Commissioners Office, 
451 Government Way, Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814, weekdays, from 9 a.m. to 5 p.m. 
KOOTENAI COUNTY ATTEST: 
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS DANIEL J. ENGLISH 
~eC2~ By: 
Richard C. Panabaker, Chairman 
Publication Date: Monday, 8/30/04 
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CERTIFICATION 
I hereby certify that the attached Notice of Ordinance Adoption contains a 
true and complete summary of Ordinance No. 337 of Kootenai County, Idaho, 
and that the attached summary provides adequate notice to the public of the 
contents of said Ordinance ~",\,""I/J"''''l . ~,,"'''of 1ST OIS""",1. ~ ~ ~Icr-ltl )-.6_ ~" ~'!y()!o ~ ... ~~v" ~ 
DANIELJ. ENGUSH, CLERK !CjM~ omcE ~,. '\ 
II 1 _ ."...Jl ___ :: gl ALlonoR lie:') E By:~MQ,&l0IMJ~\ AND llil ~ D~ Cl~rk % ~ .... RECaRDER/~ ? ~. "'-.. ,,~ ~ ~ t'~~ .... - ... . ~ .;::. ~. (;t,· -,~:""..r '-:.;; .~ #, '"" ~ ~'\! ~llll iLV;;AO r.'~~ "llm/tl;II,,"1\'\'~ 
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1-2-1 
SECTION: 
1-2-1: 
1-2-2: 
1-2-3: 
1-2-4: . 
CHAPTER 2 
SA VING CLAUSE 
Repeal Of General Ordinances 
Public Utility Ordinances 
Court Proceedings 
Severability Clause 
1-2-3 
1-2-1: REPEAL OF GENERAL ORDINANCES: All general 
ordinances of the county passed prior to the adoption of this 
code are hereby repealed, except such as are included in this code or are 
by necessary implication herein reserved from repeal (subject to the saving 
clauses contained in the following sections), and excluding the following 
ordinances which are not hereby repealed: tax levy ordinances; 
appropriation ordinances; contract ordinances and ordinances authorizing 
the execution of a contract or the issuance of warrants; ordinances relating 
to the transfer or acceptance of real estate by or from the county; 
ordinances authorizing a zone change; ordinances authorizing a bond 
issue; and all special ordinances. (2004 Code) 
1-2-2: PUBLIC UTILITY ORDINANCES: No ordinance relating to 
railroad crossings with streets and other public ways, or 
relating to the conduct, duties, services or rates of public utilities shall be 
repealed by virtue of the adoption of this code or by virtue of the preceding 
section, excepting as this code may contain provisions for such matters, in 
which case this code shall be considered as amending such ordinance or 
ordinances in resp~ct to such provisions only. (2004 Code) 
1-2-3: COURT PROCEEDINGS: No new ordinance shall be 
construed or held to repeal a former ordinance whether such 
former ordinance is expressly repealed or not, as to any offense committed 
against such former ordinance or as to any act done, any penalty, forfeiture 
or punishment so incurred, or any right accrued or claim arising under the 
105 
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former ordinance, or in any way whatever to affect any such offense or act 
so committed or so done, or any penalty, forfeiture or punishment so 
incurred or any right accrued or claim arising before the new ordinance 
takes effect, save only that the proceedings thereafter shall conform to the 
ordinance in force at the time of such proceeding, so far as practicable. If 
any penalty, forfeiture or punishment be mitigated by any provision of a new 
ordinance, such provision may be, by consent of the party affected, applied 
to any judgment announced after the new ordinance takes effect. 
This section shall extend to all repeals, either by express words or 
implication, whether the repeal is in the ordinance making any new 
provisions upon the same subject or in any other ordinance. 
Nothing contained in this chapter shall be construed as abating any action 
now pending under or by virtue of any general ordinance of the county 
herein repealed and the provisions of all general ordinances contained in 
this code shall be deemed to be continuing provisions and not a new 
enactment of the same provision;' nor shall this chapter be deemed as 
discontinuing, abating, modifying or altering any penalty accrued or to 
accrue, or as affecting the liability of any person, firm or corporation, or as 
waiving any right of the county under any ordinance or provision thereof in 
force at the time of the adoption of this code. (2004 Code) 
1-2-4: SEVERABILITY CLAUSE: If any section, subsection, 
subdivision, paragraph, sentence, clause or phrase of this 
code or any part thereof is for any reason held to be unconstitutional or 
invalid or ineffective by any court of competent jurisdiction, such decision 
shall not affect the validity or effectiveness of the remaining portions of this 
code, or any part thereof. The board of county commissioners hereby 
declares that they would have passed each section, subsection, 
subdivision, paragraph, sentence, clause or phrase hereof irrespective of 
the fact that anyone or more sections, subsections, subdivisions, 
paragraphs, sentences, clauses or phrases be declared unconstitutional, 
invalid or ineffective. (2004 Code) 
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c 
Supreme Court of Montana. 
Wendy Michael PULA, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
STATE of Montana, Defendant and Respondent 
No. 99-315. 
Submitted on Briefs Feb. 27,2001. 
Decided Jan. 25,2002. 
Arrestee brought negligence action against the State 
after she was raped by a male inmate while she was 
jailed pending an appearance before a judge. The 
District Court of the Seventeenth Judicial District, 
Blaine County, John C. McKeon, J., entered judg-
ment in favor of the State. Arrestee appealed. The 
Supreme Court, Leaphart, J., held that: (1) evidence 
regarding the conduct of the county and the conduct 
of inmate was admissible in arrestee's negligence 
action against the State; (2) the State presented suffi-
cient evidence to support submission of the case to 
the jury; and (3) the State's jury instructions on inde-
pendent intervening causation did not warrant rever-
sal of judgment 
Affinned. 
TrieweiIer, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which 
Nelson, J.,joined. 
West H eadnotes 
ill Appeal and Error 30 <£:=:>964 
30 Appeal and Error 
30XVJ Review 
30XVl(H) Discretion of Lower Court 
30k963 Proceedings Preliminary to Trial 
30k964 k. In General. Most Cited Cases 
Supreme Court reviews a District Court's grant or 
denial of a motion in limine for an abuse of discre-
tion. 
ill Appeal and Error 30 <£:=:>970(2) 
30 Appeal and Error 
30XVI Review 
30XVJ(H) Discretion of Lower Court 
30k970 Reception of Evidence 
Page 1 
30k970(2) k. Rulings on Admissibility 
of Evidence in General. Most Cited Cases 
Trial 388 ~43 
388 Trial 
388IV Reception of Evidence 
388IVCA) Introduction, Offer, and Admission 
of Evidence in General 
388k43 k. Admission of Evidence in Gen-
eral. Most Cited Cases 
The District Court has broad discretion to determine 
if evidence is admissible; accordingly, absent an 
abuse of discretion, the Supreme Court will not over-
turn the District Court's determination. 
ill States 360 ~112.2( 4) 
360 States 
360m Property, Contracts, and Liabilities 
360kl12 Torts 
360k1 12.2 Nature of Act or Claim 
360k1 12.2(4) k. State Institutions, Inju-
ries in Operation Of. Most Cited Cases 
Evidence regarding the conduct of the county and the 
conduct of inmate was admissible in arrestee's negli-
gence action against the State, and thus arrestee was 
not entitled to a motion in limine to exclude evidence 
of intervening and superseding causes of arrestee's 
injuries; the evidence was relevant on the issue of 
causation of arrestee's injuries while she was in jail 
pending an appearance before a jUdge. 
ill Trial 388 ~139.1(7) 
388 Trial 
388VI Taking Case or Question from Jury 
388VJ(A) Questions of Law or of Fact in 
General 
388k139.1 Evidence 
388kI39.1(5) Submission to or With-
drawal from Jury 
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388kI39.1(7) k. "No" Evidence; To-
tal Failure of Proof. Most Cited Cases 
Trial3881C=>178 
388 Trial 
388VI Taking Case or Question from Jury 
388VleD) Direction of Verdict 
388kJ 78 k. Hearing and Determination. 
Most Cited Cases 
Considering all evidence in the light most favorable 
to the opposing party, judgment as a matter of law is 
properly granted only when there is a complete ab-
sence of any evidence which would justifY submitting 
an issue to the jury. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule SOfa). 
1.£ States 360 ~112.2( 4) 
360 States 
360m Property, Contracts, and Liabilities 
360kJ 12 Torts 
360kl12.2 Nature of Act or Claim 
360klI2.2(4) k. State Institutions, Inju-
ries in Operation Of. Most Cited Cases 
The State presented sufficient evidence to support 
submission of the case to the jury, and thus arrestee 
was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law in 
negligence action; evidence that the sheriff and jail 
employees failed to follow the State's guidelines con-
cerning the housing of inmate, the inmate's access to 
the public, and the inmate's status as a trusty created 
issues regarding breach and causation of arrestee's 
injuries which warranted submission of the case to 
the jury. Rules Clv.Proc., Rule SO(a). 
.llil Trial 388 €='295(1) 
388 Trial 
388VII Instructions to Jury 
388VII(G) Construction and Operation 
3881<295 Construction and Effect of Charge 
as a Whole 
388k295(1) k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
The Supreme Court reviews jury instructions to de-
termine whether the instructions as a whole fully and 
fairly instruct the jury on the law applicable to the 
case. 
11l Appeal and Error 30 <C=:>1068(1) 
30 Appeal and Error 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(J) Harmless Error 
30XVJ(J)J 8 Instructions 
Page 2 
30kl068 Error Cured by Verdict or 
Judgment 
30kJ 068(1) k. In General. Most 
Cited Cases 
The State's jury instructions on independent interven-
ing causation did not warrant reversal of judgment, 
even though the instructions may not have been cor-
rect statements of the law, where the instructions 
stated that if the jury found that the State's negligence 
did not cause injury to arrestee the jury was to sign 
the verdict form and notifY the bailiff it had reached a 
verdict, the jury found that the State's negligence did 
not cause injury to arrestee, and the intervening cau-
sation jury instructions were later in the special ver-
dict form and were not even addressed by the jury. 
**365 *123 For Appellant: Robert M. Peterson, Pe-
terson Law Office, Daniel A. Boucher, Altman & 
Boucher, Havre, MT. 
For Respondent: Dana L. Christensen, Christensen, 
Moore, Cockrell, Cummings & Axelberg, P.C., Ka-
lispell, MT. 
Justice W. WILLIAM LEAPHART delivered the 
Opinion of the Court. 
~ 1 Wendy M. Pula (Pula) appeals the verdict and 
judgment in favor of the State of Montana (State), in 
the Seventeenth Judicial District Court, Blaine Coun-
ty. Pula contends that the District Court erred when it 
denied her motion in limine to exclude evidence of 
third party misconduct, that there is insufficient evi-
dence to support the jury's verdict and that the Dis-
trict Court improperly instructed the jury on interven-
ing and superseding cause. We affIrm the verdict and 
judgment. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
~ 2 This matter arises out of a suit filed in United 
States District Court by Pula against the State of 
Montana, the City of Chinook, three Chinook police 
officers, Blaine County, and the Sheriff of Blaine 
County. All claims against the 9ty of Chinook, 
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Blaine County, and *124 their officers and em-
ployees were dismissed following settlement with 
Pula. The United States DistriCt Court dismissed the 
pendant claim for negligence against tht: Slate of 
Montana, allowing Pula to refile in state court. Pula 
then sued the State in Blaine County, alleging negli-
gence in the incarceration, monitoring and control of 
Montana State Prison inmate Chester Bauer. Bauer 
has a history of sexual assaults against women and 
had been serving sentences at the Montana State 
Prison for sexual intercourse without consent, aggra-
vated assault and felony intimidation. However, after 
being assaulted by fellow inmates and testifYing 
against them, the State arranged to have Bauer 
housed in the Blaine County Jail for his own protec-
tion. 
~ 3 The record indicates that Bauer came to be on 
quite friendly terms with his jailers in Blaine County. 
He was allowed to roam **366 the facility at will, 
had access to keys and was permitted to work in and 
outside the jail wearing civilian clothes. He also ran 
errands for the jail staff 
~ 4 Pula, a twenty-year-old female, had been ticketed 
for minor in possession of alcohol. After failing to 
appear in court for the ticket, she was picked up by 
police and taken to the Blaine County Jail. For what-
ever reason, either because she had no money or was 
afraid or unwilling to call a friend or relative for as-
sistance, Pula could not post bond and was jailed 
pending an appearance before a judge. Because all 
cells in the women's block were full, officers put Pula 
in one of the jail's solitary confinement cells. 
~ 5 The next day, Bauer came to visit Pula in her cell. 
He introduced himself, asked if she was okay, and 
asked her if there was anything he could do to help 
her. Pula later testified at trial that, since Bauer was 
dressed in civilian clothes and seemed to have free 
run of the place, she believed that he worked at the 
jail. She also remembered seeing him around the gro-
cery store where she worked. 
~ 6 During the course of the day, May 26, ] 995, Bau-
er and Pula exchanged a series of notes. Later that 
night, at approximately 3 :00 a.m., Bauer came back 
to Pula's cell. Using the jail keys, he unlocked her 
cell and invited her to his, ostensibly to watch TV. 
Pula went willingly. While in his cell, however, Bau-
er began to fondle Pula. When she protested he told 
Page 3 
her that he had stolen the keys and, if anyone found 
out she was out of her cell, she would go to prison for 
ten years for escape. Bauer then raped her. After-
wards, he returned Pula to her cell and locked her in. 
Pula said nothing about the incident to jail officials 
but reported the rape to friends the next day. 
*125 , 7 In the ensuing criminal trial, Bauer was 
convicted of sexual intercourse without consent, in-
timidation and misdemeanor escape. Pula also filed a 
civil complaint in the United States District Court 
alleging negligence and violation of 42 U.S.C. § ]983 
against the City of Chinook, three Chinook police 
officers, Blaine County, the Sheriff of Blaine County, 
and the State of Montana. All claims against parties 
other than the State were dismissed following settle-
ment with those parties. The United States District 
Court dismissed the Uill claim against the State 
and then ruled that it was without jurisdiction to hear 
the pendent negligence claim. Pula then refiled her 
negligence claim against the State in the Seventeenth 
Judicial District Court, Blaine County. 
~ 8 In her complaint, Pula alleged that the State 
breached its duty of care in the incarceration, super-
vision and control of Bauer and that this breach re-
sulted in Bauer's attack and Pula's resulting psycho-
logical and economic damages. The State denied neg-
ligence and argued that any damages sustained by 
Pula were the result of independent and unforeseea-
ble intervening acts: in particular, the negligence of 
the other defendants named in the original federal 
suit, the contributory negligence of Pula herself and 
Bauer's intentional act. 
, 9 At trial Pula sought to prevent the State from pre-
senting evidence concerning the negligence, fault, or 
conduct of non-parties to her complaint, including 
but not limited to Blaine County, the City of Chi-
nook, Blaine County officials and Bauer, himself. 
She contended that such evidence represented an im-
permissible attempt to apportion liability to non-
parties. The State argued that such evidence was ad-
missible as proof of an intervening cause of Pula's 
injuries. The District Court denied Pula's motion in 
limine, allowing such evidence for the purpose of 
demonstrating an intervening or superseding cause 
for Pula's claimed injuries but not for the purpose of 
attempting to allocate liability to non-parties. 
, 10 At the close of trial, the District Court submitted 
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its own proposed jury instructions. These included 
instructions on the meaning of intervening and super-
seding cause, to which Pula objected. In addition, the 
District Court submitted a special verdict form which 
required the jury to first decide if the State was negli-
gent and, if so, whether that negligence was a cause 
of any injury or damage to Pula. If the jury answered 
no to the causation question, it was instructed to go 
no further. If it answered yes, it was to determine 
whether there was an intervening or **367 supersed-
ing cause. The jury determined that the State was 
negligent but that its negligence was not a cause of 
Pula's *126 injuries. 
, 1] Pula raises the following issues on appeal: 
, 12 Issue 1. Did the District Court err when it denied 
Pula's motion in limine to exclude evidence of inter-
vening and superseding causes of Pula's injuries? 
, 13 Issue 2. Was there sufficient evidence to submit 
the case to the jury? 
, 14 Issue 3. Did the District Court's jury instructions 
and verdict form incorrectly instruct the jury on the 
law of intervening and superseding cause? 
DISCUSSION 
Issue I. Did the District Court err when it denied 
Pula's motion in limine to exclude evidence of inter-
vening and superseding causes of Pula's injuries? 
lllLf1 , 15 We review a District Court's grant or 
denial of a motion in limine for an abuse of discre-
tion. Bramble v. State Dept. o(Justice. Motor Vehicle 
Dill" 1999 MT 132,1/16.294 Mont. 501, 1/16, 982 
P.2d 464. 1/ 16; Dill v. Montana Thirteenth Judicial 
Dis!. Ct .. 1999 MT 85, 1/ 8, 294 Mont. 134,1/8.979 
P.2d 1 88, 1l 8. The District Court has broad discretion 
to determine if evidence is admissible. Accordingly, 
absent an abuse of discretion, we will not overturn 
the District Court's determination. Busta v. Columbus 
Hospital Corn. (] 996),276 Mont. 342, 353, 916 P.2d 
122,130. 
ill , 16 Pula contended at trial and argues now on 
appeal that introduction of evidence concerning the 
actions of Blaine County pernlitted the State to ap-
portion blame or responsibility to non-party defen-
Page 4 
dants. She cites our decision in Plumb v. Fourth 
Judicial Dis!. Ct. (1996), 279 Mont. 363, 379, 927 
P .2d 10 1 I, 1021, for the proposition that such third 
party defenses violate substantive due process be-
cause juries are likely to assign a disproportionate 
share of liability to unrepresented parties-thereby 
reducing the recovery from the named defendant. 
While we concur with her statement of our holding in 
Plumb, we find it inapplicable to Pula's case. 
, 17 In Plumb, we concluded that portions of the 
] 995 amendments to § 27-1-703, MCA, which al-
lowed apportionment of liability to parties who are 
not named in the lawsuit, violated substantive due 
process. Plumb. 279 Mont. at 379, 927 P.2d at 1021. 
The issue in this case, however, is not how to appor-
tion blame among several liable parties but whether, 
because of the intervening negligence of another, the 
State's acts or omissions could be said to be the cause 
of Pula'S injuries. *127 Our decision in Plumb did not 
disturb the validity of the intervening cause exception 
to the general test for causation, and we have repeat-
edly upheld its validity-even after our decision in 
Plumb. See State v. Schipman. 2000 MT 102, 299 
Mont. ')73, 2 P.3d 223; Gento) v. Douglas Hereford 
Ranch. Inc" 1998 MT 182, 290 Mont. 126,962 P.2d 
1205. Evidence of the conduct of Blaine County and 
Bauer was relevant to the issue of causation in Pula's 
negligence claim and was properly admitted by the 
District Court. 
Issue 2. Was there sufficient evidence to submit the 
case to the jury'? 
, ] 8 Prior to submission of the case to the jury, the 
District Court denied Pula's motion for judgment as a 
matter of law. Motions for judgment as a matter of 
law are governed by Rule 50(a), M.R.Civ.P., which 
provides: 
If during a trial by jury a party has been fully heard 
on an issue and there is no legally sufficient evi-
dentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that 
party on that issue, the court may determine the is-
sue against that party and may grant a motion for 
judgment as a matter of law against the party with 
respect to a claim or defense that cannot under the 
controlling law be maintained or defeated without a 
favorable finding on that issue. 
IiI , 19 Considering all evidence in the light most 
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favorable to the opposing party, judgment as a matter 
of law is properly granted only when there is a com-
plete absence of any evidence which would justify 
submitting an issue to the jury. Armstronl: v. Gundei-
ro, 2000 MT 326, 1{26, 303 Mont. 37, '1126, 15 P.3d 
386, ~ 26. 
**368 ~ 20 Pula argues that, absent what she consid-
ers to be improperly admitted intervening cause evi-
dence, the State presented no evidence to counter her 
claims of duty, breach, causation and damages. Our 
review of the trial record does not support this con-
tention. 
ill,21 The State presented substantial evidence that 
the damages suffered by Pula were not the result of 
its negligent acts or omissions. Its case included tes-
timony and documentary evidence that it did not 
breach any relevant standard of care, that its acts or 
omissions were not the actual or proximate cause of 
Pula's injuries and that many of the economic damag-
es for which Pula sought recovery may have been 
related to events that occurred prior to the rape. The 
State presented evidence that it transferred Bauer to 
Blaine County for legitimate penological reasons and 
did so knowing that the county jail was a secure 
modem facility. It offered testimony that it provided 
Blaine County officials with timely and appropriate 
guidelines for Bauer'S *128 incarceration. 
~ 22 There was evidence that, despite the State's 
guidelines, Sheriff Harrington, shortly after Bauer's 
transfer to Blaine County, unilaterally decided to 
treat Bauer as a "trustee." Without any authorization 
from the State, Harrington allowed Bauer to work 
outside the jail and to wear civilian clothing. On Sep-
tember 9, 1994, approximately three months after 
Bauer was transferred, Blaine County Jailer Jim 
Doyle faxed a letter to Warden Mahoney requesting 
pennission for Bauer to work outside the jail. Bauer's 
prison supervisor, Bill Pohjola, called ~Doyle and left 
a message which Doyle acknowledges having re-
ceived. The message advised Doyle that Bill Pohjola 
from the prison had called stating that the prison 
would not "OK" Bauer to work outside the jail at that 
time. 
, 23 Approximately six months later, in March of 
1995, Ed Schmidt, Havre Probation and Parole Offic-
er, learned that Bauer was being treated as a "trus-
tee." Schmidt was concerned about this state of af-
Page 5 
fairs and contacted his supervisor who, in tum, con-
tacted officials at MSP. As a result, Schmidt was 
asked to conduct a more thorough review, which he 
did. He subsequently filed a report with Classifica-
tion Manager Candyce Neubauer and spoke with her 
on the telephone. Neubauer, Pohjola and Mahoney 
determined that Bauer could stay in Blaine CouI,lty if 
they were assured that Blaine County would appro-
priately and safely incarcerate Bauer. 
~ 24 Neubauer contacted Jailer Doyle and relayed her 
concerns about Bauer's status. Doyle assured her that 
Blaine County would appropriately and safely incar-
cerate Bauer. Schmidt personally met with Sheriff 
Harrington, Jailer Doyle and Undersheriff Murdock 
and was assured that Bauer would be properly 
housed. 
,25 On April 4, 1995, Neubauer sent two letters to 
Blaine County, one to the Sheriff and one to Jailer 
Doyle setting forth the State's concerns regarding 
Bauer's incarceration. In particular, the letter reite-
rated that MSP officials had become "very concerned 
that Chester [Bauer] was allowed into the community 
unsupervised." The letter concluded with the follow-
ing admonition: 
Because Bauer is considered a Special Management 
inmate and not a Trusty, we can not allow him to 
have access to the community. We sure would like 
to keep Bauer there if you don't have problems 
with restricting his access to the community. He is 
not to be allowed out of the jail area unsupervised. 
,26 Some 24 days later, on April 28, 1995, Jailer Jim 
Doyle distributed the following memo to all jail em-
ployees: 
*129 Control Officers: 
We need to establish some rules in dealing with 
Chester. First of all, everyone remember that he is 
still an inmate. He can not be hanging around in 
dispatch and the jailers office visiting. This has 
been happening a lot, especially at night. He comes 
out and hangs around dispatch when Kara is work-
ing. I don't think this is a good idea. The general 
public is not allowed to do this, so for sure an in-
mate shouldn't be. There are a lot of things that he 
is not supposed to see. The jail roster for one, in-
fonnation on the teletype for another. Lately if he 
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needs the garage opened he just walks in and opens 
it. This **369 cannot happen. There may be evi-
dence or something in there that needs to be kept 
secure. 
I also found out that a few nights ago, Chester was 
given the jail keys to go turn the radio off in male 
cell block. Do not give Chester the keys. The 
whole next day, all I heard from the other inmates, 
is how come an inmate has the jail keys, and that 
we should let them have them also. If word about 
this ever got to the public, it could really cause 
some problems. Chester is an inmate. What would 
have prevented him from unlocking the other in-
mates if he wanted to. We would have had some 
serious problems. I realize Chester is a nice person 
and is doing well here, and everybody likes him, 
but he is not an employee. He is a MSP inmate[.] 
Remember, Chester is not to be outside of the She-
riff's Dept. without supervision. He must be moni-
tored at all times if outside of this office. The pris-
on has already said that if something were to hap-
pen, we would be responsible. 
We will probably be getting another trustee from 
the prison one of these days. Ifhe sees Chester act-
ing like an employee, then he is going to act the 
same way. We don't need that. 
I have already talked to him about the deal with the 
jail keys, and hanging around in the offices. Lets 
not let this kind of stuff happen. We don't want 
something to go wrong and end causing up some 
problems that we can't deal with. 
Also Chester received his paperwork today from 
MSP, he was denied parole. So keep an extra close 
eye on him. I don't think he would try to leave, but 
I didn't think Bigby would either. I know this will 
be a let down for him. 
JimL. Doyle 
~ 27 The dissent argues that since the State knew that 
Bauer had access to the jailhouse keys, the threat to 
Pula was foreseeable. This *130 contention is based 
upon Warden Mahoney'S testimony that, in late 
March of 1995, Officer Schmidt brought it to his at-
tention that Bauer had access to the keys. It is signifi-
Page 6 
cant, however, that Warden Mahoney's testimony in 
this regard was inconsistent with the testimony of 
Officer Schmidt. Officer Schmidt testified as follows: 
Q:Did you know that he had access to keys? 
A: No, I did not. 
Q: Did you ever know that? 
A. No. 
~ 28 Candyce Neubauer also testified that she did not 
know that Bauer had access to the jail keys. Jailer 
Doyle did not learn of Bauer's access to keys until 
Apri.l 26 or 27, 1995, and, even then, he did not ad-
vise anyone from the State of that fact. He did, how-
ever, circulate the above memo, dated April 28, 1995, 
in which he specifically and emphatically advises his 
staff that Bauer was a MSP inmate and was not to 
have access to the keys. Clearly there was ample evi-
dence before the jury from which it could conclude 
that Warden Mahoney was mistaken when he said 
that he had been advised by Schmidt in March of 
1995 that Bauer had access to the keys. The above 
evidence would also explain why Neubauer's letter of 
April 4 did not address the issue of Bauer's access to 
the keys. First of all, there was no evidence that there 
had been an access to keys problem prior to April 4; 
secondly, Neubauer was never aware that Bauer had 
access to keys; and fmally, even the jailer was not 
aware of this until April 27 or 28. 
~ 29 We conclude that the State offered sufficient 
evidence to submit the issue to the jury. Judgment as 
a matter of law was not appropriate. The District 
Court correctly denied Pula's Rule SOra), M.R.Civ.P., 
motion. 
Issue 3. Did the District Court's jury instructions 
and verdict form incorrectly instruct the jury on the 
law of intervening and superseding cause? 
ill ~ 30 This Court reviews jury instructions to de-
termine whether the instructions as a whole fully and 
fairly instruct the jury on the law applicable to the 
case. State v. Martin, 200 J MT 83, , 23, 305 Mont. 
123,123,23 P.3d216.,23. 
ill ~ 3 J Pula argues that the District Court's instruc-
tions on independent intervening causation were in-
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correct statements of **370 the law as established by 
this Court in Busta. Whatever the merits of this ar-
gument, it is clear from the jury's verdict that it never 
even reached the question of an intervening or super-
seding cause. 
,32 Like the standard jury verdict form proposed by 
Pula herself, the *131 District Court's special verdict 
form required the jurors to answer a series of ques-
tions on breach of duty, causation and damages; mov-
ing on to succeeding questions depending on their 
answer to the preceding question. On the frrst ques-
tion-whether the State was negligent-the jury ans-
wered "yes." However, in response to the next ques-
tion on the special verdict form-whether the State's 
negligence was a cause of any injury or damage to 
Pula-the jury answered "no." Having answered this 
causation question in the negative, the form in-
structed the jury not to consider the third question-
whether there was an intervening cause. Instead it 
instructed the jury to simply sign the form and notify 
the bailiff that it had reached its verdict. 
, 33 The dissent contends that the jury verdict only 
makes sense if the jury, despite not having answered 
the special verdict question, found that the County's 
or Bauer's conduct was an independent intervening 
cause, thereby superseding the State's negligence. 
That, however, is not the only plausible explanation 
for the verdict. If the jury found that the letters from 
Neubauer to Blaine County officials (specifying no 
unsupervised community access) and the memo from 
the Blaine County jailer to his staff (to treat Bauer as 
an inmate with no more access to the jail keys) cut 
off any causal connection between the State's negli-
gence and the attack on Pula, there was no necessity 
for the jury to go further and address the question of 
independent intervening cause. 
, 34 Since the jury did not consider the issue of inter-
vening cause in reaching its verdict, we conclude that 
the District Court's instructions on intervening cause 
had no effect on the outcome of the trial. 
, 35 We will not reverse a civil cause by reason of 
any error where the record shows that the same result 
would have been attained had the error not been 
committed. Rule 14. M.R.App.P. See also Stenherg v. 
Neel (1980), 188 MOllt. 333, 339. 613 P.2d 1007, 
l..Qll (where the jury does not reach the issue of 
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damages, no error can be predicated on damage in-
structions). The record indicates that the jury did not 
reach the question of intervening cause. Therefore, 
we will not assign error to the instructions addressing 
that issue. 
CONCLUSION 
~ 36 We conclude that the District Court properly 
denied Pula's motion in limine to exclude the State's 
evidence of an independent intervening cause of Pu-
la's injuries. The State presented sufficient evidence 
on the issues of breach and causation to warrant send-
ing the * 132 case to the jury and Pula's motion for a 
directed verdict was properly denied. Finally, the 
District Court's jury instruction on intervening cause, 
while not conforming to our suggestion in Busta, had 
no effect on the outcome of the trial. The verdict and 
judgment are affirmed. 
We concur: KARLA M. GRAY, C.J., and JIM 
REGNIER,J. 
Honorable DOROTHY McCARTER, District Judge, 
sitting in place of Justice PA TRJCIA COTTER. 
Honorable ED McLEAN, District Judge, sitting in 
the vacant seat of the Court as of the date of submis-
sion. 
Justice TERRYN. TRIEWEILER dissents. 
~ 37 I dissent from the majority's conclusions that 
there was sufficient evidence to submit the issue of 
independent intervening cause to the jury and that the 
Plaintiff suffered no harm from those instructions. 
~ 38 The jury found the State of Montana negligent. 
The only facts alleged as a basis for the State's negli-
gence were that it failed to protect the Plaintiff by 
adequately controlling and supervising Chester Bau-
er, an inmate for whom the State was responsible. It 
is not logically possible for the State to have been 
negligent in the manner alleged and for that negli-
gence not to have been a contributing cause of dam-
age to the young woman **371 that Bauer raped 
while under the State's presumed control. The only 
basis for finding that the State's omissions were not 
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the cause of Plaintiffs damages was the Court's in-
struction that the chain of causation could be severed 
by the independent, intervening omissions of the 
county or acts of Chester Bauer. Thosc instructions 
should not have been given because the intervening 
acts and omissions relied on by the State were com-
pletely foreseeable. Because they were given, the 
bizarre and unjust result in this case should be re-
versed. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
~ 39 Chester Bauer is a sexual predator who was 
convicted of sexual intercourse without consent in 
1983 and sentenced to the Montana State Prison. 
While at the Montana State Prison, in 1991, he was 
convicted of intimidation for trying to extort sexual 
favors from the wife of a prison employee by threat-
ening her and her children. In addition to these two 
offenses, he was serving a ten-year sentence for ag-
gravated assault and ten years for use of a dangerous 
weapon when, in 1994, he was transferred by the 
State of Montana to the Blaine County jail. Presuma-
bly because of the threat that he posed to others, he 
was denied parole on nine occasions-eight times prior 
to his transfer to Blaine County. Blaine County pris-
on officials were advised that he had been classified 
as a minimum security inmate and they treated him 
accordingly by making him a trustee. 
*133 ~ 40 His freedom and mobility while in Blaine 
County first came to the attention of Montana State 
Prison officials after he was observed in street 
clothes, roaming freely about the Blaine County 
courthouse by Edward Schmidt, a state probation and 
parole officer. On March 21,1995, he wrote to Mike 
Gersack, his supervisor, and sent a copy of his letter 
to Candyce Neubauer who was in charge of classifi-
cation of Montana State Prison inmates. In his letter, 
he advised Gersack and Neubauer that Bauer was 
being treated as a trustee at the Blaine County jail 
and in that status, worked at various jobs in the city 
of Chinook. His work included repairs to private ve-
hicles for which he received payment. He had no 
particular hours by which he had to return to the pris-
on facility and, in fact, had a private vehicle at his 
disposal which had been loaned to him by one of the 
jailers. 
~ 41 Schmidt pointed out that when he observed Bau-
er, he was dressed in civilian clothes and that he had 
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been advised by the undersheriff in Blaine County 
that Bauer had access to go and come as he pleased. 
'Ii 42 This information, as well as the faci that Bauer 
had access to jailhouse keys, was communicated to 
Mike Mahoney, the warden at the Montana State 
Prison. Mahoney admitted that he had knowledge of 
this information prior to Bauer's attack of Pula and 
that Bauer in fact was the State's responsibility. Ma-
honey gave the following testimony: 
Q. This matter regarding Mr. Bauer's detention up 
here came to your attention in March of 1995, cor-
rect? 
A. I believe that's correct. 
Q. And it was brought to your attention because adult 
probation and parole officer Ed Schmidt expressed 
concerns about the fact that Mr. Bauer was even up 
here, didn't he? 
A. My recollection is, Mr. Schmidt had made person-
al contact with inmate Bauer and was deeply 
troubled by the issues that he attended to in that 
conversation and notified the department of his 
concern. 
Q. He saw a Montana State Prison inmate running 
around like a trustee, didn't he? 
A. I believe that would be a fair observation or as-
sessment, yeah. 
Q. The prison requested him to look into it further 
and he reported back to you, did he not? 
A. Yes, he did. 
Q. And isn't it true that the information that was pro-
vided to you indicated that Mr. Bauer had freedom 
to come and go as he pleased? 
*134 A. In essence, that would probably be fair. 
**372 Q. And that he had complete access inside the 
jail and outside the jail at that point? 
A. Again, with the custody level a lot to be desired. 
1 'I 5 
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Q. So he was free to roam around inside the jail, 
wasn't he? 
A. From what I recall, yes, it sounds like he was. 
Q. And you were aware of that? 
A. At that point in time, yes, I was. 
Q. And as well, he could leave the jail and go out into 
the community, correct? 
A. Again, at that point in time, yes. 
Q. And you also had concerns because there were 
problems with his access to keys, correct? 
A. That's correct as well. 
Q. And that came to your attention during this period 
in late March of 1995, correct? 
A. All of those issues pretty much stemmed from 
Officer Schmidt's contact. 
Q. And those concerns prompted a review by you and 
Candyce Neubauer and William Pohjola at the 
prison, correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. That resulted in the classification summary or a 
re-classification document; is that correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Okay. And your recommendation after going 
through this was what, Mr. Mahoney? 
A. If you're referring to the face sheet? 
Q. Yes. 
A. I wrote at the bottom that it would appear that the 
placement does not accurately address public safe-
ty and recommend we re-evaluate and potentially 
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return to the Montana State Prison. 
Q. And that decision never was pursued, was it? 
A. No, sir, it was not. 
Q. Mr. Bauer was maintained at the Blaine County 
jail, correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And the concerns that you had regarding his free-
dom inside and outside the jail, they formed the ba-
sis for this recommendation of yours, didn't they? 
A. Initially, yes, they did. 
Q. And that would include not just the freedom, but 
his access to * 135 keys, correct? 
A. Basic security practices. 
Q. And the freedom to go inside the jail and outside 
the jail whenever he wanted, that's a fundamental 
breakdown in a detention facility, would you 
agree? 
A. That would probably be a fair assessment, that's 
correct. 
Q. That inmate is still your responsibility, he's a 
Montana State Prison inmate, correct? 
A. Still an inmate. 
Q. Okay. You can't change that status, can you, by 
transferring him to another facility? 
A. No, sir, I cannot. 
Q. And you can't also change his court commitment 
by transferring him to another facility? 
A. No, that certainly exceeds the bounds and authori-
ty of the warden. 
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Q. Now, the response that was given to these con-
cerns about access to keys and complete freedom 
up here in Blaine County, that ended up being 
Candyce Neubauer's letter to Sheriff Harrington, 
correct? 
A. 1 believe that's correct. 
Q. And that letter indicates that the concern of the 
prison is his ability to access the community, cor-
rect? 
A. 1 think the public safety issue was the theme, that 
would be correct. 
Q. There's nothing in that letter that addressed or 
dealt with the problems with Mr. Bauer's access to 
keys at this facility, is there? 
A. No, there's nothing in here that states specifically 
keys. 
Q. And that's a concern that as a prison official you 
would agree that you should **373 specifically ad-
dress with the detention facility? 
A. Most definitely it's to be addressed. It just wasn't 
placed in there. 
Q. And, in fact, it wasn't placed in any written docu-
ment, was it? 
A. To the best of my knowledge, no, it was not. 
,43 In other words, the State of Montana admitted 
responsibility for the detention and supervision of 
Chester Bauer. It admitted that those responsible for 
him knew he was not being detained in a secure fa-
shion and had freedom to not only move about the 
community but freedom to roam the jail facility and 
access to keys at the jail. It admitted that *136 these 
breaches of security were a threat to public safety and 
it admitted that the only activity it made any effort to 
curtail was Bauer's freedom of movement within the 
community of Chinook. 
,44 This was the situation to which Wendy Pula was 
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exposed when brought by force to be locked in a cell 
with no freedom of movement on May 25, 1995, for 
failing to appear .on a charge of possessing alcohol as 
a minor, an offense for which we have since held a 
minor cannot be jailed. State v. Bauer, 2001 MT 248, 
1\l33, 307 Mont. 105, ·p3, 36 P.3d 892. , 33. 
, 45 However, because of Bauer's freedom of move-
ment, he was able to retrieve jailhouse keys, open the 
cell door of a minor, take her to his jail cell and force 
her to have intercourse with him without consent. 
How, under these circumstances, can it be seriously 
argued that the acts of this sexual predator were unfo-
reseeable is mystii'ying. 
, 46 The State's response is that because of Candyce 
Neubauer's letter, it had a right to assume that Bauer 
was under proper supervision and his freedom of 
movement had been curtailed. However, Neubauer's 
letter was written on April 4, 1995, and as acknowl-
edged by Mahoney, was limited in its criticism to 
Bauer's unsupervised presence in the community. It 
made no suggestion that his freedom of movement at 
the Blaine County jail be restricted or that his access 
to Blaine County jail keys be denied. 
,47 We have previously held that intervening crimi-
nal acts are not always unforeseeable, Estate of 
Strever v. Cline (J 996). 278 Mont. 165, 178-79. 924 
Pold 666. 673-74, and that sometimes intervening 
acts are foreseeable as a matter of law, CusenbalJl v. 
Mortensen, 1999 MT 221. '37,296 Mont. 25, '37, 
987 P.2d 351. 11 37. 
,48 In Mills v. Mather (J 995). 270 Mont. J 88, 198, 
890 P.2d 1277, ] 283-84, we noted that: 
There are '" situations in which the actor, as a rea-
sonable man, is required to anticipate and guard 
against the intentional, or even criminal, miscon-
duct of others. In general, these situations arise 
where the actor is under a special responsibility 
toward the one who suffers the harm, which in-
cludes the duty to protect him against such inten-
tional misconduct.. .. 
(Quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 302B cmt. 
e (1965». 
, 49 The facts in this case present just such a cir-
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cumstance. The State of Montana had a special re-
sponsibility to protect Pula and other potential vic-
tims from the harm that Bauer inflicted by his inten-
tional conduct. 
,50 Furthermore, based on the previously mentioned 
admissions by *137 the State, the threat posed by 
Bauer was completely foreseeable and the county's 
total failure to protect others from him was weIl 
known to the State. Therefore, neither Bauer's con-
duct nor the county's conduct could have served as an 
independent intervening cause protecting the State 
from liability for its negligence. 
, 51 For example, in CusenbalJ) the plaintiff was 
injured when an intoxicated patron left the bar, got in 
his vehicle and drove the vehicle into the bar. The 
defendant bar owner proposed that the district court 
instruct the jury that an independent intervening 
cause severed the chain of causation. The district 
court declined to do so and the jury returned a verdict 
for the plaintiff. On appeal, we affIrmed the district 
court and stated that: 
[TJhis case involves the aIlegation that the chain of 
causation was severed by an independent interven-
ing act. However, not all **374 intervening acts 
are independent. Those that are foreseeable do not 
break the chain of causation. In other words, if one 
of the reasons that makes a defendant's act negli-
gent is a greater risk of a particular harmful result 
occurring, and that harmful result does occur, the 
defendant is generally liable. The test is based on 
foreseeability. [Citation omitted.] 
In this case, unlike the act of leaving a vehicle un-
locked, the act of Mortensen in serving alcohol to 
WelIs is the very act which caused the conduct that 
resulted in the injury to Cusenbary.The conse-
quences of serving alcohol to a person who is visi-
bly intoxicated are reasonably foreseeable precisely 
because of the causal relationship between serving 
alcohol and drunken conduct. Wells' drunken con-
duct was not freakish, bizarre, or unpredictable as 
Mortensen asserts. Rather, drunken conduct is the 
expected, predictable, and therefore reasonably fo-
reseeable outcome of serving alcohol to a person 
who is already intoxicated. 
Page II 
Cusenbarv. 296 Mont. at 32-33,987 P.2d at 355-56. 
Accordingly, we conclude that as a matter of law 
Wells' conduct of driving a vehicle while intox-
icated, through the wall of the Town Tavern, was a 
foreseeable intervening cause that did not serve to 
supersede or break the causal chain between Mor-
tensen's original negligence and the injury to Cu-
senbary. 
CusenbalJ'. 296 Mont. at 37, 987 P.ld at 358. 
,52 Likewise in this case, the lack of proper supervi-
sion of Bauer, a known rapist, who was denied parole 
on nine occasions because of the known risk that he 
presented, was the very omission that alIowed him 
*138 to assault the Plaintiff. The consequences of 
failing to supervise him and of permitting him to 
freely roam the jailhouse were reasonably foreseeable 
because they were the exact reason that he had been 
imprisoned in the first place. 
,53 Finally, it is not correct that the Plaintiff suffered 
no prejudice from the District Court's erroneous in-
structions on intervening cause. The jury was in-
structed that: 
If you find that a negligent act of any other person or 
entity caused the injury and damage to plaintiff and 
that this negligent act of other persons or entities 
occurred after any negligent act of Defendant State 
of Montana and that this negligent act ... could not 
reasonably be foreseen by Defendant State ofMon-
tana to happen in the natural sequence of events, 
the later negligent conduct of this third person or 
entity is an independent intervening and supersed-
ing cause of the plaintiffs injury and damage. 
If you find that the conduct of the third person or 
entity was the intervening and superseding cause of 
injury and damage to plaintiff, then you must re-
turn your verdict for Defendant State of Montana. 
Court's Instruction No. 18. 
11 '54 ;Supersede lisdefined'in'Webster!s ·Ninth.'New 
Colle.giate:Dicfionary "as'~2 :':to~take :the :place, 'room, 
or:position'of;3:to displace:in :favor.ofanother:" We 
have in fact stated in our opinions that an indepen-
dent intervening cause cuts off the chain of causation. 
Based on either the standard definition of" super-
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sede" or our own case law, it was perfectly consistent 
for the jury to conclude that if the county's or Bauer's 
conduct was an independent intervening cause, then 
the State's negligence was not the cause of Pula's 
damages. It does not matter that the jury did not get 
to the final question about independent intervening 
causes. The Court's instruction was prejudicial and 
was the only possible explanation for the jury's find-
ing that the State negligently failed to supervise Bau-
er but that while he was roaming freely about the jail 
with access to keys, that failure to supervise did not 
cause his assault on Wendy Pula. 
,55 The facts of this case shockingly demonstrate an 
avoidable tragedy caused by the failure of state and 
local prison officials to protect a young woman from 
a known sexual predator who had been placed in the 
State's custody because of a series of violent criminal 
offenses. Wendy Pula was an underage girl impri-
sonedbecause she was unable to post bond to secure 
her appearance on a charge of being *139 a minor in 
possession of **375 alcohol. Had she been convicted 
of being a minor in possession of alcohol, she could 
not have been imprisoned for that offense. See Bauer, 
'33. Yet while she was in prison for her inability to 
post bond, she was raped and assaulted by a danger-
ous predator for whom the State was responsible only 
to be told that in spite of the State's negligence, she is 
entitled to no damages. This result cannot be ex-
plained on any evidentiary or logical basis. I con-
clude that it can only be attributable to the District 
Court's erroneous instruction to the jury that the State 
could be relieved of liability by an intervening inde-
pendent act. Since there was no intervening act which 
was "unforeseeable," the defense was inapplicable 
and the District Court erred by submitting those in-
structions to the jury. For these reasons, I would re-
verse the judgment of the District Court and I dissent 
from the majority's decision to do otherwise. 
Justice JAMES C. NELSON joins in the foregoing 
dissent. -
Mont.,2002. 
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IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
DOUGLAS AND MICHELLE 
STAFFORD, husband and wife, 
PlaintiffslPetitioners, 
vs. 
KOOTENAI COUNTY, a Political 
Subdivision of the State ofIdaho, acting 
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"RICK" CURRIE, RICH PIAZZA, and 
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CASE NO.: 09-2516 
PLAINTIFFS'/PETITIONERS' REPLY 
BRIEF ON APPEAL 
COME NOW PlaintiffslPetitioners Douglas and Michelle Stafford (hereafter "Stafford"), by 
and through their attorney of record, John F. Magnuson, and respectfully submit this Reply Briefin 
support oftheir appeal. 
I. INTRODUCTION. 
The parties have briefed the facts giving rise to this dispute. Those facts are largely 
undisputed. It is the inferences and legal conclusions to be drawn from those facts that remain 
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disputed. 
The issue before the Court is not whether the Staffords violated Kootenai County Ordinance 
No. 283. Ordinance No. 283 was effective from July 26, 1999 through December 11, 2005. J The 
primary issue before the Court is whether the Staffords violated Ordinance No. 374. Kootenai 
County specifically charged the Staffords with violating Ordinance No. 374 to the exclusion of any 
other ordinance. See AR, Vol. I, pp. 0005; 0127-0130. 
II. ARGUMENT. 
A. If the Staffords Did Eneaee in Citable Conduct (a Point Not Conceded), 
Then the Chareeable Offense Was Under Ordinance No. 283. 
The County acknowledges that the improvements at issue were completed by July 17,2002. 
See BriefofRespondentsatpp. 3-4 (citingARpp. 11-12; 12A-20). Ordinance No. 283 was in effect 
at that time, and remained in effect for over three years thereafter (until December 12,2005, the 
effective date of Ordinance No. 374). 
Ordinance No. 374, the ordinance under which the Staffords were actually charged, was 
adopted so as to "take effect and be in full force" on December 12,2005. See AR, Vol. I, p.0093. 
Since the conduct giving rise to the charge occurred three and one-half years before, as 
acknowledged by Kootenai County, Ordinance No. 374 could not be applied retroactively to 
criminally punish conduct that occurred prior to the adoption of the ordinance. See, Q..&,., State v. 
Byers, 102 Idaho 159, 166,627 P.2d 788 (1981). 
"The fundamental principle that 'the required criminal law must have existed when 
the conduct in issue occurred,' Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law (J"d Ed. 
On December 12,2005, Ordinance No. 374 took effect, superseding the provisions 
of Ordinance No. 283. See AR, Vol. I, p. 0093. 
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1960), at 58-59, must apply to bar retroactive criminal prohibitions emanating from 
courts as well as from legislatures .... " 
Statev. Byers, 102 Idaho at 166 (quoting Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.s. 347, 354, 84 S. Ct. 
1697, 1702-03 (1964». There is no question that Ordinance No. 374 is criminal in nature in that it 
specifically provides that violations may constitute criminal misdemeanors punishable by a 
maximum fine of $300 or six (6) months in jailor both. 
Accordingly, the following statement urged by the County, in its responsive Brief, is an 
incorrect statement of the law: 
A violation of Ordinance No. 283 occurred every day from the time the first 
disturbance occurred in the summer of 200 1 until Ordinance No.3 74 took effect on 
December 12, 2005, and a violation of Ordinance No. 374 has occurred every day 
from that date forward. 
See Brief of Respondents at p. 10 (emphasis in original). At most, the County can argue that a 
violation occurred under Ordinance No. 283 from the time of the first disturbance in the summer of 
2001 until December 12,2005. The County cannot argue that there are any chargeable violations 
under Ordinance No. 374 from and after December 12,2005 based upon the clear language of the 
ordinance (specifying a prospective effective date), and the constitutional prohibitions against ex post 
facto laws. See State v. Byers, supra. Against this background, and based upon the cited authorities, 
the Kootenai County Commissioners' finding that the Staffords violated Ordinance No.3 74 should 
be reversed. 
B. Ordinance No. 337 Has No Effect On These Proceedine-s. 
In its Response Brief, Kootenai County cites §§ 1-2-3 of the Kootenai County Code, adopted 
via the enactment of Ordinance No. 337 on August 30, 2004. Section 1-2-3 ofthe Kootenai County 
Code provides: 
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No new ordinance shall be construed or held to repeal a former ordinance whether 
such fonner ordinance is expressly repealed or not, as to any offense committed 
against such former ordinance or as to any act done, any penalty forfeiture or 
punishment so incurred, or any right accrued or claim arising under the former 
ordinance, or in any way whatever to affect any such offense or act so committed or 
so done, or any penalty, forfeiture or punishment so incurred or any right accrued or 
claimed arising before the new ordinance takes effect.. .. 
See K.c.c. § 1-2-3 (appendix A to the Brief of Respondents). 
The cited language relied upon by Kootenai County, as contained in § 1-2-3, actually supports 
the argument of the Staffords. The language relied upon by Kootenai County supports the 
proposition that if the Staffords were to be charged with any offense, it should have been under 
Ordinance No. 283 (in effect atthe time ofthe alleged violations) rather than Ordinance No. 374 (the 
adoption of which post-dated the commission ofthe alleged violations). 
C. The County May Not Use These Proceedin2s to Establish a Violation 
of an Act Not Char2ed Under Ordinance No. 283. 
The County argues, consistent with the decision of the Commissioners, that this case 
presents, in essence, a case of "no harm-no foul" as the cited conduct is alleged to run afoul of both 
Ordinance No. 283 and Ordinance No. 374. To this end, as an implicit means to "end-run" the ex 
post facto infinnities arising from the application of Ordinance No. 374, the County argues: "It is 
true that from that date forward [December 12,2005], Ordinance No. 283 had no further force or 
effect. This does not change the fact that Ordinance No. 283 was in full force and effect until 
December 12, 2005, however." See Brief of Respondents at p. 12 (emphasis in original). A 
Defendant is entitled to notice of the charges against him. The charging authority must prove the 
offense charged and the Defendant is not subject to conviction for other offenses even if those 
offenses were proven at trial. See,~, State v. Washington, 20 Or. App. 350, 531 P.2d 743, 
affinned, 273 Or. 829 (1975) (copy attached). The Staffords were never charged with violating 
PLAINTIFFS' !PETITIONERS' REPLY BRIEF ON APPEAL - PAGE 4 
123 
Ordinance No. 283. 
D. Neither Ordinance No. 283 Nor No. 374 Apply to the Facts at Bar. 
The Board erred, as a matter oflaw, in its interpretation as to the applicability of Kootenai 
County Site Disturbance Ordinances (in whatever variant) to the facts at bar. Each of the ordinances 
states that "an undisturbed natural vegetation buffer shall be retained at the waterfront ... The buffer 
shall be a minimum of twenty-five feet in slope distance from the high water mark of the water 
body .... " See, U, AR, Vol. I, p. 0057-58. 
The ordinances in turn each define an "undisturbed natural vegetation buffer" as: 
An area where no development activity has occurred or will occur, including, but not 
limited to, logging, construction of utility trenches, roads, structures, or surface and 
storm water facilities. Buffer areas shall be left in their natural state. 
See AR, Vol. I, p. 0049 (emphasis added). 
The Board was presented with unrebutted evidence that the Stafford property was developed 
within twenty-five feet of the high water mark of Lake Coeur d'Alene before any activity was 
undertaken thereon by the Staffords. In other words, the property, prior to any action giving rise to 
the disputes at issue, was "disturbed" by definition. There was no "undisturbed natural vegetation 
buffer" to maintain. The ordinances specifically require the maintenance of previously undisturbed 
natural vegetation buffers and, according to their clear terms, do not apply where the area in question 
has already been disturbed through development activity or logging. In this instance, there is no 
"natural" area to preserve. 
E. The Staffords Incorporate the Remainin~ Ar~uments 
Previously Contained in Their Openin~ Brief on Appeal. 
As to the definition of "supercede," and the applicability of the law of estoppel to these 
particular facts, the authorities and arguments cited by Kootenai County, in its Respondents' Brief, 
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do not change or alter the conclusions previously advanced with respect to those issues by the 
Staffords. The Staffords reincorporate the arguments previously contained in their Opening Brief. 
III. CONCLUSION. 
Based upon the reasons and authorities set forth above, Appellants Douglas and Michelle 
Stafford respectfully request that the Court reverse the Order of Decision of the Kootenai County 
Board of Commissioners, find that, as a matter oflaw, their has been no violation of Ordinance No. 
374 shown (the same Ordinance being inapp licable to the facts at bar), and enter an order remanding 
the matter with instructions that the violation be dismissed. The Staffords also request an award of 
reasonable attomeyfees and costs as incurred herein pursuant to Idaho law, including I.e. §§ 12-117 
and 12-121. A/A 
DATED this --fh.- day of November, 2009. 
/---
ers Stafford 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was served upon the 
following by facsimile and first-class mail, postage prepaid, addressed as follows, this __ _ 
day of November, 2009: 
Patrick M. Braden, Deputy Attorney 
Kootenai County Dept. of Legal Services 
451 Government Way 
P.O. Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-9000 
Fax: 446-1621 
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Court of Appeals of Oregon. 
STATE of Oregon, Respondent, 
v. 
Billy Walker WASHINGTON, Appellant. 
Argued and Submitted Jan. 17,1975. 
Decided Feb. 10, 1975. 
Rehearing Denied March 19,1975. 
Review Granted April 15, 1975. 
Defendant was convicted in the Circuit Court. 
Multnomah County, Richard J. Burke, J., of first-
degree burglary, and he appealed. The Court of Ap-
peals, Schwab, C.J., held that where neither the 
statutory definition of first-degree burglary nor the 
indictment put defendant on notice that he might be 
convicted of the crime of theft, defendant was not 
entitled to a jury charge defining the elements of 
theft, notwithstanding defendant's contention that 
evidence offered at trial might support theft convic-
tion. 
Affirmed. 
West Headnotes 
(1] Criminal Law 110 ~795(4) 
110 Criminal Law 
110XX Trial 
llOXX(G) Instructions: Necessity, Requis-
ites, and Sufficiency 
llOk795 Grade or Degree of Offense; In-
cluded Offenses 
llOk795(4) k. Effect of Doubt as to 
Grade or Degree. Most Cited Cases 
Rule that trial court should instruct on other of-
fenses when such instruction is supported by evid-
ence does not mean that trial court can instruct on 
any offenses arguably committed by defendant that 
are disclosed by evidence. ORS 136.460, 136.465. 
[2] Indictment and Information 210 C==:>189(7) 
210 Indictment and Information 
210XIII Included Offenses 
Page 2 of5 
Page 1 
21 Ok 189 Lesser Grade or Degree of Offense 
Charged 
21Ok189(7) k. Degrees of Burglary. Most 
Cited Cases 
Second-degree burglary is always necessarily in-
cluded offense in charge of first-degree burglary. 
ORS 164.215, 164.225. 
[3] Indictment and Information 210 C==:>191(.5) 
210 Indictment and Information 
210XIII Included Offenses 
21Ok191 Different Offense Included in Of-
fense Charged 
21OkI91(.5) k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
(Formerly 2IOk191) 
When determining when offense is lesser included, 
court's consideration should be limited to statutory 
definition of offenses and indictment in particular 
case.ORS 136.460, 136.465 . 
[4] Larceny 234 €;::;:>70(3) 
234 Larceny 
234II Prosecution and Punishment 
234II(C) Trial and Review 
234k69 Instructions 
234k70 In General 
234k70(3) k. Applicability to Issues 
and Evidence. Most Cited Cases 
Where neither burglary statute nor indictment for 
first-degree burglary put defendant on notice that 
he might be convicted of crime of theft, defendant 
was not entitled to jury instruction defining ele-
ments of theft, notwithstanding contention that 
evidence offered at trial might support theft convic-
tion.ORS 136.460, 136.465, 164.225. 
*351 **743 J. Marvin Kuhn, Deputy Public De-
fender, Salem, argued the cause for appellant. With 
him on the brief was Gary D. Babcock, Public De-
fender, Salem. 
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Scott McAlister, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salem, argued 
the cause for respondent. With him on the brief 
were Lee Johnson, Atty. Gen., and W. Michael Gil-
lette, Sol. Gen., Salem. 
Before SCHWAB, C.J., and FOLEY and FORT, JJ. 
SCHWAB, Chief Judge. 
The broad issue in this case concerns the method 
whereby trial courts should determine whether they 
can instruct a jury on the elements of a crime other 
than that charged in an indictment. The narrow is-
sue is whether, as defendant claims, the trial court 
could and should have instructed on the elements of 
theft at the conclusion of his burglary trial. 
Defendant was charged with first degree burglary. 
ORS 164.225. There was evidence that during the 
afternoon of February 14, 1974 defendant stole 
house keys from Robert Redfern; that an hour or so 
later Redfern's daughter, Judith DeVine, returned to 
the family home and found the door ajar; that DeV-
ine entered the house and was attacked by a man; 
and that her purse was taken at that time. Later that 
**744 evening police stopped defendant's car be-
cause it matched the description-bronze Pontiac 
with Iowa license plates-of a car DeVine had seen 
idling in front of *352 her house just before she 
entered an was attacked. The officers found a purse 
under the seat. De Vine later identified the purse 
and its contents as her property. 
Defendant told police the following story of the 
day's events. Defendant drove Redfern and Nath-
aniel Johnson to Redfern's place of employment to 
obtain money to buy drinks . Defendant remained in 
the car while Redfern and Johnson went in. Johnson 
returned alone claiming Redfern had decided to 
stay. Johnson then asked defendant to drove to what 
proved to be Redfern's home address, which de-
fendant did. Johnson entered the house and returned 
carrying a purse. Johnson later left the purse in the 
car, asking defendant to dispose of it. 
Defendant requested the trial court to instruct the 
Page 3 of5 
Page 2 
jury that it could 'also consider the lesser included 
offense of Theft in the Second Degree by Receiv-
ing.' The trial court did not do so, instructing only 
on the elements of the crime charged-first degree 
burglary. The jury found defendant guilty, and he 
appeals from the resulting judgment. 
Defendant argues that the evidence offered at trial-
such as DeVine's inability to identify him as her as-
sailant and defendant's story about receiving the 
purse from Johnson-if believed by the jury would 
have led it to reasonably conclude that defendant 
committed theft by receiving the purse from John-
son but did not enter the burglarized residence and, 
therefore, did not commit burglary. Defendant's ar-
gument thus focuses only on the evidence offered at 
trial, rather than the statutory definitions of the ele-
ments of the crimes in question or the specifics of 
the indictment*353 in this case. This argument con-
fuses two analytically distinct questions: (I) when 
Should a trial court instruct on offenses, other than 
that charged in an indictment; and (II) what of-
fenses, other than that charged, Can a trial court de-
scribe to the jury. 
[1] State v. Williams, 99 Or.Adv.Sh. 1934, 526 
P.2d 1384 (1974), and State v. Atkins, 99 
Or.Adv.Sh. 1333,525 P.2d 1018 (1974), hold that a 
trial court should instruct on other offenses when 
such instruction is supported by the evidence. 
However, in both Williams and Atkins it was con-
ceded that the requested instruction regarding an-
other offense Could properly have been given; the 
only question was whether it Should have been giv-
en based on the evidence. It would thus be a mis-
take to read Williams and Atkins, as defendant ap-
parently does, for the proposition that a trial court 
can instruct on any offenses arguably committed by 
the defendant that are disclosed by the evidence. 
The facts of State v. Hammang, Or.App., 99 
Adv.Sh. 2102, 527 P.2d 137, Sup.Ct. review al-
lowed (1974) illustrate our point. In that case there 
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was evidence that defendant had stolen some guns 
and later participated in a homicide. If he had been 
prosecuted only for murder, and evidence about 
having stolen guns had been admitted in the murder 
trial, it does not necessarily follow that the court 
could instruct the jury on the elements of theft, 
even though that offense may have been disclosed 
by the evidence. 
II 
The authority of a court to instruct a jury on the ele-
ments of crimes other than charged in an indictment 
usually depends upon lesser-included- and neces-
sarily-included-offense*354 analysis. There are two 
relevant statutes: 
'Upon a charge for a crime consisting of different 
degrees, the jury may find the defendant not guilty 
of the degree charged in the accusatory instrument 
and guilty of any degree inferior thereto or of an at-
tempt to commit the crime or any such inferior de-
gree thereof.' ORS 136.460. 
'In all cases, the defendant may be found guilty of 
any crime the commission of which is necessarily 
included in that with which he is charged in the ac-
cusatory**745 instrument or of an attempt to com-
mit such crime.' ORS 136.465. 
The real problem in this case boils down to determ-
ining what can be considered in deciding whether 
an offense is lesser included or necessarily included 
in that charged: the statutes defining the offenses 
and/or the indictment and/or the evidence at trial. 
It has been pointed out that there is a technical dis-
tinction between 'lesser included' and 'necessarily 
included' offenses, but that courts generally use 
these terms interchangeably. Olais-Castro v. 
United States, 416 F.2d 1155, 11 A.L.R.Fed. 165 
(9th Cir. 1969) . Thus, it has been suggested that 
' necessarily-included ' offense 'denotes a relation-
ship which always exists between two offense cat-
egories * * * regardless of the facts of a particular 
case,' while what is a ' lesser-included ' offense 
Page 4 of5 
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'depends upon particular facts .' 8 Moore's Federal 
Practice, s 31.03 (2d ed. 1969). 
[2] Under the above analysis, in order to determine 
if an offense is 'necessarily included,' a court 
should limit itself to an analysis of the relationship 
between the two offense categories, i.e., the stat-
utory definitions of the offenses. For example, first 
degree burglary, ORS 164.225, is defined as con-
sisting of the acts *355 that constitute second de-
gree burglary, ORS 164.215, plus additional ag-
gravating acts. Thus, second degree burglary is, un-
der the statutes, always a necessarily included of-
fense in a charge of first degree burglary. As anoth-
er example, the various degrees of robbery, ORS 
164.395 to 164.415, would appear to be combina-
tions of the crime of theft, ORS 164.045, 164.055, 
and the various degrees of assault and related of-
fenses,ORS 163.165 to 163.190. Thus, in a robbery 
case both theft and some degree of assault might 
well always be, under the statutes, necessarily in-
cluded offenses. 
[3J Continuing the above analysis, determining 
whether an offense is 'lesser included' presents al-
ternative possible approaches. It has been broadly 
stated that this can depend on 'particular facts,' 8 
Moore's Federal Practice, supra, but does this mean 
that the indictment sets the parameters of these of-
fenses which are lesser included, as argued by the 
state, or that just the evidence can make an offense 
lesser included, as implicitly argued by defendant? 
We believe the better rule is, and hold, that when 
determining whether an offense is lesser included 
the court's consideration should be limited to the 
statutory definition of the offenses and the indict-
ment in the particular case. Our conclusion rests 
primarily on the problem of notice to a criminal de-
fendant of the charges he must be prepared to 
meet. Reading the relevant statutes furnishes notice 
of charges that are included. Reading the relevant 
statutes together with the indictment furni shes no-
tice of the charges that are included in the particular 
case. Permitting instructions on other offenses, 
even if there is evidence at trial that they were com-
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mitted, runs the risk that a criminal defendant *356 
could rightfully complain that he stands convicted 
of an offense he was never notified he might have 
to defend against. As the court put it in Kelly v. 
United States, 125 U.S.App.D.C. 205, 370 F.2d 
227,229 (1966), cert. denied 388 U.S. 913, 87 S.Ct. 
2127,18 L.Ed.2d 1355 (1967): 
'* * * (Defendant's) right to invoke (the lesser in-
cluded offense or necessarily included offense doc-
trines) does not extend beyond the right of the pro-
secutor. The right of the prosecutor is limited to the 
offense of which defendant has been given notice 
by the indictment and the defendant is not suQiect 
to conviction for other offenses because of the 
nature of the proof. What is controlling is the of-
fense char ed in the indictment, not the offense es-
ta Iished by the trial proo , wether it is t e pro~ec­
utOr or defendant who is seeking extensIOn froJ!! · tbe 
offense charged to another offense as 'necesSilrily 
included." 
[4] Turning to the facts at bar, our holding compels 
the conclusion that the trial court could not have in-
structed the jury on the elements of theft at the con-
clusion**746 of defendant's burglary trial. Under 
the statutes, the gravamen of burglary is to enter or 
remain unlawfully in a building with the intent to 
commit a crime therein. ORS 164.215; 164.225. 
Nothing in the statutes puts defendant on notice he 
might be found guilty of theft. The indictment in 
this case reads: 
,* * * 
The said defendant, on or about February 14, 1974, 
in the County of Multnomah, State of Oregon, did 
knowingly and unlawfully enter a building, to-wit: 
a dwelling, located at 5526 Northeast 38th, Port-
land, in the County and State aforesaid, with the in-
tent to commit the crime of theft therein, contrary 
to the Statutes in such cases made and provided, 
and against the peace and dignity of the State of . 
Oregon .. 
'* * * ' 
Page 5 of5 
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*357 Nothing in this indictment puts defendant on 
notic.e that he might be convicted of the crime of 
theft. Cf., State v. Ryan, 15 Or. 572, 16 P. 417 
(1888). 
Affirmed. 
Or.App. 1975. 
State v. Washington 
20 Or.App. 350,531 P.2d 743 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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~,,,,,TE OF IDAHO ) 
County of KOOTENAI )SS 
/;'" ~ ~lJq 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
DOUGLAS AND MICHELLE STAFFORD, } 
} 
Petitioners/Plaintiffs/Appellants, ) Case No. CV 2009 2516 
vs. ) 
) 
KOOTENAI COUNTY, et al. } 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ORDER ON APPEAL 
} 
Respondent/Defendant/Respondent. ) 
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND BACKGROUND. 
This is an administrative review of a decision by the respondent Kootenai County 
Board of County Commissioners (Board) pursuant to the Idaho Administrative 
Procedure Act, I.C. § 67-5201, et seq. Petitioners Douglas and Michelle Stafford 
(Staffords) appeal to this Court from a decision of the Board, which upheld the 
decisions of the Kootenai County Building and Planning Department (Planning 
Department) (R. Vol. III, p. 615-624), which upheld the decision of the Kootenai County 
Hearing Examiner, which found Staffords in violation of Kootenai County Ordinance No; 
374, the "Site Disturbance Ordinance." R. Vol. III, pp. 468-474. 
The Staffords made improvements in the 25-foot buffer area between their 
property and the st)ore of Lake Coeur d'Alene. The Ordinance reads: 
For lots with frontage on a recognized lake or the Coeur d'Alene or 
Spokane Rivers, an undisturbed natural vegetation buffer shaH be. 
retained at the waterfront. A stairway or walkway (which does not exceed 
4 feet in width), stairway landings (which do not exceed 6 feet in width or 
length), or a tram shall be allowed to encroach within the buffer. The 
buffer shall be a minimum of 25 feet in slope or distance from the high 
water mark of the water body ... 130 
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On August 29,2007, the Planning Department issued a Notice of Violation, 
alleging Staffords violated Ordinance No. 374 by causing a site disturbance within the 
25-foot setback. R. Vol. I, p. 5. On March 19, 2008, the Planning Department again 
issued a Notice of Site Disturbance Ordinance Violation (R. Vol. I, p. 136), which 
Staffords timely appealed on March 21,2008. Following the October 2,2008, hearing, 
the Hearing Examiner found Staffords had violated Ordinance No. 374. R. Vol. III, pp. 
468-474. Staffords then appealed to the Board. On February 12,2009, the Board held 
a hearing on Staffords' appeal and issued a written Order of Decision on March 19, 
2009. The Order required, inter alia, a design professional to prepare a remediation 
plan for the no-disturbance zone; the Order was later amended on April 16,2009, 
changing the timeline for compliance. Staffords timely filed a Petition for Judicial 
Review on March 27, 2009, and a First Amended Petition for judicial Review on April 
24,2009. 
Staffords raise three issues on appeal: 
1. Whether the Board's Order denying their appeal was erroneous as a 
matter of law? 
2. Whether the Board's Order denying their appeal was arbitrary, 
capricious, and abuse of discretion, or unsupported by substantial 
evidence in the record? 
3. Whether the County should be estopped from citing Staffords for a 
violation of Ordinance No. 374? 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW. 
The standard governing judicial review in a case involving the Local Land Use 
Planning Act (LLUPA) provides this Court "shall not substitute its judgment for that of 
1 31 
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the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact." Idaho Code § 67-
5279(1). Rather, this Court defers to the agency's findings of fact unless they are 
clearly erroneous. In other words, the agency's factual determinations are binding on 
the reviewing court, even where there is conflicting evidence before the agency, so long 
as the determinations are supported by substantial, competent evidence in the record. 
Fischerv. City of Ketchum, 141 Idaho 349, 352,109 P.3d 1091,1094 (2005). 
A county zoning board is treated as an administrative agency for the purposes 
of judicial review. Chisholm v. Twin Falls, 139 Idaho 131, 75 P.3d 185 (2003). "As 
administrative bodies having expertise in the zoning problems of their jurisdiction, their 
actions are presumptively valid." Gordon Paving Co. v. Blaine Co. Bd. Of Comm'r., 98 
Idaho 730,731,572 P.2d 164, 165 (1977). The reviewing court must Iimitits review to 
the factual record compiled in proceedings before the zoning board. Bone v. City of 
Lewiston, 107 Idaho 844,693 P.2d 1046 (1984). The party that attacks a Board's 
finding must illustrate that the Board erred pursuant to I.C. § 67-5279(3). A Board's 
findings may not: (1) exceed the agency's statutory authority; (2) violate statutory or 
constitutional provisions; (3) be made upon unlawful procedure; (4) not be supported by 
substantial evidence in the record; or (5) be arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of 
discretion; and a substantial right must have been prejudiced. Price v. Payette County 
Bd. of Comm'rs, 131 Idaho 426,429,958 P.2d 583, 587 (1998). 
III. ANALYSIS. 
A. The Board's Decision Sustaining the Violation of Ordinance No. 374 
Was Not Erroneous as a Matter of Law. 
Staffords argue the adoption of Ordinance No. 374 post-dated the conduct that 
gave rise to the violation charged because there is no dispute that the Staffords' actions 
132 
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were performed in 2001, while Ordinance No. 374 came into effect on December 12, 
2005. The Staffords go on to argue Ordinance No. 283, which had been in effect at the 
time of Staffords' actions and contains similar language to Ordinance No. 374, is 
irrelevant to these proceedings because Staffords were not charged under Ordinance 
No. 283, and Ordinance No. 283 no longer exists as the superseding of Ordinance No. 
283 means it was '''obliterated,' 'annulled,' and 'rendered of no force and effect'" by 
adoption of Ordinance No. 374. Petitioners' Opening Brief on Appeal, pp. 12-13. 
Staffords' final argument in this regard is that the Board's determination in this matter 
was contrary to the language of Ordinance No. 374 because there is no evidence the 
acts of the Staffords caused significant adverse effects to property or water and the 
undisturbed natural vegetation buffer promoted by Ordinance No. 374 was previously 
logged, developed and used prior to Staffords' purchase in 1999. Id. 
In response, the Board notes the language of Ordinance Nos. 374 and 283 are 
identical to one another and to their predecessor, Ordinance No. 251, which was 
adopted on October 15,1996, and was in effect until Ordinance No. 283 was adopted 
on July 21, 1999, replacing it. Brief of Respondents, pp. 8-9. The Board argues 
Staffords caused site disturbances, and work to be performed, in the no-disturbance 
zone beginning in the summer of 2001 and the landscaping performed by Staffords 
"within the no-disturbance zone is an ongoing violation of the Site Disturbance 
Ordinance in effect at any given time." Id., pp. 9-10. (emphasis in original). 
The presence of rock bulkheads, waterfalls, manicured lawns, swales, 
sand and boulders all violate this clear mandate, and do so every day they 
continue to be present within this no-disturbance zone, regardless of 
however aesthetically pleasing these features may be. Therefore, it was 
perfectly lawful and appropriate to cite Stafford for an ongoing violation of 
this provision of the Site Disturbance Ordinance currently in effect, 
Ordinance No. 374. 
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Id., p. 10. (emphasis in original). Because of the ongoing nature of the violation, the 
Board claims any argument regarding Ordinance No. 374 superseding Ordinance No. 
283 (and thereby rendering Ordinance No. 283 obliterated or annulled) is moot. Id. In 
this regard, the Board cites the saving clause of the Kootenai County Code, at § 1-2-3, 
which states in relevant part: 
No new ordinance shall be construed or held to repeal a former 
ordinance ... as to any offense committed against such former 
ordinance ... or in any way whatever to affect such offense or act so 
committed or so done, or any penalty, forfeiture or punishment so incurred 
or any right accrued or claim arising before the new ordinance takes 
effect, save only that the proceedings thereafter shall conform to the 
ordinance in force at the time of such proceeding, so far as practicable. 
Kootenai County Code, § 1-2-3, adopted via enactment of Kootenai County Ordinance 
No. 337. Additionally, the Board argues foreign case law has defined "supersede" to 
mean ''to take the place, room, or position of, ... to displace in favor of another" and 
while Ordinance No. 283 had no force and effect beyond December 12, 2005, its being 
superseded by Ordinance No. 374 nevertheless cannot turn unlawful conduct at the 
time of occurrence into lawful conduct. Brief of Respondents, p. 12, citing Pula v. 
State, 40 P.3d 364, 374 (Mont. 2002). Finally, as to Staffords' argument the Board's 
determination is contrary to the language of Ordinance No. 374, the Board argues the 
purpose of the Ordinance (protecting property, surface water and ground water against 
significant adverse effects) does not require a finding of actual significant adverse 
effects to cite a landowner for violation of the requirement to maintain a 25-foot 
undisturbed vegetation buffer from the ordinary high water mark. Id., p. 13. The Board 
argues it acted properly in recognizing that remediation of the site disturbance was 
necessary (due to watering/fertilizing the lawn in the buffer area, and erosion of sand 
placed in the buffer area) regardless of the aesthetically pleasing features of Staffords' 
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additions. Id., pp. 13-14. 
Preliminarily, a public body may not permit a use that is prohibited by a land use 
ordinance. City of Coeur d'Alene v. Simpson, 142 Idaho 839,846,136 P.3d 310,317 
(2006); County of Ada, Board of County Com'rs v. Walter, 96 Idaho 630, 632, 533 P.2d 
1199,1201 (1975) (county commissioners may not allow a use that would violate a 
zoning ordinance); Hubbard v. Canyon County Com'rs, 106 Idaho 436,437,680 P.2d 
537,538 (1984) (county commissioners may not permit an implied variance violative of 
land use ordinances); City of Burley v. McCaslin Lumber Co., 107 Idaho 906, 909, 693 
P.2d 1108,1111 (Ct.App. 1984) (a variance request contemplates no modification of 
the zoning ordinance). As such, the Board has no authority to deviate from the Site 
Disturbance Ordinance. Ordinance No. 251, No. 283, and No. 374 are identical as to 
Section 8(B) of each of those iterations. Section 8(B) of each of those Ordinances 
reads: 
Waterfront Lots For lots with frontage on a recognized lake or the Coeur 
d'Alene or Spokane Rivers, an undisturbed natural vegetation buffer shall 
be retained at the waterfront. A stairway or walkway (which does not 
exceed 4 feet in width), stairway landings (which do not exceed 6 feet in 
width or length), or a tram shall be allowed to encroach within the buffer. 
The buffer shall be a minimum of 25 feet in slope or distance from the 
high water mark of the water body. 
R. pp. 57-58; Appendix to Petitioners' Opening Brief on Appeal, p. 13; R. p. 89. Idaho 
Courts have followed the reasoning of jurisdictions which hold that where an applicant 
has complied with all existing requirements, a public official must issue a building 
permit. Ben Lomond, Inc. v. City of Idaho Falls, 92 Idaho 595, 600-601, 448 P .2d 209, 
214-15 (1968) (discussing State ex rei. Ogden v. City of Bellevue, 45 Wash.2d 492, 
275 P.2d 899 (1954); Sgromolo v. City of Asbury Park, 134 N.J.L. 195, 46 A.2d 661 
(1946». An occupancy permit, however, is likely a matter of discretion. Although no 
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Idaho case law directly on point exists, foreign jurisdictions consistently find issuance of 
a certificate of occupancy as discretionary. See Assoko v. City of New York, 539 
F.Supp.2d 728, 739 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) ("If a building does not conform to the 
requirements for a Certificate, the Commissioner has no discretion to issue one."); 
Collins v. Olin Corp., 418 F.Supp2d 34, 62 (D.Conn., 2006) (Finding no question of 
material fact regarding the fundamentally discretionary nature of issuance of a permit or 
license); Silver v. Franklin Township Board of Zoning Appeals, 966 F.2d 1031, 1034 
(6 th Cir. 1992) (holding plaintiff had not established a substantive due process violation 
because the board had discretion to grant him a permit even if plaintiff complied with 
"minimum, mandatory requirements; therefore, plaintiff had no "justifiable expectation" 
or "legitimate claim of entitlement".) 
Here, Staffords' initial application for building permit was issued in July 1999. 
A.R. Vol. I, p. 28. Staffords' initial certificate of occupancy was granted on March 23, 
2000. Id., pp. 39-40. In 2001, Staffords "cleaned up" their property within the 25 foot 
setback zone; this included re-greening, moving rocks, adding sand, and adding a 
barbeque pit. Petitioners' Opening brief on Appeal, p. 7. In August of 2005, Staffords 
applied for another building permit for an addition to their home; the permit was 
approved in October 2005. R. Vol. I, p. 67. In August of 2007, Staffords requested a 
certificate of occupancy on the addition and the request was denied by letter dated 
January 15, 2008. Id., pp. 113-114. Staffords argue the determination that they 
violated Ordinance No. 374, giving rise to the denial of the certificate of occupancy, was 
improper because the violation was based on "improvements that the Department 
acknowledges were completed in July 2001" and at that time, Ordinance No. 283 was in 
effect, not Ordinance No. 374. Petitioners' Opening Brief on Appeal, p. 8. 
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Again, issuance of a certificate of occupancy is a matter of discretion. 
Additionally, Staffords complaint of being cited for violation of an ordinance not yet in 
effect at the time of their actions, results in no prejudice to Staffords because 
Ordinance No. 374 does not differ in any way from Ordinance No. 283. The language 
and purpose of each consecutive site disturbance ordinance was identical. Staffords 
state, "ft]he charging document which carries criminal penalties, was based solely upon 
Ordinance No. 374." Id., p. 12. 
An ex post facto analysis is inappropriate here. Article I, Section 9, Clause 3 of 
the United States Constitution and Article I, section 16 of the Idaho Constitution prohibit 
ex post facto laws. The clauses prevent enactment of "any statute which punishes as a 
crime an act previously committed, which was innocent when done; which makes more 
burdensome the punishment for a crime, after its commission, or which deprives one 
charged with a crime of any defense available according to law at the time when the act 
was committed ... " Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 42,110 S.Ct. 2715, 2716-17 
(1990) (quoting Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167,169-70,46 S.Ct. 68, 70 (1925»; 
Wheeler v. Idaho Dept. of Health and Welfare, 147 Idaho 257, _, 207 P.3d 988, 993 
(2009). (italics added). 
First of all, the italicized portion demonstrates why this is not an ex post facto 
application. Staffords' actions took place in 2001. At that time Ordinance No. 283 was 
in effect. While Staffords were accused of violating and determined to have violated 
Ordinance No. 374 (the successor ordinance to Ordinance No. 283), in no way does 
that punish Staffords for acts previously committed, "which were innocent when done", 
because Ordinance No. 283 punished the same behavior prior to 2005. 
Second, there is also no evidence before the Court that Ordinance No. 374 
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makes "more burdensome the punishment for the crime [Staffords' violation]" as 
outlined in Col/ins, because even though the ordinance number changed, the potential 
punishment has always remained the same. 
Third, there is no evidence before the Court that the newer ordinance "deprives 
one charged with a crime of any defense available according to law at the time when 
the act was committed", as set forth in Collins. Staffords have simply not identified how 
they were deprived of any defense available according to law at the time their acts were 
committed. 
Fourth, the ex post facto prohibition applies only to criminal or penal, not civil, 
actions. Wheeler, 147 Idaho 257, _, 207 P.3d 988, 993. Staffords argue: 
The County cannot argue that there are any chargeable violations under 
Ordinance No. 374 from and after December 12, 2005 based upon the 
clear language of the ordinance (specifying a prospective effective date), 
and the constitutional prohibitions against ex post facto laws. 
Petitioners' Reply Brief on Appeal, p. 3. Staffords have not set forth support for their 
contention the Kootenai County's site disturbance ordinance is criminal or penal, nor 
have they established that, to the extent the ordinance was intended to be civil, it is 
nonetheless so punitive as to negate that intention. See U.S. v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 
248-49,100 S.Ct. 2636, 2641-42 (1980). Staffords state, "[t)here is no question that 
Ordinance No. 374 is criminal in nature in that it specifically provides that violations may 
constitute criminal misdemeanors punishable by a maximum fine of $300 or six (6) 
months in jail or both." Petitioners' Reply Brief on Appeal, p. 3. (emphasis added). 
First of all, Staffords have never been charged criminally, not that such fact makes or 
does not make such Ordinance criminal in nature. Second, "Violations of this 
Ordinance may be considered a criminal misdemeanor ... " Ordinance No. 374, Section 
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13; R. p. 93. The use of the word "may" makes it discretionary. Most crimes make a 
combination of certain facts (eg., driving and being in control of a vehicle on a public 
highway) a crime. There is nothing discretionary about the following language of I.C. § 
18-8004: "It is unlawful for any person who is under the influence of alcohol, drugs or 
any other intoxicating substances ..... to drive or be in actual physical control of a motor 
vehicle within this state, whether upon a highway, street or bridge, or upon public or 
private property open to the public." (emphasis added). Third, and most importantly, it 
is unlikely that the Kootenai County Ordinance(s) at issue are criminal and/or penal in 
nature, as a remediation plan was proposed to bring the Staffords' property within the 
site disturbance ordinance requirements. See R. Vol. I, pp. 102-104, 111-114. 
Staffords focus much of their argument on the fact that their actions were taken 
back in 2001. This Court is convinced that the Ordinance covers the "status" of 
property, not just the "actions" taken that placed that property out of compliance with 
the Ordinance. This interpretation, that the Ordinance covers the status of property, is 
indicated by phrases such as: " ... an undisturbed natural vegetation buffer shall be 
retained at the waterfront", and ..... shall be allowed to encroach within the buffer." 
Ordinance No. 374, Section 8(8); R. p. 89. (italics added). This interpretation that the 
Ordinance covers the status of property (not simply the actions taken by the landowner 
that created that status), is made clear by the penalties section of the Ordinance. The 
penalties for violation of Ordinance No. 374 are as follows: 
Violations of this Ordinance may be considered a criminal misdemeanor 
and shall be punishable by a maximum fine of three hundred dollars 
($300.00) or six (6) months in jail or both. Each day of violation shall 
constitute a separate offense. The county may also take civil action to 
compel performance and completion of, or maintenance of, improvements 
instal/ed pursuant to this chapter. 
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Ordinance No. 374, Section 13; R. p. 93. (emphasis added). The plain language of 
the penalties section of the ordinance supports the Board's statement that: 
The presence of rock bulkheads, waterfalls, manicured lawns, swales, 
sand and boulders all violate this clear mandate, and do so every day they 
continue to be present within this no-disturbance zone, regardless of 
however aesthetically pleasing these features may be. 
Brief of Respondents, p. 10. Because each day of violation constitutes a separate 
offense, and because the County cannot permit Staffords to engage in a use prohibited 
by an ordinance, see supra, the Staffords' violation of the site-disturbance ordinance 
was properly charged under Ordinance No. 374, despite Staffords' acts having violated 
the Ordinance before December 2005, at a time when Ordinance No. 283 was in effect. 
Staffords' final argument that the Board's determination is contrary to the 
language of Ordinance No. 374 also fails. Staffords' argument is in two parts. 
First, Staffords argue: "The stated purpose of Ordinance No. 374 is "to protect 
property, surface water, and ground water against significant adverse effects from 
excavation, filling, clearing, unstable earthworks, soil erosion, sedimentation, and storm 
water run-off .. .' See AR, Vol. 1, p. 0078." Petitioners' Opening Brief on Appeal, p. 14. 
Staffords argue there was no showing of "significant adverse effects" due to the 
placement of a barbeque pit, lawn sand and basalt rocks . . Petitioners' Opening Brief on 
Appeal, p. 14. Staffords appear to claim that since there has been no showing of 
"significant adverse effects" (the stated purpose of the ordinance), there can be no 
violation of Ordinance No. 374. If the stated purpose of I.C. § 18-8004 is to reduce 
injury and death on the highway caused by drunk drivers, and the statute accomplishes 
that stated purpose by making it illegal to drive while under the influence of alcohol or 
drugs, the prosecuting attorney does not need to prove that the impaired driver would 
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have caused death or injury on the highway. The prosecutor need only prove that the 
person was driving or in control of a vehicle on a highway while impaired. It is the 
status that is the violation of the law, not the stated purpose that is the violation of the 
law. In the present case, the violation is in not having " ... an undisturbed natural 
vegetation buffer. . . retained at the waterfront." Ordinance No. 374, Section 8(8): R. p. 
89. The violation charged is not a violation of the "Purpose" section of that Ordinance, 
Section 3, which reads: "The purpose of this Ordinance shall be to protect property, 
surface water, and ground water against significant adverse effects from excavation, 
filling, clearing, unstable earthworks, soil erosion, sedimentation, and stormwater runoff 
and to provide maximum safety in the development and design of building sites, roads, 
and other service amenities." 
Second, Staffords argue that logging and development which took place prior to 
Staffords' purchase of the property results in there not having been an "undisturbed 
natural vegetation buffer" in place when Staffords bought the property in 1999. 
Petitioners' Opening Brief on Appeal, pp. 14-15. Staffords' argument is that since the 
25-foot setback zone had already been logged, developed and used before Staffords 
bought the property in 1999, and " . .. since the purpose of leaving an undisturbed natural 
vegetation buffer is to preclude development activity, then that purpose is irrelevant 
when development activity has already occurred." Id. Essentially, Staffords argue they 
can't have violated the Ordinance by disturbing the natural vegetation buffer (by 
Staffords planting grass, placing sand and rocks, building a barbecue pit), because 
some prior owner before them had disturbed the natural vegetation buffer in different 
ways (by logging and placing slash in this strip). That argument is simply not 
supportable. Ordinance No. 374, Section 4, specifically defines "Undisturbed Natural 
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Vegetation Buffer" as: 
An area where no development activity has occurred or will occur 
including, but not limited to, logging, construction of utility trenches, roads, 
structures or surface and storm water facilities. Buffer areas shall be left 
in their natural state. 
Given the "or" language used in the definition, it appears the ordiriance, which requires 
"an undisturbed vegetation buffer shall be retained at the waterfront", prohibits 
development activity from occurring prospectively as well as retroactively. Thus, again, 
the Board is correct in noting a violation of Ordinance No. 374 has occurred each day 
forward from the ordinance's enaction in December 2005. To the extent -a prior owner 
engaged in logging and other development activities on that buffer zone, the ordinance 
nonetheless prohibits development activity which "will occur" and Staffords' actions 
beginning in 2001 amounts to activity which occurred regardless of the previous 
owners' development activity having already occurred before their purchase of the 
property. One also needs to look at where the phrase "natural vegetation buffer" is 
used, and that is in Section 8(B) of these ordinances, specifically Ordinance No. 374. 
Under that section, for waterfront lots, " ... an undisturbed natural vegetation buffer shall 
be retained at the waterfront." Under this Ordinance, the landowner has a duty to retain 
twenty-five feet of "undisturbed natural vegetation". There is no possible way to 
construe that Ordinance to mean that if some prior landowner has previously come in 
and "disturbed" the area, that fact means all bets are off and the current landowner can 
disregard the Ordinance and "disturb" that area even more, or "disturb" it in a different 
way. Such an interpretation is neither supported by any rule of statutory construction, 
nor by logic. 
/ 
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.,. 
B. The Board's Decision Was Not Arbitrary, Capricious, an Abuse of 
Discretion, or Unsupported by Substantial Evidence in the Record. 
Staffords argue only, "the Board's application of the Ordinance [No. 374] to the 
facts at bar was arbitrary, capricious, and to the extent necessary, constituted an abuse 
of discretion" for the reasons Staffords articulated in their argument above. Petitioners' 
Opening Brief on Appeal, p. 15. In response, the Board states: 
... [T]he undisputed evidence in the record shows that a violation of the 
no-disturbance zone mandate of the Site Disturbance Ordinance currently 
exists on the Stafford property. Therefore, the Board's decision that the 
Department properly issued a citation to Stafford for violating the Site 
Disturbance Ordinance was based on substantial evidence in the record 
as a whole. 
Brief of Respondent, p. 15. 
As noted by the Board, even where there is conflicting evidence before an 
agency, the agency's factual determinations are binding on the reviewing court as long 
as they are supported by substantial competent evidence in the record. Lane Ranch 
Partnership v. City of Sun Valley, 144 Idaho 584.590, 166 P.3d 374, 380 (2007). 
SUbstantial and competent evidence is "relevant evidence which a reasonable mind 
might accept to support a conclusion." Lamar Corp. v. City of Twin Falls, 133 Idaho 36, 
43. 981 P.2d 1146. 1153 (1999). In the instant case, the Board made nine findings of 
fact. A.R. Vol. III, pp. 619-20. The Board discussed the first and second applications 
for building permits and certificates of occupancy and the presence of an unpermitted 
waterfall, manicured lawn, bulkhead, swales and sand in the no-disturbance zone. Id. 
There is no support for the contention that the evidence considered by the Board was 
not relevant evidence a reasonable mind may accept to support the conclusion 
reached. Lamar Corp., 133 Idaho 36,43. 981 P.2d1146, 1153. And even Staffords do 
not make the claim that they engaged in no development within the twenty-five-foot 
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setback area. Staffords readily admit they cleaned-up their property, including areas 
within the setback, and added sand, re-greened, and added a barbecue pit. Petitioners' 
Opening Brief on Appeal, p. 7. It follows that the Board did not act in an arbitrary or 
capricious manner or abuse its discretion in reaching its conclusion. And rather than 
merely affirming the Notice of Violation, the Board ordered Staffords "shall submit and 
receive approval for a Site Disturbance remediation plan and pay all associated fees." 
A.R. Vol. III, p. 623. The record does not indicate any attempt by the County to enforce 
the penalties Staffords identify as criminal for the violation at issue. 
C. The County Should Not Be Estopped from Citing Staffords for a 
Violation of Ordinance No. 374. 
Staffords' final argument is that the County be estopped, under the unique facts 
of this case, from charging Staffords with a violation of an Ordinance which post-dates 
the offenses charged. Petitioners' Opening Brief on Appeal, pp. 16-17. Staffords admit 
the doctrine of estoppel generally does not apply to governmental agencies, but argue 
"the people in their collective and sovereign capacity ought to observe the same rules of 
honesty and fair dealing that is expected of a private citizen, and should no more be 
allowed to lull a citizen to repose and confidence in what would otherwise be false and 
erroneous position than should a private citizen." Id., p. 15, citing Murtaugh Highway 
Dist. V. Twin Falls Highway Dist., 65 Idaho 260, 142 P.2d 579 (1943). The Board cites 
Idaho case law setting forth the "extraordinary circumstances" rule regarding estoppel 
against governmental entities. Harrell v. City of Lewiston, 95 Idaho 243,506 P.2d 470 
(1973); Sprenger, Grubb & assoc. v. City of Hailey, 127 Idaho 576, 903 P.2d 741 
(1995); Terrazas v. Blaine County, 147 Idaho 193,198, 207 P.3d 169 (2009). 
As in Terrazas, Staffords here do not explicitly identify whether the doctrine of 
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equitable estoppel or quasi-estoppel is applicable. Equitable estoppel elements are: (1) 
a false representation or concealment of a material fact; (2) that the party asserting 
estoppel did not know or could not have known; (3) the false representation being made 
with the intent that it be relied-upon; and (4) actual reliance and action on the 
representation or concealment to the party's detriment. Williams v. Blakely, 114 Idaho 
323,325,757 P.2d 186, 188 (1987). Quasi-estoppel, on the other hand, applies where: 
(1) the offending party took a position different than their original position; and (2) either 
(a) the offending party gained an advantage or caused a disadvantage to the other 
party or (b) the other party was induced to change positions or (c) it would be 
unconscionable to permit the offending party to maintain an inconsistent position from 
one he or she already derived a benefit from or acquiesced in. Allen v. Reynolds, 145 
Idaho 807, 812,186 P.3d 663,668 (2008). Here, there is no allegation of any false 
representation or concealment of a material fact. Thus, it is likely Staffords are invoking 
the doctrine of quasi-estoppel. As in Terrazas, it cannot be said the Board here took 
inconsistent positions; determination that Staffords' actions took place in the twenty-five 
foot setback zone has been the only official position taken and there is no evidence 
Staffords were induced to change their position. "If this Court were to apply the 
doctrine of estoppel in the instant case, then all future boards of commissioners in 
similar circumstances would be estopped from disagreeing with the opinions of a staff 
member simply because a landowner expended money in reliance on these opinions." 
Terrazas, 147 Idaho 193, _, 207 P.3d 169, 177. (Discussing statutory authority to 
approve or deny subdivision applications). And, as stated above, the Board had no 
authority to permit Staffords to engage in an action prohibited by ordinance. See City of 
Coeur d'Alene v. Simpson, 142 Idaho 839,846,136 P.3d 310,317; County of Ada, 
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Board of County Com'rs v. Walter, 96 Idaho 630, 632, 533 P.2d 1199, 1201; Hubbard 
v. Canyon County Com'rs, 106 Idaho 436,437,680 P.2d 537, 538; City of Burley v. 
McCaslin Lumber Co., 107 Idaho 906,909,693 P.2d 1108, 1111. There is no evidence 
of any advantage inuring to the County as a result of its affirming a Notice of Violation. 
Therefore, it cannot be said the County maintained an inconsistent position from one it 
already derived a benefit from. Nor was there any acquiescence in Staffords' second 
building permit of request for certificate of occupancy as the Board states, "no plans 
[were] shown for any development of activity within the no-disturbance zone." AR. Vol. 
III, p. 619. Under these facts, Staffords have not shown the exigent circumstances 
(which the parties in Harrell, Spenger, Grubb & Assoc., and Terrazas were all also 
unable to demonstrate) and the application of estoppel is, likewise, not warranted here. 
IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER. 
For the reasons stated above, the Board's decision must be affirmed. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED the March 19,2009, Findings of Fact, Applicable 
Legal Standards, Conclusions of Law and Order of Decision of the Board (Petition for 
Judicial Review, p. 6, ~ 27; First Amended Petition for Judicial Review, p. 6, 1f 26, 
Exhibit A to Petition for Judicial Review; Exhibit A to First Amended Petition for Judicial 
Review), rejecting Stafford's appeal and finding a violation under Ordinance 374 (R. 
VoL III, pp. 615-624) is AFFIRMED. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED the April 16,2009, Amended Findings of Fact, 
Applicable Legal Standards, Conclusions of Law and Order of Decision of the Board 
(First Amended Petition for Judicial Review, p. 6, 1f 26, Exhibit B), rejecting Stafford's 
Appeal and finding a violation under Ordinance 374 (R. Vol. III, p. 628-636) is also 
AFFIRMED. 
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Entered this 2nd day of December, 2009. 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON APPEAL 
I Lawyer 
Patrick M. Braden 
Fax# /' 
446-1621 . 
JneCiaUSefl: Deputy Clerk 
147 Page 18 
.. 
JOHN F. MAGNUSON 
Attorney at Law 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
DOUGLAS AND MICHELLE 
STAFFORD, husband and wife, 
PlaintiffslPetitioners, 
vs. 
KOOTENAI COUNTY, a Political 
Subdivision of the State ofIdaho, acting 
through the KOOTENAI BOARD OF 
COMMISSIONERS; and ELMER R. 
"RICK" CURRIE, RICH PIAZZA, and 
TODD TONDEE, COMMISSIONERS, in 
their official capacities, 
Defendants/Respondents. 
CASE NO.: 09-2516 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
FEE CATEGORY: L 
FEE: $101 
TO: RESPONDENTS/DEFENDANTS KOOTENAI COUNTY, a political subdivision 
of the State of Idaho, acting through the KOOTENAI BOARD OF 
COMMISSIONERS; and ELMERR. "RICK" CURRlE, RICH PIAZZA, and TODD 
TONDEE, COMMISSIONERS, in their official capacities, 
AND TO: YOUR ATTORNEY OF RECORD, SCOTT W. REED. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that: 
1. The above-named Appellants, Douglas and Michelle Stafford, appeal against the 
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above-named Respondents, Kootenai County, a political subdivision of the State ofldaho, acting 
through the Kootenai Board of Commissioners; and Elmer R. "Rick" Currie, Rich Piazza, and Todd 
Tondee, Commissioners, in their official capacities, from the following order and judgment entered 
in Kootenai County Case No. CV-09-2516 by the District Court, the Honorable John T. Mitchell 
presiding: Memorandum Decision and Order on Appeal (entered December 2, 2009). 
2. Appellants have a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court pursuant to Idaho 
Appellate Rule II(a)(2). 
3. The issues on appeal shall include, but not be limited to, the following: 
(a) Whether the Kootenai County Board of Commissioners' Order 
denying the Staffords' appeal was erroneous as a matter of law? 
(b) Whether the Kootenai County Board of Commissioners' Order 
denying the Staffords' appeal was arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse 
of discretion? 
(c) Whether the Kootenai County Board of Commissioners' Order 
denying the Staffords' appeal was unsupported by substantial 
evidence on the record as a whole? 
(d) Whether Kootenai County should be estopped from citing Staffords 
for a violation of Ordinance No. 374? 
( e) Whether the District Court erred in affirming the March 19, 2009 and 
April 16, 2009 Findings and Conclusions of the Kootenai County 
Commissioners? 
4. Is a reporter's transcript requested? No. 
5. The Appellants request that the following documents be included in the Clerk's 
Record in addition to those automatically included under IAR 28: 
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NUMBER DOCUMENT TITLE FILEDIENTERED 
1 Petition for Judicial Review March 27, 2009 
2 First Amended Petition for Review Apri127,2009 
3 Memorandum Decision and Order on Appeal December 2, 2009 
6. Appellants Stafford also request that, since this proceeding represents an appeal from 
an administrative decision for the Kootenai County Board of Commissioners (pursuant to the Local 
Land Use Planning Act, IC. §67-6521 and the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act, Ie. §§67-5270 
through 67-5277), that the administrative record of proceedings before the County, lodged with the 
District Court, be included in the record on appeal. 
7. I certify: 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
DATED this 
A copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served upon the Reporter; 
The estimated fee for preparation of the Clerk's Record 
($100) has been or will be paid contemporaneously herewith; 
Service has been made on all parties required to be served pursuant 
to IAR 20; and 
That the Appellate filing fee has been paid. 
13 ;tz.,aay of January, 2010. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was served upon the 
following as indicated and addressed below this '3 f7i--day of January, 2010: 
t 
Patrick M. Braden, Deputy Attorney Daniel English 
Kootenai County Dept. of Legal Services Clerk of the District Court 
451 Government Way 501 Government Way, Caller 9000 
P.O. Box 9000 Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-9000 FIRST-CLASS MAIL 
HAND DELIVERY 
STAFFORD.APPEAL.wpd 
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_;TATE OF IDAHO } C 
COUNTY OF KOOTI=NAJ \.. 
FILED: JAN 14 20 (() 
AT g; 2. S-- O'CLOCK A-
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICt K, DISTRICT~~URT 
~~~~~~~~~~~( THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTE 
DOUGLAS AND MICHELLE STAFFORD 
husband and wife, ) 
Plaintiffs/Appellants 
VS 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
KOOTNEAI COUNTY, a Poiltical Subdivision of ) 
The State OfIdaho, acting through the KOOTENAI ) 
BOARD OF COMMISIONERS; AND ELMER ) 
R. "RICK" CURRIE, RICH PIAZZA, and TODD ) 
TONDEE, COMMISIONERS, in their official ) 
capacities, ) 
DefendantslRespondents 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Appeal from: First Judicial District, Kootenai County. 
Honorable: John T. Mitchell, Presiding 
Case Number from Court or agency: CV -09-2516 
CNIL CASE NUMBER 
CV-09-2S16 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
OF APPEAL 
Order or Judgment appealed from: Memorandum Decision And Order On Appeal of 
December 2, 2009 
Attorney for Appellant: John F. Magnuson 
Attorney for Respondent: Patrick M. Braden, Deputy Attorney 
Notice of Appeal Filed: January 13 , 2010 
Notice of Cross-Appeal Filed: N/ A 
152 
tbr~ 
Appellant Fee Paid: Paid 
Request for additional (clerk's) (agency's) record filed: No 
Request for additional reporter's transcript filed: No 
Name of Court Reporter: Julie Foland 
Was reporter's transcript requested? Yes 
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Dated: January 14,2010 
DANIEL 1. ENGLISH 
Clerk of District Court 
bY:~~~ 
Deputy 
EXHIBITS LIST 
Clerk's Transcript Record - Volumes 1 of 1 
Agency's Record - Volumes 1 thru 7 
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IN THE SUPPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
DOUGLAS AND MICHELLE STAFFORD, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs/Petitioners, 
vs 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
KOOTENAI COUNTY, a Political Subdivision of ) 
the State of Idaho, acting through the KOOTENAI ) 
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS; and ELMER R. ) 
"RICK" CURRIE, RICH PIAZZA, and TODD ) 
TONDEE, COMMISSIONERS, in their official ) 
capacities, ) 
Defendants/Respondents. ) 
) 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
SUPREME COURT NO. 
37320-2010 
I, Daniel J. English, Clerk of the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, in and for the County of Kootenai, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing 
record in the above entitled cause was compiled and bound under my direction as, and is 
a true, full and correct record of the pleadings and documents under Rule 28 of the Idaho 
Appellate Rules. 
I further certify that exhibits were offered in this case. 
I certify that the Attorneys for the Petitioners and Respondents were notified that the 
Clerk's Record was complete and ready to be picked up, or if the attorney is out of town, 
the copies were mailed by U.S. mail, postage prepaid. on the _ day of 
February, 2010. 
I do further certify that the Clerk's Record will be duly lodged with the Clerk of the 
Supreme Court. 
In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said Court at 
,) 
Kootenai County, Idaho this""::" day of Febr'uary, 2010. 
DANIEL J. ENGLISH 
. Clerk of the DistricJ: Court 
, ;;,~ \. ,i f, h:I \ ') j ·:'kJ?r~\:.,·~Z < , }: 
oeputY Cl¢rk" ',,-
